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This thesis aimed to contribute to the existing literature exploring distinctively human 
cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, the aim was to investigate whether, and how, the 
distinctively human propensity for understanding the mental states of others (referred 
to commonly in the literature as ‘theory of mind’) facilitates cumulative cultural 
evolution. The general methodology used throughout this thesis involved grid search 
tasks in which participants searched for stimuli using vicarious information generated 
from a participant who had already attempted the same grid search. The first 
experimental chapter in this thesis explored the suitability of the grid search task for 
capturing search behaviour in response to vicarious information about search 
outcomes. The second experimental chapter explored adult transmission behaviour, 
and whether small amounts of intentionally produced information could facilitate 
cumulative culture relative to small amounts of inadvertently produced information. 
This methodology was extended to a sample of children in Chapter 4 in order to assess 
whether the ability to intentionally select beneficial information to facilitate cumulative 
culture increases with age. The final experimental chapter explored a similar task 
context, but instead of manipulating downward transmissions, manipulated upward 
transmissions to assess whether feedback from successors influences the quality of 
information sent by the predecessor. Together these studies explored the ability (which 
may be distinctive to humans) to tailor transmitted information to the needs of a 
specific receiver in order to best facilitate the retention of beneficial knowledge. 
This thesis found that the sharing of intentionally selected knowledge is sufficient for 
generating cumulative cultural evolution over generations, relative to circumstances 
where only inadvertent cues about a predecessor’s performance is available. 
Furthermore, the developmental trajectory found in this capacity suggests that it may 
be supported by distinctively human cognitive mechanisms. We believe that capacities 
for understanding others’ minds were responsible for the successful performance of 
the adults and older children in the transmission chain tasks, and we argue for the 
logical plausibility of this interpretation. However, other alternative interpretations of 
our results remain possible, and these are also discussed, along with potential future 
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Clarification of terminologies used 
Throughout this thesis I will use several terms to describe the roles of the individuals 
taking part in these tasks and the direction of communicative transmissions between 
them.  
In all cases, any pair of participants who interact directly with one another include an 
experienced individual (who has completed their own attempt at the task), and a naïve 
individual (who has not yet completed their own attempt at the task). These members 
represent the predecessor and successor (respectively) in a cultural chain. To make 
these terms clear and consistent for all chapters, I will refer to the experienced 
predecessor as the ‘cultural parent’, and I will refer to the naïve successor as the 
‘cultural offspring’. In circumstances where information from a cultural parent is not 
generated by a human participant (e.g., in Chapter 2 where information was computer-
generated rather than using real participant data), I will refer to this as the ‘parent 
model’.  
The direction of transmission (particularly relevant for Chapter 5) refers to whether a 
transmission is made from the cultural parent to the cultural offspring, or vice versa. 
Information transmitted from cultural parent to cultural offspring is referred to as 
‘downward transmission’, and information transmitted from cultural offspring to 
cultural parent is referred to as ‘upward transmission’.  
The terms ‘intentional knowledge sharing’, ‘intentional knowledge transmission’, 
intentional information sharing’, ‘intentional information transmission’ and ‘teaching’ 
are all used, relatively interchangeably, to mean the deliberate sending of known 
information to a cultural offspring. Use of these terms was decided based on the 
appropriateness to the context each time.  
Finally, throughout this thesis I refer to ‘mental state understanding’, however, similar 
terms (‘theory of mind’, ‘mental state inference’, ‘mentalizing’, ‘mindreading’ etc.) are 
also used commonly throughout the literature to mean the same thing. In some 
context-dependant cases, however, some of the other terms are used within this thesis. 
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Chapter 1:  General Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Opening Remarks 
The purpose of this review is to explain how human capacities for understanding the 
mental states of others could potentially help us to understand key differences 
between human and non-human culture. This chapter will argue for a facilitatory effect 
of mental state understanding in distinctively human cumulative culture, and briefly 
introduce the methods used to test this theory in the following chapters of this thesis. 
First, I will discuss the evidence for cumulative culture, and its supporting capacities, in 
non-humans, as well as pinpointing what about it is specifically unique to humans. Then 
I will discuss the uniqueness of mental state understanding to humans, including the 
emergence of mental state understanding (as measured using ‘elicited’ responses) in 
human development, and claims of capacities present in non-humans and infants 
(identified using ‘spontaneous’ response methods). This section will go on to discuss the 
arguments that refute the claims of mental state understanding based on the 
spontaneous measures, and will argue that it is specifically the mechanisms of 
metarepresentational understanding that emerge around age 4 (consistent with results 
using elicited responses) that support cumulative culture. This theme will be continued 
in the following section with a discussion of the mechanisms directly supporting 
cumulative culture (flexible use of social learning strategies; flexible teaching; 
intentional bidirectional communication) and how the use of these mechanisms is 
made possible by maintaining and comparing representations of other minds. Finally, I 
will discuss the current experimental methods used to examine cumulative culture in a 
lab setting, and how use of an abstract, computer-based task will be used to investigate 
the link between mental state understanding and cumulative culture in the following 





1.2  The extent to which cumulative cultural evolution is unique to humans  
Humans are the only species that unambiguously exhibit ‘cumulative cultural evolution’ 
- a phenomenon that produces the accumulation of beneficial traits including 
behaviours and artefacts, such that they become more effective or efficient over time 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2008b; Dean et al., 2014). This is achieved when traits are cycled 
through repeated social transmissions over generations of learners, with adaptive, 
beneficial traits being retained, and maladaptive traits being pruned. It is very common 
for humans to generate technology and complex systems that could only be the result 
of repeated transmission (see Basalla (1988)). Even seemingly early artefacts of human 
culture have been found to have become more complex and multipurpose as a result of 
cumulative culture, as evidenced from the evolution of Oldowan stone tools (Lycett & 
Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2013).  
The retention and accumulation of adaptive traits (the ‘ratchet effect’, (Tennie, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, 1999)) is a key characteristic of cumulative culture that 
allows improvement of performance over generations. As such, many generations of 
transmission ultimately lead to traits that are far beyond the creative abilities of a single 
generation (Tomasello et al., 1993). In some cases, such accumulation can lead to the 
origins and underlying mechanisms becoming opaque to later generations 
(Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2016).  
Many non-human species have been found to socially transmit information within 
populations, leading to distinct community variations in cultural traits. Examples include 
geographically distinct dialects in yellowhammers (Podos & Warren, 2007), and whale 
song (Garland et al., 2011), as well as variations in the use of tools between crow 
populations (Holzhaider et al., 2010), and foraging techniques and grooming in 
chimpanzee populations (Whiten et al., 1999; Whiten & Van Schaik, 2007). However, 
despite the commonality of culture across species, the evidence of cumulative culture 
in any non-human species is questionable. 
There have, however, been some claims of cumulative culture in non-humans, derived 
from evidence of human-like transmission and trait emergence in a variety of non-
human primate species. Examples include experimental studies of chimpanzees (Vale et 
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al., 2017) and baboons (Claidière et al., 2014), and naturalistic observations of Japanese 
macaques (Schofield et al., 2018). There is also supporting evidence from naturalistic 
observations in the non-primate literature, for example, Hunt & Gray (2003) found that 
New-Caledonian crows were capable of developing complex foraging tools by adapting 
earlier designs to increase durability. In this study, the social transmission of the tool 
designs was not empirically tested, and rather only implied by the design’s uptake by 
the wider population of birds. However, empirical evidence has been found in other 
species. For example, social transmission leading to increased knowledge of beneficial 
foraging areas has been found to influence migratory behaviour of wild ungulates such 
as bighorn sheep and moose (Jesmer et al., 2018).  
The above examples all contribute to the growing literature that both humans and non-
humans satisfy the basic criterion for cumulative culture, i.e., the transmission and 
accumulation of beneficial traits over generations. However, there is still a general 
consensus that cumulative culture takes a distinctive form in humans, leading to an 
increased complexity of human cultures in comparison (Boyd & Richerson, 1996). 
Reasons proposed for this advanced cumulative culture in humans have generally 
focused on social learning mechanisms that may also be unique, thus opening up access 
to sources of information that are only available if these unique mechanisms are also in 
place. However, there is growing speculation as to whether these proposed supporting 
capacities really are unique to humans, which calls into question their proposed role as 
sufficient prerequisites for cumulative culture. 
 
Imitation 
Imitation (which here, consistent with other literature in this field, is defined as action-
copying) occurs when an individual is able to perform a new behaviour as a result of 
seeing another individual perform that behaviour (Heyes, 1993). Copying the actions of 
others serves to facilitate the acquisition of new skills, and doing so selectively based on 
the outcome of other’s actions (i.e., copying only successful actions of others) has been 
argued to form the basis for cumulative culture (Tomasello et al., 1993). As such, 
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action-copying has been attributed as a central feature of human culture (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1996; Lewis & Laland, 2012). 
One of the most prominent arguments for action-copying as a facilitator of cumulative 
culture concerns apparent differences in this ability, between humans and non-
humans. Call et al. (2005) and Tennie et al. (2009) argued that non-human social 
learning involves the reproduction of only the outcomes of actions (‘product-copying’), 
whereas humans can reproduce the actual actions used to reach the outcome 
(‘process-copying’). It is this process-copying that is said to boost understanding of what 
is required to achieve the outcome, thus resulting in the high-fidelity transfer of 
information. High fidelity information transfer (i.e., the accurate copying of actions 
responsible for cumulative culture) is argued to be largely responsible for cumulative 
culture because information that is transferred with accuracy requires much less trial 
and error on part of the receiver (Tomasello, 1999).  
This distinction in action-copying is supported by studies demonstrating that 
chimpanzees will adopt product-copying in circumstances where causal information 
about the outcome is clear, whereas human children will copy the actions of a 
demonstrator regardless of clarity (Horner & Whiten, 2005). Humans of all ages, but 
not non-humans, are often found to overimitate, that is, copying irrelevant actions of 
others even when they know that they are not necessary to achieve the desired 
outcome (Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2011). Such behaviour suggests 
inferences have been made about the intentions of the actions, since copying irrelevant 
actions does not help to achieve the physical outcome, but may achieve some 
additional goal regarding the processes involved. 
However, process-copying has been demonstrated in many non-human species using 
the ‘do as I do’ paradigm, in which participants are trained to copy the action of an 
agent, and after training is complete, a novel action is produced. If participants copy the 
novel action, action-copying is said to have taken place. This has been found to varying 
degrees in many species including chimpanzees (Custance et al., 1995), orangutans 
(Call, 2001) and dogs (Topál et al., 2006), suggesting action-copying is not exclusive to 
humans or primates more generally. Furthermore, there are examples of both human 
children and chimpanzees successfully learning how to complete a task, but only 
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following social demonstrations, as opposed to a ghost display that shows the process 
of achievement without a social demonstrator (Hopper et al., 2007, 2010). This 
suggests that, at least to some degree, non-humans do rely on process-coping, which 
calls into question its relevance for cumulative culture. 
In addition to the evidence that suggests both humans and non-humans are similarly 
capable of process-copying, there is also growing evidence that this capacity is not 
necessary for cumulative culture to occur. Caldwell & Millen (2009) found that 
cumulative culture can occur in circumstances where only access to product-copying 
was available, and thus process-copying is unlikely to be a (sole, at least) contributor to 
distinctively human cumulative culture.  
 
Innovation 
Even if the capacity to imitate is present, without modification, traits cannot evolve 
either in terms of refinement or complexity, therefore innovative modifications are 
necessarily critical to the process of cumulative culture (Enquist et al., 2008). As such, 
innovation has been suggested as a driver of human unique cumulative culture because 
it allows an individual to build on the performance of others over and above what can 
be achieved in populations of non-humans (Vaesen, 2012). While innovation can occur 
through spontaneous and unintentional production of a novel behavioural variant (e.g., 
as a result of errors in transmission), those cases most likely to contribute to cumulative 
culture are often considered to be driven by problem solving, whether it’s finding a 
novel solution to a new problem, or an old problem using behavioural modifications 
that were not previously available (Kummer & Goodall, 2012; Reader & Laland, 2003).  
However, there exists some evidence suggesting innovation is not unique to humans. 
Anecdotal examples of innovative behaviour in non-human populations include, but are 
not limited to, birds adapting migratory behaviours to avoid starvation (Sol et al., 2005; 
Sol et al., 2005), food washing practises in Japanese macaques (Kawai, 1965), and 
lemurs using their tail to reach and soak up drinking water (Hosey et al., 1997).  
Rather than capturing innovation as a novel variant on behaviour, experimental studies 
focus more on the ability to spontaneously and adaptively switch behaviours to favour a 
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more suitable one following a change in circumstance. This has revealed some 
propensity for innovation in terms of the flexibility of foraging techniques in great apes 
(Manrique et al., 2013), lemurs (Dean et al., 2011) and starlings (Boogert et al., 2008).  
Therefore, given that innovation is regularly seen in non-humans, there is good reason 
believe that something else is restricting cumulative culture in non-human populations.  
 
Behavioural Conservatism and Flexibility 
Another capacity that has been considered as a driver of cumulative culture is flexible 
solution switching. Having this capacity means that when a behaviour is not particularly 
efficient (such as eating soup using a fork – not impossible, but very slow), it can be 
rejected in favour of a more beneficial alternative (eating soup using a spoon).  
While humans are very good at switching solutions, non-humans have been argued to 
be more conservative, meaning they have difficulty switching solutions even if a better 
solution is available (Dean et al., 2014). There are numerous reports of great apes 
retaining a known solution to a problem, even when a novel and more efficient strategy 
is presented to them (Gruber, 2016; Hopper et al., 2011; Hrubesch et al., 2009; 
Marshall-Pescini & Whiten, 2008). As such, behavioural conservatism has been 
suggested to be a barrier to successful cumulative culture in non-human populations. 
However, there have been some reports suggesting some non-humans do show a 
degree of flexibility in their problem solutions, and they do not always perseverate with 
the responses they have performed previously. For example, Dean et al. (2012) found 
that chimpanzees continued to explore the features of a puzzle box even after they had 
developed a solution, suggesting that they were open to the possibility of an 
alternative. Lehner et al. (2011) found the same exploratory behaviour in captive 
orangutans, extending to them switching to a more beneficial solution if they found 
one. As such, it cannot be surely stated that behavioural conservatism is what restricts 
cumulative culture in non-humans. 
In summary, the claims that cumulative culture is enhanced in humans because of an 
increased potential for imitation and/or innovation, or restricted in non-humans 
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because of behavioural conservatism are not supported fully by empirical evidence. In 
at least some contexts, non-humans have been found to imitate, innovate and 
overcome behavioural conservatism, indicating that the absence of cumulative culture 
in non-human species cannot be attributed to any of these capacities alone. However, 
there are still seemingly human-unique capacities that have yet to be explored in 
relation to cumulative culture. It is specifically the cognitive capacities found to emerge 
in typically developing humans at around 4 years of age, that are particularly promising 
as a potential explanation for the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture. In this 
thesis, I explore one of these capacities - mental state understanding - as a possible 
supporting capacity, that may be responsible for revolutionizing social learning and 
cumulative culture in humans. In the following section, I discuss the evidence that 
mental state understanding is unique to humans, and further evidence that it is 
potentially linked to cumulative cultural evolution. 
 
1.3  The extent to which mental state understanding is unique to humans 
1.3.1  The historical context of mental state understanding research 
Mental state understanding refers to the ability to attribute mental states to, or infer 
mental states of others. This includes making reasoned inferences about states such as 
knowledge, desires and beliefs, in the absence of explicit signals (such as being verbally 
told they exist) (Premack & Woodruff, 1978a; Spaulding, 2020).  
The earliest study to explore mental state understanding investigated chimpanzees’ 
ability to attribute goals to human agents by assessing their ability to identify the tool 
needed for the experimenter to complete a task (Premack & Woodruff, 1978a). 
However, the interpretation of this study was controversial, with claims emerging 
shortly afterwards that chimpanzees’ success in this task could be explained more 
parsimoniously by associative learning (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1978). This would 
mean that goal attribution in these circumstances was not connected to mental state 
reasoning, and that chimpanzees were forming associations between the objects and 
the agent’s actions, which does not require any understanding of intentionality, beliefs 
or desires (Gergely & Csibra, 1997).  
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Since the aforementioned early work, there has been long and extensive debate about 
whether mental state inference is unique to humans, and in what way. Some argue that 
mental state understanding is a cognitive mechanism that is not available to non-
humans, or human children under 4 years of age, however there is extensive debate 
about whether this is the case. The controversy surrounding mental state attribution in 
both non-humans and human children exists mainly because the conclusions drawn 
from empirical tests depends strongly on the methodology used. These methods are 
broadly categorised into ‘elicited’ and ‘spontaneous’ measures. In some of the existing 
literature, these measures are referred to as ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ respectively, 
however, because these labels imply that mental state understanding operates at two 
distinct levels (i.e., just one of the several theoretical viewpoints regarding the 
contrasting results), the following sections will refer to these measures as ‘elicited’ and 
‘spontaneous’. These terms accurately distinguish the studies discussed, and are more 
theoretically neutral than other labels. Elicited measures include those which require a 
verbal or motor response, such as a point, usually in response to a question which 
directly addresses understanding. Spontaneous measures, on the other hand, include 
responses that do not require such a deliberate answer, for example, examination of 
eye movements. From these (broadly involuntary) responses, inferences are made 
about the cognitive processing that is likely to have produced them. Only humans over 
the age of 4 years are reliably found to pass elicited tests of mental state understanding 
such as false belief reasoning tests (section 1.3.2), however, claims of the ability to 
understand mental states in younger children and non-humans has emerged from the 
results of spontaneous tests. The following section will review the methodologies for 
testing mental state understanding and consider their validity in accurately assessing it. 
Table 1 summarises some high-profile claims for mental state understanding in child 
and non-human populations under the methodologies discussed. This table highlights 
key studies and is not intended to reflect a comprehensive record of the literature.
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Table 1     
Summary of experimental tests claiming to capture mental state understanding in human and non-human populations.  
 
Traditional False Belief tasks 


















An age-related increase was found in the ability to 
correctly identify location of search based on false 








et al. (1985) 
Typically developing, but not autistic children were 
able to correctly identify the location that the agent 









Scores in a nonverbal false belief task correlated 
with a verbal false belief task – children at 4 years 





Krachun et al. 
(2009) 
Children responded correctly in both true and false 














Infants looked for longer at a scene when the 
agent’s actions did not match the child’s knowledge 






Surian et al. 
(2007) 
Infants looked for longer at a scene when the 
agent’s actions did not match the child’s knowledge 






Song et al. 
(2008) 
Infants looked for longer at a scene when the 
agent’s actions did not match the child’s knowledge 







Kovacs et al. 
(2010) 
Replication study of Onishi and Baillargeon: Both 7-
month-olds and adults looked longer at the scene 
when the agent’s belief (true or false) was not 






Träuble et al. 
(2010) 
Children looked for longer at an agent’s reach that 







et al. (2013) 
Infants took the agent’s perspective into account 





 Yott & Poulin-
Dubois (2016) 
Neither age group indicated false belief 
understanding by looking for longer at a scene 
when the agent’s actions did not match the child’s 
knowledge of the agent’s belief. 
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 Powell et al. 
(2018) 
Found no evidence that 18-month-old’ children’s 
expectations about an agent’s beliefs were violated 
when the agent’s actions did not match the child’s 




& Yott (2017) 
No indication of false belief understanding by 
looking longer at a scene when the agent’s actions 
did not match the child’s knowledge of the agent’s 
belief. 
No inter-task correlation found between tasks 












Anticipatory looks to correct locations indicated use 
of implicit mental state understanding rather than 
alternative explanations (associative 








Children correctly looked in anticipation to the 







 Senju et al. 
(2009) 
Neurotypical adults, but not adults with Asperger’s 
syndrome, spontaneously anticipated the action of 







 Schneider et 
al. (2012) 
Adult’s anticipatory looking suggested that they 
follow the beliefs of the agent without being 









17-month-olds but not 11-month-olds anticipated 
the actions of a shape agent (triangle) using 







Low & Watts 
(2013) 
All age groups correctly anticipated the actions of 
others, signalled by anticipatory looking. Only 4-
year-olds and adults were able to make verbal 
predictions about the agent’s actions.  
Adult 
humans 
 Kulke et al. 
(2018) 
Failed to replicate using the methodology of 
anticipatory looking results of the following studies: 
(Low & Watts, 2013; Schneider et al., 2012; Senju 




 Dörrenberg et 
al. (2018) 
Failure to replicate direct test of second-order false 





 Burnside et al. 
(2018) 
No age group demonstrated a clear understanding 
of false beliefs through anticipatory looking.  
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 Kulke et al. 
(2019) 
No anticipatory looking behaviours found, except 
for in second-order false belief understanding in 
adults.  
 
Inconsistent patterns of belief tracking in usually 





 Call & 
Tomasello 
(1999) 
Apes selected locations by touching. None passed 
the false belief task. 
Chimpanzee 
Bonobo 
 Krachun et al. 
(2009) 
Apes always reached for the location that the agent 
reached for – so they were correct in true beliefs, 
but incorrect in false beliefs. Face orientation 
indicated some possibly implicit cues, but this was 







 Krupenye et al. 
(2016) 
All apes looked in anticipation to the location 
where they expected the agent to search for an 




 Kano et al. 
(2019) 
All apes subscribed a false belief if they witnessed 
the act that caused the false belief to happen.  
 Japanese 
Macaques 
 Hayashi et al. 
(2020) 
Macaques anticipated false-belief guided actions 






 Marticorena et 
al. (2011) 
Looking times were no different in expected and 
unexpected events. Failed to replicate the Onishi 
and Baillargeon paradigm in non-humans.  
Rhesus 
Macaques 
 Martin & 
Santos (2014) 
Macaques looked for longer at events that violated 
their own expectations about the location of the 
object, but their looking time was not affected by 
an agent’s belief, suggesting they did not 
spontaneously track other’s beliefs.  
Unexpected 
Contents 




Perner et al. 
(1987) 
Children correctly attributed a false belief to an 
agent at 4 years of age, but younger age groups 








Children were able to consider representations 
from another’s perspective based on their false 
belief from 4 years of age.  






Krachun et al. 
(2010) 
Developmental progression was found for false 
belief understanding in children (performance was 
below chance at 3.5 years of age, but above chance 
at 4.5 years of age). 
Chimpanzees spontaneous looking behaviours 
showed no evidence that they were capable of 




Goal Attribution tasks 







Citation Main finding 














By 18 months, children were found to consider an 
agent’s belief when interpreting their goal. Also found 







 Gergely et al. 
(1995) 
Children looked for longer at a scene when the agent’s 




Chimpanzee  Premack & 
Woodruff 
(1978b) 
Chimpanzees were found to reach for objects required 
by an actor when those objects were out of reach to 




 Buttelmann et 
al. (2017) 
Used the same experimental paradigm as Buttelmann 
et al. (2009) with non-human primates. Found that 
apes behaved in the same way towards an agent’s 




Chimpanzee  Uller & Nichols 
(2000) 
Used the same methodology as Gergely et al. (1995) 
to demonstrate that chimpanzees looked for longer at 
a scene when the agent’s action is irrational based on 
their perceived goal. 
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1.3.2  Explicit measures identifying the capacity for mental state 
understanding in children from 4 years of age 
False belief attribution tasks 
Elicited response tasks are direct measures, in that they require a response to a direct 
understanding-based question. Elicited tests of false beliefs typically set the age of 
mental state attribution at around 4 years of age, with children under this threshold 
reliably found to respond incorrectly to test questions.  
The gold standard test of mental state understanding is widely regarded to be the false 
belief attribution paradigm. These tasks require a participant to make an inference 
about an agent’s belief that is different from their own. False belief attribution tasks 
were initially conceptualized by Dennett (1978), and first implemented using child 
participants by Wimmer & Perner (1983) in the ‘unexpected transfer task’ (Figure 1). In 
this task, a child is shown a scene with two characters (for all similar examples in this 
chapter, these characters will be referred to as ‘agent X’ and ‘agent Y)’. Agent X hides 
an object in location A before leaving the scene. In the absence of the agent X, agent Y 
displaces the hidden object to location B. When the agent X returns, the child is asked 
‘where will agent X look for the object’. The child can either verbally express or point to 
a location to give their answer. Here, children are being asked to make an inference 
about the agent X’s belief about the object’s location, and if they have a capacity for 
mental state understanding, they should therefore correctly infer that the agent X has a 
false belief by stating that they believe the object to be in location A. Both Wimmer & 
Perner (1983) and Baron-cohen et al. (1985) found that neurotypical children become 
capable of correctly answering only at around the age of 4 years (Of course, it is worth 
noting that there is some individual variation with this, as some children pass the test as 
early as 3 years and others as old as 5 years). Prior to acquiring this ability, children 
typically respond (incorrectly) with the actual location of the target object (location B). 
Therefore, the younger children appear to fail to understand that agent X should falsely 


























  Agent Y                          Agent X   
This is Agent X and Agent Y.  
Agent Y has a blue box. 
Agent X has a red box. 
 
Agent X has a marble. 
Agent X puts the marble in her red box. 
 
Agent X goes for a walk. 
 
Agent Y takes the marble out of the red 
box and puts it in the blue box. 
 
Now Agent X has come back.  






A related paradigm, the ‘unexpected contents task’ (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Perner 
et al., 1987) demonstrates that children under 4 years of age also fail to attribute false 
beliefs to themselves. In this paradigm, the child is given an opaque container labelled 
to contain sweets. When the child is asked what is inside the container, they correctly 
(according to the only piece of evidence available) answer “sweets”. The container is 
then opened to reveal its actual contents – some pencils. When asked what their friend 
will think is inside, children under 4 years of age typically answer egocentrically, 
claiming their naïve friend will share their knowledge that what’s inside is pencils. 
Interestingly, when knowledgeable children are asked to recall what they originally 
thought was in the tube, they also answer “pencils”. Therefore, not only are they 
unable to attach a false belief to someone else, but they are also unable to attach a 
false belief to their past self. This is in line with research reporting that children will 
claim they have always held knowledge that they had just learned, which holds true 
until around the age of 5 years (Taylor et al., 1994). 
Due to the requirement of classic tests of elicited false beliefs to include verbal 
communication with the participant, such studies have not been implemented in 
infants, or in non-human primates. Given that no conclusions can be drawn about these 
populations in classic elicited response tests, simplified spontaneous response 
measures have been used to assess the presence of mental state understanding in 
these populations.  
While some argue that elicited false belief tasks are the only way to demonstrate 
mental state understanding (Gomez, 2004), others argue that an earlier developing 
mental state understanding mechanism in children under 4 years of age might indicate 
an earlier development of mental state understanding, measured in a way that is not 
affected by inhibitory control (Leslie, 2005) or limited executive function (Rubio-
Fernández & Geurts, 2013). The following section discusses tests using spontaneous 
response measures of mental state understanding in non-humans and children under 4 




1.3.3  Spontaneous measures identifying the capacity for mental state 
understanding in non-humans and children under 4 years of age 
Evidence for mental state understanding in young children (under 4 years of age) 
emerges from the same methodology that claims to find evidence in non-humans. Of 
course, viable evidence of mental state understanding in both populations would have 
considerable implications for our understanding of cumulative culture. Demonstrating 
the use of mental state understanding in children under the threshold 4 years could 
suggest that adult-like mental state understanding is merely enhanced, rather than 
enabled by later developing mechanisms, which could bring into question its seemingly 
important role in cumulative culture. Similarly, a presence of mental state 
understanding in non-human populations would call into question claims that it is a 
distinctively human mechanism, and its role in cumulative culture would be unlikely to 
be what sets it apart from the capacity in humans. However, such claims are based on 
controversial spontaneous response measures, which, unlike the directness of elicited 
measures, rely on inference about participant understanding on the part of the 
experimenter. As such, spontaneous response measures are more open to 
interpretation than elicited response measures, and it is entirely possible that the 
results of these tasks pick up false positives that may have come about for reasons 
other than the participant reasoning about mental states. Furthermore, it could be 
argued that even if these tasks really do capture mental state understanding, this may 
be unlikely to be beneficial to cumulative culture relative to an understanding which 
can be subjected to explicit reasoning about others’ knowledge. The following section 
assesses the spontaneous response measures used to test mental state understanding 






1.3.4  Evidence of mental state understanding in non-humans and very 
young children  
Tactical deception 
Non-human mental state understanding is commonly associated with tactical deception 
tasks, which typically demonstrate a non-human primate acting in a certain way that 
appears to cause a false belief in another. On the surface, tactical deception creates a 
convincing basis for arguing that mental state understanding is present in non-humans 
– after all, to deceive, the deceiver has to be aware that another agent can have a mind 
state that differs from their own, and an understanding of how they can behave to 
manipulate that mind state. However it is also possible, and highly likely, that the 
behaviour seen in non-humans in these tasks is resting on mechanisms other than 
mental state understanding.  
There is substantially more evidence of tactical intent to deceive in non-human 
primates relative to human children (Byrne & Whiten, 1992). Non-human primates are 
seen to deceive by withholding the location of food (Hirata & Matsuzawa, 2001; Melis 
et al., 2006), producing gaze and movement cues to manipulate others to attend sites 
of low reward to free up space at a site of high reward (Hall et al., 2017) and by using 
alarm calls to distract other’s from acquiring food (Wheeler, 2009)). Despite this wealth 
of compelling evidence that non-human primates may be capable of mind reading with 
intent to deceive, their behavior could be explained as having occurred by chance, or by 
use of alternative mechanisms such as trial-and-error learning based on previously 
experienced similar situations (Heyes, 1998).  
 
Measuring eye gaze 
False belief tasks have been adapted to explore potentially successful attribution of 
mental states in non-humans, and children under the age of 4 years. These adapted 
tasks typically measure spontaneous cues from eye movements to infer children’s 
expectations about where an agent will search for a hidden object. Eye movement 
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recording therefore expands the false belief paradigm by allowing assessment of non-
verbal participants, and assessment of involuntary responses.  
Anticipatory looking in unexpected transfer tasks has been used to study children too 
young to pass the tests which use elicited responses. This spontaneous understanding is 
assumed based on the child’s direction of gaze during the task, such that gaze towards 
a location indicates that the child expects some activity to occur at that location. 
Looking in anticipation has been demonstrated in 2-year-old children, in the absence of 
any explicit response (Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; Southgate et al., 2007), leading to 
claims that children are able to attribute false beliefs to agents much earlier than they 
are able to explicitly demonstrate this capacity. 
Anticipatory looking tasks are primarily used because they can be easily adapted for use 
with non-humans, while preserving the basic logic of the unexpected transfer task 
(Kano et al., 2017). One of the most recent studies to be carried out in non-humans, 
implemented by Krupenye et al. (2016), used a scene layout adapted from the 
traditional unexpected transfer task, whereby an agent hides an object, only to have it 
displaced by another agent in their absence. When the hider comes back, the 
participant’s direction of gaze gives a spontaneous cue to where they expect the hider 
will search for their hidden object. In this task, apes, including chimpanzees, bonobos 
and orangutans, were found to reliably look at the location the hider originally placed 
the object, rather than the location it was last seen by the participant. This suggests 
that apes may have some understanding of the protagonist’s belief about the object 
location. More recently, the same paradigm has been used to demonstrate similar 
performance in Japanese macaque monkeys (Hayashi et al., 2020).  
One of the most convincing studies of mental state understanding in children under 4 
years of age was conducted by Clements & Perner (1994). The main difference between 
this study and other spontaneous tests is that the child’s response (a look in 
anticipation) was made following an explicit prompt from the experimenter (e.g., “I 
wonder where he’s going to look?”). This means that the child’s response is open to 
much less interpretation than other studies, which rely on children following the story 
on their own. Interestingly, this study only found anticipatory looking from children at 
around 3 years of age, preceding elicited mental state understanding much more 
33 
 
closely than other tests requiring a spontaneous response. This calls into question the 
validity of similar tests that find positive results for anticipatory looking from much 
younger children.  
 
Looking times 
Evaluation of gaze to assess reasoning about mental states is not limited to anticipatory 
gaze. It is also possible to measure looking time, for example, the length of time a 
participant spends attending to a scene, or feature of a scene. This measure requires a 
similar task structure to the anticipatory looking tasks, however, instead of assessing 
the direction of gaze before an event, it measures the duration of gaze following an 
event. A longer duration of gaze indicates that something has occurred that does not 
match the participant’s expectations, and a shorter gaze indicates dismissal due to the 
participant’s expectations matching the outcome of the event. These tasks have led to 
claims that very young children, from the age of 3 months are capable of detecting 
events that are unexpected (Spelke et al., 1992). 
Looking times are therefore used to assess an infant’s reaction to unexpected events, 
with longer looking times indicating surprise (i.e., a violation of expectation) at an event 
that did not have the outcome that matched to the expected outcome based on earlier 
activity in the scene. Holding an expectation about an agent’s behaviours is assumed to 
require some level of mental state understanding to represent an agent’s goal, and to 
distinguish behaviours that are consistent with their goal (i.e., rational actions) from 
those that are not consistent with their goal (i.e., irrational, unexpected actions). 
Gergely et al. (1995) illustrated the ‘violation of expectation paradigm’ by habituating 
participants to a visual scene of a ball character moving from the left side of the screen 
to the right by jumping over a visible obstacle (the jump being a rational action), or 
jumping over an invisible obstacle (the jump being an irrational action in the absence of 
the obstacle). Participants were then shown two test events with no obstacle – one 
where the ball moved to the other side of the scene along the floor without jumping, 
and another where the ball moved to the other side of the screen by jumping over an 
invisible obstacle. Participants who observed the ball character being rational in the 
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habituation phase were expected to predict that the ball character will move to the 
other side of the screen in the most rational way in the test event, evidenced by a 
reduced looking time. This was the case – children at around 12 months of age spent 
much longer looking at scenes where the ball character made an irrational jump 
compared with scenes when the ball character moved without jumping. This suggests 
that these children had some expectation about the character’s goal-directed 
behaviour based on their behaviour in the habituation event, as well as the agent’s 
intention – which is only to move to the right side of the scene. Using an adapted 
version of the same task, Uller & Nichols (2000) found the same result as in the 
chimpanzees, suggesting that they were also able to attribute the correct goal to the 
moving agent. While goal attribution may be a feature of mental state understanding, 
however, it is not clear from these tasks whether infants or chimpanzees could 
recognise circumstances where the agent has a different goal, or belief, to their own.  
Violation of expectation has been assessed in a similar context to the traditional 
unexpected transfer task, revealing false belief attribution in children as young as 15 
months of age (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), and distinction between self and other 
beliefs in children aged 13 months (Surian et al., 2007). Furthermore, using this task 
design, children aged between 14 and 18 months have been claimed to be able to 
update their knowledge of other’s beliefs, for example, Song et al. (2008) found that 
when the protagonist of the unexpected transfer scene was given information about 
the correct location of their object following its displacement, 18-month-old children 
looked for longer at the event when the agent searched in the empty location, 
suggesting the children had updated their understanding of the protagonist’s 
knowledge. To check that this effect was not related to the child’s own visual access 
(i.e., updating their own knowledge rather than the protagonist’s), Poulin-Dubois et al. 
(2013) used an adapted version of the unexpected transfer task used by Onishi & 
Baillargeon (2005), in which the protagonist was blindfolded during the search. With 
regards to looking times, children showed no expectations about where the protagonist 
would search, suggesting that infants were disregarding their own visual access to take 





Despite the controversy surrounding goal attribution, a compelling contribution to the 
mental state understanding literature has been made by use of the active helping 
paradigm, the basic principles of which involve a participant appropriately assisting an 
agent with a potentially differing goal. Supporters of this paradigm argue that active 
behavioural response to the unexpected transfer task carries more weight than visual 
response measures. For example, Buttelmann et al. (2009) claimed that visual response 
tasks only indicate that the child recognises something is unusual, rather than 
identifying what it is they find unusual, meaning that it is possible that these tasks do 
not require an understanding of mental states. In an active helping task, Buttelmann et 
al. (2009) found that by 18 months, children will attempt to assist an agent with their 
goal, in ways that depend on the belief the agent holds about the location of an object 
in the unexpected transfer task. To successfully assist the agent, the child must have 
some understanding of the agent’s goal, and belief about the location of the object. For 
example, if the agent holds a false belief and searches location A (i.e., the original 
location of the object before displacement), the child will help them look for the toy in 
location B (i.e., the true location of the object after displacement). However, if the 
agent holds a true belief that the object is in location B, but they search location A, the 
child will help to search in location A, assuming that their true belief about the object 
being in location B means that their goal is not to locate the object. In a later study, 
Buttelmann et al. (2017) found that great apes (including chimpanzees, bonobos and 
orangutans) also performed similarly to children in these tasks, apparently successfully 
applying an understanding of false beliefs.  
 
1.3.5  Failures to replicate classic spontaneous tests 
Recent evidence has emerged suggesting that many of the tasks using spontaneous 
measures do not produce reliable results. Many researchers have now attempted to 
replicate previous studies, failing to find the same results, sometimes using larger 
samples. Furthermore, different measures, such as anticipatory looking and violation of 
expectation, do not appear to reliably capture the same results at the same ages, 
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indicating a lack of convergent validity. Failures to reproduce key results have been 
found in direct replications of both human infant (Kulke et al., 2019; Kulke & Rakoczy, 
2018) and non-human primate (Horschler et al., 2020) studies, and conceptual 
replications (close, but not exact replications) (Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Poulin-Dubois & 
Yott, 2017; Powell et al., 2018; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). Furthermore, a large 
number of unpublished studies have been collated by Kulke & Rakoczy (2018), many 
stating a failure to replicate using both direct and indirect measures.  
 
1.4. Alternative explanations for the results found in implicit tests 
The previous section outlined some of the experimental claims for spontaneous mental 
state understanding in non-humans and in young children, however these claims are 
based on methodologies that rely on inference about behaviours rather than explicit 
evidence that these behaviours are caused by an understanding of other’s mental 
states. As such, these tests are not without controversy, even setting aside the 
aforementioned replication problems. The following section will discuss some of the 
dissenting voices contributing to the wide variety of alternative, non-mentalistic 
explanations for the positive results found in these populations. 
In a recent article, Quesque & Rossetti (2020) stated two main criteria that should be 
met by measures of mental state understanding. Firstly, it should be clear that 
respondents maintain a distinction between their own and other’s mind states. 
Secondly, success on a task cannot be accounted for by lower level processes such as 
arbitrary attention orientation and associative learning. However, it is entirely possible 
that all of the examples of spontaneous mental state understanding discussed above 
can be explained using simpler alternative mechanisms that do not require mental state 
inference.  
One of these mechanisms, proposed by Povinelli & Vonk (2004), details a parsimonious 
system whereby inferences about others are derived from observable behaviours 
alone. This system states that social interaction only very occasionally involves 
generating inferences about mental states. The vast majority of inferences are derived 
from reading the behaviours of others, and associations between these behaviour and 
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the environment (i.e., associative learning). Associative learning, which is generally 
found to be ubiquitous in all animal species, can account for the majority of behaviours 
usually attributed to mindreading (Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Heyes, 2012). Heyes (1998) 
stated that in every study claiming non-human primates have an understanding of 
mental states, the behaviour could have occurred by associative learning or other non-
mentalistic capacities such as behaviour reading. Infrequent mental state inference 
(i.e., in rare situations where reading behaviour is not sufficient) may occur in human 
adults, but it is likely that human infants and perhaps non-humans rely on behaviour 
reading mechanisms even in cases where it may appear that they are applying an 
understanding of mental states. 
Others argue that the results found in tests of spontaneous mental state understanding 
capture the ‘teleological stance’ (Gergely & Csibra, 1997, 2003). Teleology refers to 
action interpretation based on reality alone. This is done using ‘the principle of rational 
action’, which assumes that the agent will act only to fulfil their goal by the most 
efficient way possible. This is thought to involve the representation of actions using 
three relevant situational aspects, each of which represents a non-mentalistic concept: 
the agent’s action, the agent’s goal, and environmental constraints. Infants may be able 
to make a non-mentalistic inference about one of the three situational aspects if they 
have access to information about the other two, for example, in the violation of 
expectation task, knowing the goal of the agent and the environmental constraints, 
infants are able to predict an efficient action.  
While teleology does, in theory, stand as a potential mechanism for predicting actions, 
goals or environmental constraints in children with immature mental state 
understanding, a lack of direct empirical support for these claims means that its use as 
an alternative explanation must be treated with some caution (Juvrud & Gredebäck, 
2020). Furthermore, it has been proposed that any experiment effective enough to test 
for mental state understanding independently from behaviour reading, associative 
learning or teleology (i.e., elicited response tests) would not be suitable for use with 
any non-human or human infant due to the cognitive demands necessary to glean the 
desired response (van der Vaart & Hemelrijk, 2014; Buckner, 2014). 
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One of the highest-profile alternative explanations is the ‘two-systems theory’, which 
suggests that children and non-humans passing spontaneous-response tests of mental 
state understanding are doing so using an entirely different system for inferring other 
minds than human adults. Apperly & Butterfill (2009) proposed that mental state 
understanding develops in at least two distinct systems, one of which develops earlier 
and elicits the automatic but limited response seen in young children and non-humans 
(system-one), and the other later developing system, which allows access to more 
flexible processes that neither of these populations have (system-two). The crucial 
difference between these systems is in their representational capacity. For example, 
while a young child using system-one can recognise whether an agent can see an 
object, only children using system-two can form a representation of how an agent can 
see an object, including distinguishing when the agent’s representation differs from 
their own.  
Experimental examinations have found evidence of a separate automatic system for 
perspective taking in adults (Furlanetto et al., 2016; Qureshi et al., 2010; Samson et al., 
2010), although see Cole et al. (2016) and Conway et al. (2017) for an alternative 
explanation). However, the results of these studies have been attributed to 
‘submentalizing’ (Heyes, 2014), which claims participants in these tasks use behavioural 
cues rather than applying mental state understanding. This theory has been supported 
by evidence suggesting that the same automatic perspective taking effect is found 
when character agents are replaced with arrows (Santiesteban et al., 2014). As it 
stands, there is no conclusive evidence that adult humans have access to system-one, 
and therefore, there is limited support for the two-systems theory. Of course, as noted 
previously, even if there is an early, but limited, capacity for mental state understanding 
(as would be consistent with the two-systems theory), it is unlikely that the level of 
understanding achievable using simpler systems would be sufficient to underlie the 
behaviours required to facilitate cumulative culture. 
The current section has outlined some of the alternative explanations proposed for the 
positive results found for mental state understanding tests in non-humans and very 
young children. Alongside the failures to replicate studies testing for mental state 
understanding using spontaneous measures, alternative non-mentalistic explanations 
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for positive results add weight to the idea that reasoning about mental states (which 
may be critical for cumulative culture, as we will argue below) is not present in non-
humans, nor very young children. In contrast, tests of mental state understanding that 
use elicited responses are relatively uncontroversial, and remain consistent with 
theories claiming that 4 years of age is a key milestone in cognitive development. The 
following section will discuss further evidence in support of these claims.  
 
1.5  Further evidence of age 4 as a key cognitive milestone 
Meta-representational flexibility  
Given the wealth of evidence suggesting that tests of spontaneous mental state 
understanding may not be capturing the same capacity in young children and non-
humans that is seen in children over 4 years of age and adults, it appears that this age 
represents a key milestone in distinctively human cognitive development. Tests of 
meta-representational flexibility further support the significance of this developmental 
milestone, with evidence suggesting that older children are able to adopt a kind of 
flexibility of reasoning that is not available to younger children. This adds weight to the 
idea that the age at which children pass elicited response false belief tasks reflects a 
real change in their conceptual understanding.  
Tests of meta-representational understanding typically measure the ability to hold 
multiple representations of the same object/person, and the ability to flexibly switch 
between these representations. It makes logical sense that holding multiple 
representations of the same person or object is a fundamental requirement for passing 
the unexpected transfer test (which requires a representation of both reality and the 
agent’s false belief). However, to understand that someone else may hold a different 
number of representations than oneself, one must first have an understanding that an 
object can be represented in several ways.  
Children under 4 years of age typically struggle to recognise more than one label for an 
object. Supporting evidence of children’s difficulty with holding multiple 
representations is found in the ‘ambiguous figures’ test (Doherty & Wimmer, 2005). An 
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ambiguous figure is a picture that can be fully interpreted in more than way. For 
example, the shape in Figure 2 can be viewed as either a duck or a rabbit. While it’s 
possible for adults and older children to freely switch from rabbit to duck and back 
again, for children below the age of acquisition for mental state understanding, this is 
problematic even in circumstances where they are aware of both possible 
interpretations. This demonstrates that children under 4 years of age are unable to 
represent an object as two things at once. Acquisition of this meta-representational 
understanding indicates the emergence of higher-level cognitive skills that support 
human-unique culture.  
 
Figure 2 
Recreated stimuli from the ambiguous figures test, adapted from Doherty & Wimmer 
(2005) 
 
Note. Participants are shown the image in the green box, which could be seen as a 
rabbit’s face or a duck’s face. Images of the full duck and rabbit are included here to 
demonstrate how the ambiguous figure could fit both interpretations.  
 
The cognitive turning point at 4 years of age is also measured using tests of more 
general attentional flexibility and cognitive control, for example, in the ability to see the 
same object as belonging to more than one dimension, and flexibly switching between 
them. This capacity is evaluated using the dimensional change card sort task (Figure 3; 
Zelazo et al., 1996), which generally finds that children are able to do this effectively by 
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5 years of age. In this task, children are given test cards depicting coloured objects 
(such as ‘blue tortoise’, and ‘red cactus’) and categories in which to sort those cards 
(such as boxes labelled with a picture of a blue cactus and red tortoise). First, the child 
is asked to sort the cards by one dimension, for example, by type, so the cactus goes in 
the cactus box and the tortoise in the tortoise box regardless of colour. Afterwards, 
children are asked to switch dimension, and sort by colour. Now, the cactus belongs in 
the tortoise box and the tortoise belongs in the cactus box. While 5-year-olds and the 
majority of 4-year-olds are able to do this without any difficulty, 3-year-olds perform 
poorly, unable to switch dimensions after the initial sorting, indicating perseveration 
with the original sorting method, despite being able to correctly state the new rule. It 
should be noted that the difficulty children have is specifically with the switching 
element, not with any particular sorting method (Zelazo, 2006). This contributes to the 
argument that children’s general flexibility of perspective is immature before the age of 
4 years.  
 
Figure 3 
Recreated stimuli from the dimension change card sort task, adapted from Zelazo et al. 
(1996) 
 
Note. The participant is asked to sort by one dimension (in this case, type, indicated by 
the arrows), and then will be asked to sort by the other dimension (colour).  
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1.6  Development of mental state understanding and related capacities 
beyond 4 years of age 
While it is widely accepted that the 4-year milestone carries a cognitive turning point in 
human development, there is evidence to suggest that the capacities emerging at this 
age continue to develop much later into childhood. As such, children who have reached 
the 4-year milestone may have access to basic forms of adult-like capacities such as 
‘first-order’ mental state understanding, but they may not have access to higher orders 
of mental state understanding until they are older (Doherty, 2008). These higher orders 
allow more complex reasoning about beliefs. The first-order belief reasoning captured 
in the standard false belief task allows reasoning of scenarios like the following, against 
real circumstances: 
 
“Liz believes that the sock is in the green drawer”. 
 
As such, a child can represent Liz’s belief about the sock’s location even if the sock is in 
the red drawer. Higher-order reasoning allows additional layers of belief representation 
to be added to this, for example, ‘second-order’ belief reasoning would allow an 
understanding of the following: 
 
“Mark believes that Liz believes that the sock is in the green drawer”. 
 
Testing for second order mental state understanding has proved challenging, 
particularly in terms of capturing age differences in adult samples (Oesch & Dunbar, 
2017). In an early study using an adapted traditional false belief task, Perner & Wimmer 
(1985) found that second-order false belief understanding becomes accessible to 
children at around the age of 7 years (although see Sullivan et al. (1994) for a simplified 
version capturing this capacity in 6-year-olds). Even more recent studies have used a 
similar paradigm (involving 3 agents in the standard false belief task) to capture a third 
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order, revealing that even more complex reasoning emerges between 14 and 20 years 
(Valle et al., 2015). Of course, as the anecdotes used in these tests become more 
complex, it bears consideration of whether a lack of evidence at certain ages is caused 
by the language in the task materials being syntactically complex.  
Further studies attempting to capture mental state understanding in older children and 
adults include measures that test the ability to reason about abstract behaviours 
(strange stories test; Happé (1994)), or taking other’s perspectives (Newcombe & 
Huttenlocher, 1992; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). An early study reported a continual 
development of second-order perspective-taking up until the age of 8 years (Salatas & 
Flavell, 1976), however more recent research revealed further refinement (i.e., making 
fewer errors) up to the age of 27 years (Dumontheil et al., 2010).  
The evidence for further developing mental state understanding into adolescence 
suggests that there may be further capacities that rely on this more complex reasoning 
coming into fruition at around the same time. This means that 4 years of age is not 
necessarily the point at which humans become capable of adult-like reasoning, 
including the level that is required for cumulative culture. However, it is likely that the 
age of 4 years is the point at which humans start to develop these distinctive 
mechanisms. The following section will review evidence that suggests mental state 
understanding, more generally, is a key prerequisite for cumulative culture. 
 
1.7  Mental state understanding as a key capacity for cumulative cultural 
evolution 
The previous section established that the only convincing evidence of mental state 
understanding is in humans – specifically those over the age of 4 years. The cognitive 
turning point at 4 years of age is supported by a wealth of claims stating that not only 
are there alternative explanations for earlier developing mental state understanding, 
but that the tests showing an early mental state understanding fail to replicate. This is 
critical from the perspective of investigating mental state understanding as a key factor 
facilitating distinctively human cumulative culture, because claims of early development 
are based on evidence analogous to that used to make claims of mental state 
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understanding in non-human primates. This would therefore bring to light the idea that 
it could be mental state understanding that distinguishes human from non-human 
culture. However, arguments for the uniqueness of human capacities for mental state 
understanding are not the only reasons to believe that it could be implicated in 
cumulative culture. There are also logical arguments that can be made for why and how 
capacities for mental state understanding might fundamentally alter cultural 
transmission, in such a way that beneficial modifications are more likely to be 
preserved, further transmitted, and modified further in advantageous ways. This 
section therefore explains how mental state understanding, specifically the distinctive 
mechanism found in humans over the age of 4 years, could be a key cognitive 
prerequisite for cumulative culture. 
 
Flexible use of social learning strategies 
Having access to mental state understanding allows application of reasoned 
understanding about others and why they make, or do not make, good models for 
learning. Of course, exhibiting preferences for good models for learning does not 
necessarily require mental state understanding - there are many examples of non-
humans using ‘social learning strategies’ to achieve the same result in some 
circumstances (Laland, 2004). Social learning strategies are rules that guide who to 
learn from, such as ‘copy when uncertain’, ‘copy the most experienced’, or ‘copy the 
majority’. 
Heyes & Pearce (2015) argued that all non-human social learning, and likely a great deal 
of human social learning, is dependent on general-purpose associative learning. 
Associative learning processes are not driven by understanding, but rather heuristic 
biases (that is, forming a positive association that favours copying a successful model as 
a result of their connection with reward, e.g., food). However, there are instances in 
which humans use ‘explicitly metacognitive’ social learning strategies, which are 
reportable rules that consciously represent properties of the user’s or other’s mental 
states and other cognitive processes. Recent support has emerged for a developmental 
trajectory of explicitly metacognitive social learning. Blakey et al. (under review) tested 
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children between the age of 4 and 8 years using a task in which children had to select 
one of two agents to give them information about a scene that only one of the agents 
had visual access to. It was found that older children selected a knowledgeable 
informant (i.e., the agent who had visual access to the scene) from whom to learn more 
often than younger children, suggesting that the older children were likely to have used 
some reasoning about perceptual access, and thus the knowledge held by the agents.  
It is thus proposed that humans’ distinctive propensity for flexible, selective social 
learning drives cumulative culture. That is, selectively using social learning strategies 
when they are most required, such as in cases when beneficial outcomes are opaque 
(such as manufacturing processes for safe food preparation (Henrich & Broesch, 2011)), 
and coupling this with asocial interaction with the environment (Galef, 1995). 
Therefore, having an understanding of mental states allows humans to make accurate 
representations of what they themselves know, and also what others know, in order to 
make an informed decision about when to seek information from a knowledgeable 
model (including making decisions about what to transmit about their own knowledge, 
see below), and when to rely on trial and error learning, or innovation (Heyes, 2016). 
This method is much more effective in the context of cumulative culture compared with 
biases that are driven by associative learning. 
 
Flexible teaching 
Mental state understanding is not just a useful tool used to read more from behaviour 
of others, but also to tailor signals to the receiver of information. This is an essential 
feature of intentional teaching, which requires information to be transmitted from a 
knowledgeable source to a naive source. Even without restrictions on time, it would be 
impossible for a cultural parent to transmit every detail of the knowledge they have to 
the cultural offspring, and therefore it is beneficial for the cultural parent to transmit 
the information to the cultural offspring in a way that inspires extended, general-
purpose learning , that, in such a way that helps them to fill in the gaps. In this sense, 
teaching can form the basis for accumulation over time.  
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The evidence of teaching in non-humans is restricted only to instances of information 
transmission whereby a cultural parent actively supports the transmission of 
information that will promote enduring traits in a cultural offspring (Hoppitt et al., 
2008). However, this is distinctly different from intentional teaching because, while the 
cultural parent is producing information that modifies the cultural offspring’s 
behaviour, there is no requirement for the cultural parent to understand that their 
information transmission is the reason for the resulting behavioral modification. This 
kind of teaching is referred to as ‘functional teaching’, because while the animal is 
producing information intentionally, it is likely due to an evolved adaption that 
functions to facilitate learning in others, rather than being caused by a deeper 
understanding of the learner’s needs (as is required in intentional teaching). While 
transmission of inadvertent information can promote enduring traits through local 
enhancement (i.e., searching a foraging site because you see someone else searching 
there (Heyes et al., 2000)) many species are not found to intentionally transmit 
information to benefit another’s uptake of that information (Whiten et al., 2003).  
In uncommon examples, functional teaching can be applied to some cases in non-
humans (Thornton & Raihani, 2008). For example, Thornton & MaCuliffe (2006) found 
that wild meerkats will teach their pups to disarm prey by exposing them to scorpions 
that have had their sting removed, and gradually introducing scorpions with varying 
levels of disability. Further evidence from Franks & Richardson (2006) revealed 
existence of ‘tandem running’ (i.e., guiding another agent to a specific location, or 
through a route in intervals to track their progress) in ants. Together these studies 
suggest that some group-living species have evolved to actively transmit information to 
facilitate other’s learning. These examples of non-human teaching are heavily restricted 
by context, even though they are present across the board in those species. The degree 
to which these examples demonstrate intentional teaching (i.e., in terms of the 
teacher’s awareness of their facilitatory behaviour) is also questionable. This form of 
teaching would fit in some functional definitions, such as Caro & Hauser (1992)’s, which 
states that for teaching to occur, the teacher modifies their behaviour at a cost, only in 
the presence of the learner. This can include encouragement or punishment resulting 
from the learner’s behaviour, resulting in a newly acquired knowledge or skill. However, 
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just because a behaviour functions to teach, does not mean that the teacher can 
intentionally deliver it as teaching. Therefore, this would not fit in more cognitive 
definitions of teaching, such as the ‘three steps to recognizing teaching’ as outlined by 
Davis-Unger & Carlson (2008), who state that to intentionally teach, the teacher has to 
recognize (a) a gap in the learner’s knowledge, (b) that the gap occurs between the 
teacher and the learner (i.e., you, as the teacher, know more), and (c) that teaching will 
bring about learning.  
The distinction between human and non-human teaching is not in the absence or 
presence of it, but as suggested by Burdett, Dean, & Ronfard (2017) and Caldwell, 
Renner, & Atkinson (2018), in specific differences in the execution. Premack (2007) 
argued that the behaviours seen in the meerkats and the tandem running ants reflect 
adaptions to specific behaviours, aimed at a single target, that do not generalize to 
other contexts. In agreement, Thornton & Raihani (2009) stated that human teaching is 
flexible and generalizable, and that the capacity to do so requires some assumptions to 
be made about the knowledge of others through an understanding of their mental 
states. This allows humans to assess ignorance in others, generalize teaching so it 
becomes useful across contexts, and alter their teaching styles according to the 
learner’s ability. The use of flexible teaching in humans has shown to be useful in 
transmission studies. For example, Caldwell et al (2018) showed adult humans a 
selection of knots which they were asked to replicate, then teach what they had 
learned to a naïve participant. It was found that conditions in which the learner was 
actively taught were significantly more successful than conditions where the learner 
was given an end-state or intermediate-state of the cultural parent’s performance to 
independently learn from. While this study is not a test of culture accumulating, it does 
demonstrate that teaching enables novel skills to be transmitted effectively, particularly 
skills which the learner might find difficult to uptake. The ability to tailor a teaching 
style means that new skills are passed on efficiently without the risk or cost to 





Intentional bidirectional communication 
Explicit representations of the self and other minds have been proposed to exist, in 
part, for the purpose of sharing information with others, and to allow this constant 
updating in line with group members (Shea et al, 2014). Of course, if cultural parents 
are expected to tailor information to the needs of the cultural offspring, it makes sense 
to assume the cultural parent would benefit from some cultural offspring feedback. This 
fits with the most basic model of synchronous teaching, in which the cultural parent 
and cultural offspring communicate bidirectionally. Feedback from the cultural 
offspring may assist the cultural parent in fine-tuning the information they provide, 
such that it becomes more tailored to the needs of the cultural offspring. As such, it is 
not only the cultural parent’s responsibility to select useful information to transmit to 
the cultural offspring, but the cultural offspring’s responsibility to select information 
about their own knowledge in order to guide the cultural parent’s information 
transmissions.  
To effectively communicate about their own knowledge, the cultural offspring must 
consider what they know relative to what the cultural parent knows, that is, mental 
state understanding in at least the second order. This means that the cultural offspring 
has to understand the cultural parent’s mental state in order to select information that 
is informative about their own knowledge, but particularly to the teacher. Cultural 
offspring communications may serve to clarify to the cultural parent that the cultural 
offspring knows about a certain thing, but also to indicate that they need more 
information.  
There is a very limited pool of experimental evidence that supports the necessity of 
bidirectional communication for accumulation of information over generations, 
however there are a select few studies that do suggest that interactive teaching can 
support more accurate transmission of information. For example, Caldwell et al. (2018) 
found that interaction with a teacher did facilitate subsequent learner success in cases 
where the goal was particularly difficult to achieve, suggesting that interactive teaching 
may be particularly supportive for hard-to-learn information. Further support comes 
from experimental literature suggesting that being a learner as part of a conversational 
dyad (engaging in bidirectional communication) holds significant benefit compared with 
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a learner who is not part of the conversation, but holds the same goal (an ‘overhearer’) 
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Schober & Clark, 1989). Because overhearers are not part 
of the ‘grounding’ process that the conversational dyad build, mutual knowledge, or 
mutually understood signals that act as partner-specific conversational aids do not hold 
the same benefit (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod & Anderson, 1987). Therefore, there 
is a clear advantage to cultural offspring who can give feedback to cultural parents 
about their own performance, or communication errors, or gaps in understanding, 
relative to overhearers whose specific needs have not been accommodated in the same 
way.  
This section summarised three capacities that are likely to be enhanced or enabled by 
mental state understanding. These capacities (flexible use of social learning strategies, 
intentional teaching and intentional bidirectional communication) are all possible 
benefits for cumulative culture, such as allowing careful selection of social models, and 
careful selection of tailored information transmissions. This thesis aims to explore the 
relevance of these capacities further, therefore the following section will assess current 
tests of cumulative culture that can be modified to achieve this. 
 
1.8  Investigating the effects of uniquely human social cognition on 
cumulative culture 
The broad aim of this thesis is to explore the facilitatory effect mental state 
understanding has in cumulative culture. This is done by altering aspects of traditional 
lab-based tests of cumulative culture to assess conditions in which information sending 
is restricted and therefore participants may have to apply some reasoning about other’s 
mental states to choose what to transmit. The following section will discuss the existing 
methods for testing cumulative culture under lab conditions and provide suggestions as 
to how these can be adapted to answer the questions in this thesis. 
We can observe the effects of cumulative culture in the real world in behaviours and 
artefacts that take many generations to refine, such as languages and traditions. 
However cumulative culture is also observable within single biological generations, for 
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example, recent advances in technology in which cumulative culture moves relatively 
fast. Despite the visibility of cumulative culture in the real world, lab based 
experimental tests are required to assess the conditions under which cumulative 
culture can occur in humans, and to explore the supporting capacities that are 
unavailable to children and non-humans.  
Assessment of cultural change is made possible in generational designs, which aim to 
mimic real-world replacement using experimental learner generations of participants in 
a lab. These designs can be linear, whereby information is transmitted between 
individual participants, each representing a single generation, or group focused where 
the successive replacement of individuals in the group captures cultural continuity, as 
well as (gradual) generational replacement. In linear transmission chains (Figure 4), 
information is typically transmitted unidirectionally between individual participants, 
each of whom represents a separate generation. This method has been widely used to 
study the transmission of linguistic material, either textual or spoken. Designs of this 
type have identified preferential sending of certain types of information, such as 
negative story events over positive story events (Bebbington et al., 2017) and social 
over non-social information (Mesoudi et al., 2006). Linear transmission chains also 
demonstrate how over generations, traits tend to evolve such that they become easier 
for the following generation to learn (Ravignani et al., 2017; Tamariz & Kirby, 2015). 
Replacement designs also involve transfer from earlier to later generations. However, in 
replacement chains, the longest serving member of the group is removed and replaced 
with a new group member at regular intervals in order to mimic the replacement of 
cultural generations in the real world (Figure 5). This experimental structure has led to 
replacement designs sometimes being referred to as ‘microsocieties’ due to their 
likeness to real-world societal structure (e.g., Caldwell & Millen (2008a)). Comparisons 
of conditions under which cumulative culture occurs largely comes from replacement 
design studies. This is primarily because the continuity generated by the overlapping 
learner generations protects against loss of information, and the opportunity to learn 
from more than one individual allows for success-biased copying, both of which are 
likely to be conducive to the accumulation of beneficial traits. These studies have been 
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implemented in comparisons of conditions of emulation, imitation and intentional 
teaching (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Morgan et al., 2015; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015).  
 
Figure 4 






Note. At each generation, a task is completed then some information about the 
outcome is unidirectionally transmitted to the next generation. Direction of 

















An example of the replacement chain layout 
















Note. A task is completed by the most experienced member(s) shown here with a blue 
background. Learners are represented by characters with yellow backgrounds. As the 
sessions progress, more experienced members leave, and learners take their place. 
New learners are introduced in each session.  
 
 
Given the success of generational experimental designs in exploring cumulative culture 
under different social learning conditions, it makes sense to use these as the basis for 
answering questions about the role of mental state understanding. However, in 
contrast to most previous studies of the mechanisms involved in cumulative culture, 
the studies in this thesis will use a more abstract computer-based task which offers 




1.9. Thesis goals 
In this review, I have summarised the current literature linking mental state 
understanding as a facilitator of cumulative culture, identifying an absence of empirical 
studies directly testing this. I will now outline how the studies in this thesis address this 
gap using a blend of traditional methods for assessing cumulative culture in the lab, and 
abstract computer-based tasks.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis explored a new methodology proposed by Caldwell et al. 
(2020), which uses simulated transmission chains to gain a proof of principle that 
participants can utilise information from a social source in order to increase the 
rewards available in later generations. This task does not require participants to select 
any information for transmission, and so we opted against using traditional 
transmission chain methods. Following on from this, Chapter 3 adopted a computer 
based linear transmission chain design to assess what information adults transmit to 
later generations in conditions where information transmission is severely limited. This 
intentional selection of information was directly compared to a condition in which a 
subset of inadvertent information was transmitted, and a third condition in which all of 
the information available was transmitted. Chapter 4 applied the same methodology 
used in Chapter 3 but instead uses a large developmental sample of 5- to-10-year-old 
children with the aim to explore the point in development that children begin to 
perform as adults do in this task. The intricacies of adult intentional information 
sending are explored further in Chapter 5. This final experimental chapter explored how 
feedback from an information receiver affects the quality of information transmitted by 
the producer. Together these studies contribute to the growing literature on 
cumulative culture in humans and the mechanisms that support aspects of cumulative 




Chapter 2:  Demonstrating a new methodology for examining 
performance improvement over generations of social 
transmission…without social transmission 
 
 
2.1  Abstract 
Experimentally examining cumulative culture and the mechanisms that support it 
requires some analysis of the effect of transmission over multiple generations. Previous 
laboratory research in cumulative culture has typically done this by studying the effect 
of transmission between multiple participants. Such experimental studies have been 
used to mimic cumulative culture and thereby investigate some of its supporting 
capacities in populations of human adults. However, creating large-scale comparisons 
of different capacities, or comparing the performance of different population groups, 
can push these designs to their limits – requiring large participant pools and complex 
organisation that is impractical and prone to error. The current study pilots a new 
experimental methodology proposed by Caldwell et al. (2020) that aims to address 
these limitations, while still producing multi-generational data. We did this by assessing 
twenty adults’ ability to adopt a low-risk strategy of repeating behaviour vicariously 
revealed to be rewarded, and favouring individual exploration over repeating behaviour 
vicariously revealed to be unrewarded. By presenting information representing every 
potential reward outcome, in a task involving a graded reward structure, we were able 
to create a large dataset detailing how each participant would perform in response to 
exposure to social information from high-, low-, or middle- performing demonstrations. 
This could then be used to simulate how performance would change over generations 
of social transmission. The results of this study suggested that this methodology could 
offer an effective alternative for assessing the potential for cumulative cultural 
evolution in human and non-human populations. Furthermore, we were able to 
perform an experimental manipulation that was expected to impact on the rate and 
extent of cultural evolution, and the methodology used successfully captured this. This 
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shows that the method is suitable for detecting group-level effects on cultural 
accumulation under different conditions, thus offering potential for investigating 
factors implicated in cumulative culture.  
 
2.2  Introduction 
Cumulative cultural evolution is widespread in human adults. Claims of its 
distinctiveness abound because, although it occurs in all known human populations, 
there is little to no evidence of it in natural populations of non-humans. This has further 
led to great interest in understanding the mechanisms underlying cumulative culture, 
and this interest has fuelled experimentation on the topic. Because cumulative culture 
relies on change over generations, investigating it necessarily requires methods that 
capture this generational change. This has typically involved using multi-generational 
transmission chains, which can be challenging in some populations due to practical 
limitations, such as participant organisation. In the current study, we test a new 
method that is capable of producing datasets that allow investigation of cumulative 
culture without depending on the transmission of information between individuals.  
The current study aims to test the ‘potential for ratcheting’ (‘PFR’) principle outlined by 
Caldwell et al. (2020). We discuss the issues with current methods for measuring 
cumulative culture, and introduce this innovative alternative methodology which 
addresses many of the limitations of the existing methods. To ensure that this novel 
method is viable however, it is important to establish proof of principle, prior to 
attempting to use it to test hypotheses about the presence or otherwise of cumulative 
culture under different conditions. Our decision to pilot this methodology using adult 
participants was motivated by the uncontroversial expectation that human adults 
possess the capacities that this method is designed to assess, meaning that we can 
reasonably expect to produce the signatures of cumulative culture in this population. 
These results will provide an important baseline for comparison with other populations, 
facilitating interpretation of any negative, or more equivocal results found in other 




Current experimental tests of cumulative culture  
As aforementioned in Chapter 1, cumulative cultural evolution is the capacity that 
allows for improvements to behaviours and artefacts as a result of repeated 
transmission over generations of learners. Its characteristic ratchet effect (Tennie et al., 
2009) means that transmission results in changes that are typically in the direction of 
improvement, with little to no reversal. Current tests of cumulative culture aiming to 
capture this effect rely on multi-generational transmission studies which mimic real-
world replacement using sample experimental generations of participants (Caldwell, 
2018). 
A variety of methods for generating this multi-generational transmission have 
contributed to not only demonstrating cumulative culture in adult populations, but also 
going some way to unravelling the cognitive mechanisms required for it to occur: 
‘Linear transmission chains’ involve the unidirectional transfer of information from one 
individual (referred to throughout this thesis as the ‘cultural parent’) to another (the 
‘cultural offspring’). There are few examples of this method being used to capture 
cumulative culture, however there are several studies demonstrating related 
phenomena, suggesting that it could, in principle, capture cumulative culture. For 
example, this method has been used to demonstrate preferential sending of certain 
types of information (Bebbington et al., 2017; Mesoudi et al., 2006) and the changes to 
information as a result of repeated transmission (Ravignani et al., 2017; Tamariz & 
Kirby, 2015).  
Similarly to linear transmission chains, ‘replacement designs’ (sometimes termed 
‘microsocieties’) also involve transfer from earlier to later generations. However, 
membership of adjacent generations overlap. The longest-serving members are 
removed and replaced with new group members at regular intervals in order to mimic 
the process of generational replacement in the real world (e.g., Caldwell & Millen 
2008a). This method has also been implemented in lab conditions with adult 
participants to test social learning mechanisms necessary for cumulative improvement 
to occur (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015). Related capacities have 
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also been explored using this methodology, such as the emergence of traditions (Baum 
et al., 2004). 
 
General issues in using multi-generational transmission chain designs 
While tests of multi-generational transmission are proficient for establishing the 
outcome of repeated transmission, and allowing scope for manipulation to isolate the 
cognitive mechanisms involved, there are several practical limitations that make them a 
less than ideal task design. Recreating multi-generational transmission requires 
participants to be coordinated to either be in the same place at the same time, or at 
staggered time intervals. Such coordination is difficult to control, so for example, in a 
testing circumstance whereby participants have to meet at a particular time and 
location to take part. This issue becomes even more significant when considering the 
large participant pool required in order to run a large number of chains, which will be 
required in studies with several conditions. Examining multiple transmission conditions, 
along with appropriate experimental controls, creates a significant increase in the 
number of participants required. Some examples include Zwirner & Thornton (2015) 
who used a total of 190 participants for ten chains of six participants in each of three 
conditions, Tamariz & Kirby (2015), who used a total of 308 participants for eight chains 
of 22 in each of two conditions, and Caldwell & Millen (2009) who used a total of 700 
participants for ten chains of ten participants in each of seven conditions. It is perhaps 
also worth noting that despite these large participant pools, some of these studies still 
failed to find significant differences between conditions where effects had been 
predicted (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & Thornton, 2015), and it remains possible 
that the recruitment numbers, although high, were still insufficient to detect effects 
that might have been captured with greater statistical power. 
The issues of participant numbers and participant organisation become even more 
prevalent when assessing groups of children or non-humans, as discussed in depth in 





Simulating multi-generational transmission 
The current study attempts to provide a proof of principle for a flexible methodology 
outlined by Caldwell et al. (2020), which reduces the need for transmission chain 
designs and the issues associated with their implementation. This PFR (‘potential for 
ratcheting’) methodology states that transmission chains can be simulated by collecting 
and arranging participant’s responses from multiple transmission outputs of varying 
quality, mimicking performance at different generations (as opposed to traditional 
chain tasks which generally only collect one response, following exposure to one 
transmission output). We used a grid search task in which cultural offspring (henceforth 
in this chapter, ‘participants’, since all played the role of offspring in the current task) 
were given vicarious information from a computer-generated parent model about what 
could be found hidden under some of the grid squares.  
Following the PFR methodology, participants were shown multiple sets of vicarious 
information on a parent model. Participants were required to search the grids to find 
the rewards using the vicarious information they were given to help them. As all grids 
included vicarious information about some of the searchable locations, participants 
always chose to repeat or avoid selections made by the parent model. The full set of 
trials given to each participant covered every possible parent grid score that could be 
achieved by making the required number of selections in that grid. Collecting 
participants’ scores from these sets of vicarious information allowed assessment of 
whether participants could reliably outperform a parent grid at a range of different 
levels of difficulty. From these transitions (parent model score = X; participant score = Y) 
it is then possible to infer the outcome of a linear transmission chain of a series of 
participants. 
The score data from participants was used to simulate artificial chains of participants in 
which task scores were matched to the vicarious information given to another 
participant. For example, the first position in the chain would be formed by the 
behaviour of participant A. If participant A observed a parent grid that scored three 
points and subsequently scored five points when searching their own grid, the score for 
position one in the chain would be five points. The score for position two in the chain 
would then be chosen from the behaviour of another participant who had observed a 
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parent grid that scored five points, and so on until the desired number of chain 
positions is complete. 
To our knowledge, only one study has attempted to simulate transmission chains from 
individual behavioural data in this way. Claidière et al. (2018) simulated chains using 
data from an earlier study where baboons were trained to reproduce patterns of grid 
squares on a screen (Claidière et al., 2014). While this earlier study was not a test for 
the potential for ratcheting in the baboon population, it did produce outputs that could 
be used to simulate chain positions. The later study concluded that the simulated data 
not only showed an increase in reproducibility (i.e., participants created more clusters 
of information than their predecessors) over generations, but also that it mirrored the 
real chain data in the earlier study. This suggests that a simulation task assessing the 
potential for ratcheting could potentially provide fairly accurate predictions about what 
would happen in inter-individual transmission. Furthermore, it shows that this kind of 
task may be applicable for use in non-humans and extended into tasks for adults and 
children for comparative purposes.  
The overarching aim of the current study is to demonstrate the efficiency of the PFR 
paradigm by applying it to a small population of human adults (as aforementioned, a 
population of which the uncontroversial expectation is held that they possess the 
capacities that this method is designed to assess). This aim is extended to providing a 
basis for future research in children and non-humans using the same paradigm. 
We explored the PFR principle in two contexts. The first context represented 
circumstances in which the vicarious information revealed high-precision payoff 
information. In this condition only, information about the specific locations in which the 
rewards were found was available, as well as the search pattern and the overall score 
for the search. Participants’ lowest-risk performance in this condition would be driven 
by rational decisions about which of the model’s selections to retain, and which to 
disregard. Therefore, in this condition where participants were aware of the outcome 
of individual parent selections in situations where vicarious information was of high 
precision, they could select stimuli revealed to be rewarded (successfully repeating), 
avoid stimuli revealed to be rewarded (omission error), select stimuli revealed to be 
unrewarded (commission error) or avoid stimuli revealed to be unrewarded 
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(successfully avoiding). As such, this condition captures the outcome of cumulative 
culture when the learner has insight into the effectiveness of individual elements of a 
cultural trait, and can access which elements to retain as a result of causal reasoning 
(Osiurak et al., 2016). This context was the key in terms of establishing a proof of 
principle for the potential for ratcheting task, because the link between the behaviour 
of the cultural parent and the payoffs of that behaviour are clear, and so 
outperformance of the parent model was expected.  
The second context represented a low-precision payoff setting whereby the search 
pattern and overall score for the grid was visible, but the specific locations of the 
rewards were not. In this context, the link between parent behaviour and payoffs is 
much harder for participants to establish. In this condition, scores can be maximised by 
making a rational decision about whether to repeat the entire model performance, or 
to disregard everything and rely on individual exploration, based on a threshold score 
(which varied according to the specific dimensions of the grids). Therefore, in this 
condition, where participants were not aware of the outcome of individual parent 
selections where vicarious information was of low precision, they could choose to 
repeat all parent selections or avoid all parent selections. However, for scores in this 
condition to accumulate across the chains, this relied upon either (extremely rare) 
occasions when the ‘avoid-all’ strategy resulted in selecting all of the rewarded 
locations by chance, or the use of a (suboptimal, on average) ‘mixed’ strategy, whereby 
some of the model selections were repeated and others were avoided, based on 
guesswork. This condition captures situations in which cumulative culture is not 
insightful, but rather emerges through the preferential spread of adaptive traits as a 
result of wholesale copying of successful or prestigious individuals, combined with 
variation contributed by random copying errors and blind exploration (Derex, 
Bonnefon, Boyd, & Mesoudi, 2019).  
Both conditions represent realistic learning scenarios in which an observer must make 
an executive decision about how to use available information to maximise their own 
rewards. For example, in a scenario where a hungry forager must climb trees to search 
for hidden fruit following a previous forager who returned with armfuls of fruit, the 
High-precision condition represents circumstances in which the previous forager’s 
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search is indicated by both fallen leaves (indicating searched locations) and parted 
branches revealing the trees’ bounty. In the same foraging scenario, the Low-precision 
condition represents circumstances in which the previous forager’s search is indicated 
by fallen leaves, but no information about the specific locations of their rewards is 
available because no branches have been parted.  
In the current task, participants had the goal to select as many rewards on the grid as 
possible using the vicarious information from a parent model to assist them. In the 
High-precision condition, individual participants could increase the likelihood of 
succeeding in this by adopting a strategy whereby rewarded behaviour is repeated, and 
unrewarded behaviour is avoided in favour of individual exploration. While a low-
precision setting might not allow such careful planning, adopting this insightful strategy 
in a high-precision setting would guarantee matching or outperforming the parent 
model every time. Therefore, in the High-precision condition, we expected to find a 
strong preference for repeating rewarded behaviour and avoiding unrewarded 
behaviour, in line with the goal to maximise the score. In keeping with this prediction, 
we also expected simulated chains to show the steady increase in scores over 
generations until the maximum score is reached, after which we expected to see a 
plateau effect, with no decline. 
While we had no certain expectations about how participants would behave in the Low-
precision condition, there was a limited number of ways that they could respond to the 
information: to repeat all of the selections, avoid all of the selections, or to repeat some 
selections and avoid others in an arbitrary fashion (mixed strategy). The low-risk 
strategy for individuals would be to adopt a conditional ‘repeat all selections’ or ‘avoid 
all selections’ strategy, depending on the number of rewards uncovered in the parent 
grid. Vicarious information showing an above-chance performance should be repeated 
fully, and vicarious information showing a below-chance performance should be 
avoided fully. While the ‘repeat-all’ strategy would maintain any uncovered rewards, 
adoption of the ‘avoid-all’ strategy, particularly in cases where the parent model shows 
no rewarded selections, may present an opportunity for all of the rewards to be 
uncovered by chance.  
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There was an expectation that this ‘repeat-all’ or ‘avoid-all’ strategy would be observed 
in at least some of the participants, some of the time. It was expected that participants 
would also adopt the mixed strategy occasionally. While it is not possible for 
participants using a mixed strategy to outperform the low-risk repeat-all/avoid-all 
strategy as perfectly applied, it may also increase the opportunities to select all of the 
rewarded stimuli by chance. We expected simulated chains in this condition to reveal 
much more limited accumulation of rewards, compared with the high-precision setting.  
We also included a risk questionnaire adapted from Weber et al. (2002), to assess 
whether participant’s likelihood of avoiding parent selections and taking their chances 
of finding the rewards individually correlated with their likelihood to take risks in every-
day scenarios. While we had no certain predictions about how this test would predict 
behaviour in the Low-precision condition, we expected that the most risk-prone 
participants would also be most likely to avoid parent selections and take their chances 
in individual exploration. 
 
2.3  Methods  
2.3.1  Participants 
The final sample consisted of 20 adult participants aged between 17 and 37 years 
(median = 20, 16 females). Two additional participants were recruited but withdrew 
from the study before completing the task. All participants in this sample were 
recruited from the University of Stirling via an online recruitment database through 
which students can earn tokens required for course completion by participating in 
research studies.  
The study was approved by the University of Stirling General University Ethics Panel 
(approval reference number: GUEP 35). Every participant gave written consent before 





2.3.2  The experimental task 
The task completed by participants was a landscape search task run on desktop 
computers. The task was run using Javascript online, with jsPsych (de Leeuw, 2015).  
Participants were presented with search landscapes (‘grids’) containing multiple rows of 
randomly coloured stimuli (‘marbles’) (Figure 6). Each row in the grid contained one 
target marble and several non-target marbles. Selecting the target marble scored one 
point. Selecting any of the non-target marbles in the same row, scored no points. Points 
gained cumulatively over all rows in the current grid were documented using a score 
tracker positioned above the grid. 
Selected marbles were characterised by a blurry version of the previously unselected 
marble, with a score marker next to it. In the High-Precision condition only, a score 
marker appeared next to selected targets if the selected marble was a target, the score 
marker was a green tick, and if the selected marble was not a target, the score marker 
was a red cross. In the Low-Precision condition, no feedback was provided about the 
success or otherwise of individual row selections.  
Until selected, target marbles were not distinguishable from non-targets by colour or 
position. The position of the target marble was randomly assigned in each row. 
Participants were all given the same goal, to select target marbles to score as many 
points as they could across all grids.  
Participants were presented with different sizes of search grid. The smallest contained 
three rows, each with a width of three. The largest contained six rows, each with a 
width of six. All possible size variants in between these sizes were used, and therefore 
16 different permutations were presented (as shown in Table 2). Grid sizes were shown 
in a randomised order.  
Participants were given some vicarious information on an identical grid shown above 
their own grid prior to making any selections, which they could use however they 
wished. This parent grid was visible throughout the trial and was positioned above the 
landscape on which the participant made their own selections. Despite being computer 
generated, this information was intended to reflect exposure to a previous participant’s 
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attempt for the same grid, such that the marbles were shown to have been selected. 
Annotated example screenshots for each condition can be seen in Figure 7a and 7b. 
Each participant was presented with all grid sizes showing all possible scores, for 
example, four 3x3 grids were shown, one of each showing a score of 0, 1, 2 and 3 out of 
3 possible points. Therefore, participants were given a total of 88 landscapes to search 
in each condition (Table 2).  
 
Figure 6 
Screenshots of the vicarious information given to participants in the High-precision 
condition (left) and the Low-precision condition (right). 
                                      
Note. Participant grids were identical, only without any selections made. Selected 
marbles are blurred. In the High-precision parent model grids, green ticks indicate that 
the parent model selected a target marble, and red crosses indicate that the parent 























Note. Annotations in green boxes were not visible to participants and are for the 
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Note. Annotations in green boxes were not visible to participants and are for the 





achieved by the 
parent. 
Parent grid showing 
parent selections. 
Participant grid 
before any selections 
are made. 
Score for the current 
participant grid. 




Table 2 All grid sizes and parent reward variations shown to participants. All grid sizes with one of each variation was shown in each condition.  
68 
 
The experiment followed a within-participants design, and all participants took part in 
both conditions in the same order. The reason that all participants took part in the 
High-Precision condition followed by the Low-Precision condition rather than a 
counterbalance, was to ensure they understood how the task worked before moving on 
to a condition that was necessarily more opaque. The vicarious information for each 
trial varied depending on the condition: 
Condition 1 (High-precision payoff information): Cultural parent grids showed both the 
position of the selected marbles, and the score marker (green tick or red cross) for each 
row. As participants selected the marbles on their own grid, they were provided with 
feedback about the outcome of their selection (target or non-target). Feedback was 
provided by means of the same score marker that was used in the parent grid. The 
purpose of this condition was to explore the capability of adults to outperform a model 
when everything about the outcome of the parent search is known, thus testing 
potential for ratcheting under conditions intended to make this as straightforward and 
cognitively undemanding as possible.  
Condition 2 (Low-precision payoff Information): Cultural parent grids showed the 
position of the selected marbles, but no individual row score marker. Participants were 
given the overall score that the parent achieved for the grid and were only given their 
own score on completion of all selections in that grid. The purpose of this condition was 
to explore what strategies participants adopt when it is not possible to selectively 
repeat only beneficial elements of a behaviour, and to avoid all known failures. As such, 
this condition tests the PFR paradigm and simulation method under circumstances 
where the potential for ratcheting is necessarily constrained. 
 
2.3.3  Procedure 
Participants were provided with thorough instructions on screen before beginning the 
experiment. These explained that only one marble from each row would be worth one 
point, while the others would be worth no points. Participants were instructed to 
search for target marbles by selecting one marble from each row in each grid. After 
participants had made all of the selections for a grid, a new grid was shown. 
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All participants took part in both conditions, completing 88 grids in each (176 trials in 
total). After completing the first condition, participants could take a short break before 
continuing to the second condition. An example of the task layout can be seen in 
Appendix 1.  
 
2.3.4  Additional testing measures 
Participants were given a risk behaviour scale consisting of 40 risky scenarios (Appendix 
2) in which participants must rate their likelihood of engaging in each. Ratings were 
made between 1 (very unlikely) and 5 (very likely), with a rating of 0 indicating that the 
participant would prefer not to answer. The scale used was adapted from an 
established measure outlined in Weber et al. (2002).  
The results of this scale were used to assess how participants’ likelihood of avoiding 
parent selections in the low-precision grids correlated with their likelihood to take risks 
in real life.  
 
2.4  Results 
Graphs were created using ggplot2 performed on R Studio (RStudio Team, 2020), 
supported by R version 4.0.2.  
The mean scores for each landscape size and reward structure in the High-precision 
condition are shown in Figure 8, and the mean scores for each grid size and reward 





Average participant score in the High-precision condition for each parent score shown, 
split by grid size. 
 
Note. Grid sizes are labeled as “number of rows” _ “number of stimuli on each row”. 
Error areas represent +/- 1 Standard Error. Red diagonal lines show where the x-axis is 
equal to the y-axis, i.e., the score achieved by the model, and black dashed lines show 
the score that would be expected by chance (calculates as (1/number of stimuli per 






Average participant score in the Low-precision condition for each parent score shown, 
split by grid size. 
 
Note. Grid sizes are labeled as “number of rows” _ “number of stimuli on each row”. 
Error areas represent +/- 1 Standard Error. Red diagonal lines show where the x-axis is 
equal to the y-axis, i.e., the score achieved by the model, and black dashed lines show 
the score that would be expected by chance (calculates as (1/number of stimuli per 





2.4.1  Simulating behavioural data to infer the outcome of a transmission 
chain 
We simulated the data collected in the High-precision condition to demonstrate how 
participants would have performed if they were part of a generational transmission 
chain. Simulations were performed using R Studio (RStudio Team, 2020), supported by 
R version 4.0.2. 
At generation 1 of the simulation an agent would receive a score from generation 0 
(randomly generated). The score a participant produced in response to a grid of the 
same dimensions, with the same score, would then form the input for an agent in 
generation 2. For example, if generation 1 scored three points, generation 2 would be 
formed using the score of a randomly selected participant that saw vicarious 
information scoring three points, and so on (Figure 10). 
Five hundred simulations were run for each grid type, and the average score for each 
chain position was taken. The cut-off point for number of generations was decided 
based on the point at which scores appeared to have plateaued for all grid types. 
Simulated generation graphs for each landscape size in the High-Precision condition are 





Demonstration of how the simulation created the chain data by matching behavioural 














Figure 11 cont.  
Note. The average score was taken from 500 separate simulations each run for 30 
generations. Grid sizes are labeled as “number of rows” _ “number of stimuli on each 
row”. Red horizontal lines mark the maximum score for the grid size shown, the dark 
blue curve shows the simulated data, and the orange curve shows the ‘low-risk 
performance strategy’ for that grid, which was calculated by simulating all chain 







2.4.2  Assessing the use of the low-risk strategy for maximising low-
precision information 
In the Low-precision condition, the simulated generations of smaller landscape sizes (up 
to and including 4x3 landscapes) are similar to the increases seen across the High-
precision condition. While they do take several hundred fewer generations to plateau, 
the increases in the larger high-precision landscapes in the High-precision condition are 
starkly different from larger landscape sizes in the Low-precision condition, which never 
peak and instead level off well below the maximum score attainable. Simulated 
generation graphs in the Low-precision condition can be seen in Figure 12. 
In the Low-Precision condition, individuals could adopt a low-risk strategy to maximise 
their individual score. Doing so involved either repeating all of the selections made 
when the parent model showed an above-chance score, or avoiding all of the selections 
made when the parent model showed a below-chance score. Of course, this strategy 
was optimal for increasing individual performance as opposed to the population goal to 
increase the number of rewards found over generations. The low-risk strategy that 
could be adopted for each landscape size (i.e., ‘repeat-all’ or avoid-all’) was not 
disclosed to participants.  
Figure 13 shows the percentage of participants that opted for each strategy for each 
size of landscape and parent score. As expected, when the correct strategy was not as 
obvious (i.e., around the threshold point where the low-risk response shifts between 
repeat-all and avoid-all), participants generally chose to use a mixed strategy (i.e., 



















Figure 12 cont. 
Note. The average score was taken from 500 separate simulations each run for 200 
generations. Grid sizes are labeled as “number of rows” _ “number of stimuli on each 
row”. Red horizontal lines mark the maximum score for the grid size shown, the dark 
blue curve shows the simulated data, and the orange curve shows the ‘low-risk 
performance strategy’ for that grid, which was calculated by simulating all chain 








Percentage of participants that opted for each strategy for each size of landscape and 
parent score in the Low-precision condition. 
 
Note. Where ‘repeat-all’ and ‘avoid-all’ strategies are shown, this was the lowest-risk 
strategy to use. There were no cases where a participant employed an ‘avoid-all’ 
strategy where a ‘repeat-all’ strategy was of the lowest risk, and vice versa. Grid sizes 
are labeled as “number of rows” _ “number of stimuli on each row”.   
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2.4.3  Risk behaviour 
Statistical analysis was performed using R (R Core Team, 2020). P-values of < .05 were 
taken as statistically significant. 
Risk behaviour was assessed using the total score from participants’ assessment of their 
likely behaviour in 40 scenarios, each using a five-point rating scale. Higher numbers 
indicated a higher likelihood of undertaking a risk. Risk scores ranged from 75 to 132 
(mean = 92.5, median = 88.5, n = 20).  
We found no correlation between risk behaviour and the proportion of repeated trials, 
r(18) = 0.304, p = .193. (Figure 14) Because of this, we opted not to use this result to 
bolster any other findings. 
 
Figure 14 
Correlation graph showing the lack of correlation between the proportion of low-risk 










Note. Error areas represent +/- 1 standard error.  
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2.5  Discussion 
The logistical challenges associated with using multi-generational transmission chain 
designs have severely limited the possibilities for investigating the mechanisms 
supporting distinctively human cumulative culture. In addressing these challenges, we 
provided an experimental demonstration of the PFR paradigm, introduced by Caldwell 
et al. (2020). As well as allowing for fully remote testing, this paradigm has the potential 
to reduce the number of participants required for generational designs, as well as the 
requirements for coordinating the participation of multiple individuals, by simulating 
repeated transmission from individuals’ responses. Such a paradigm could open up the 
further possibility of accurately comparing multiple transmission conditions, age groups 
and species. in the current study, this was made possible by presenting each participant 
with a wide range of vicarious information representing many generations, as opposed 
to only presenting vicarious information from the predecessor in the same chain. This 
allowed assessment of the expected ratchet effect (i.e., scores increasing with 
transmission). In addition, this allowed for a more intricate assessment of repeating 
behaviour (i.e., how much of the model attempt the participant repeats, and deviates 
from).  
 
Repeating Behaviour  
We predicted that our High-precision condition would successfully satisfy the PFR 
criteria outlined by Caldwell et al. (2020). Specifically, we expected that participants 
would demonstrate the ability to significantly outperform a model demonstration, over 
multiple generations of transmission. By using this strategy, participants were able to 
match the parent model’s performance for all rewarded selections and increase the 
chance of outperforming the parent model by deviating from selections that evidently 
resulted in no reward.    
This result is perhaps unsurprising, given that a previous study using a similar task 
paradigm found that young children reliably copy successful demonstrations and shift 
from unrewarded demonstrations (Wilks et al., in press). While this developmental 
study could demonstrate only limited evidence of increase over ‘generations’, it did 
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provide support for the idea that capacities supporting cumulative culture develop in 
early childhood.    
We had no particular expectations about the results in the Low-precision condition, 
however we did know that there was much less scope for individual participants to 
adopt a rule that ensured accumulation of beneficial information in most cases. The 
only rule that would guarantee no loss of information from the parent model (the ‘low-
risk strategy’) was to repeat all of the model selections if all, or even some, rewarded 
selections had been made by the parent model, however this restricted accumulation. 
The only situation in which participants should have risked deviating from the exact 
selections made by the parent model was in circumstances where the parent model 
scored below chance, and so scoring lower was unlikely with an avoid-all strategy. This 
strategy did, however, restrict the potential for achieving a perfect score to limited 
circumstances where avoiding all of the parent model selections resulted in selection of 
all targets by chance, which could only happen when the parent model’s score was 
zero. Furthermore, selection of all of the targets in this circumstance was relatively 
unlikely, especially for larger grid sizes, where there was a decreased chance of 
selecting targets due to an increased number of stimuli per row, and an increased 
number of targets to uncover (more rows). In some cases, particularly in circumstances 
where only some of the parent selections were rewarded, real participant behaviour 
deviated from this low-risk strategy, and used the mixed strategy, whereby some 
parent selections were repeated, and others were avoided. Of course, because there 
was no indication as to which selections were rewarded, the strategy was applied 
somewhat arbitrarily, and on average this strategy could never outperform the low-risk 
repeat-all/avoid-all strategy as perfectly applied. However, adopting this strategy did 
open up the possibility of selecting all of the rewards by chance, although again this was 







Simulations of multi-generational transmission 
Simulating repeated transmission demonstrated the effectiveness of this paradigm for 
assessing the potential for cumulative culture in two contrasting social learning 
contexts:  
While the High-precision condition does appear to provide good evidence that human 
adults are capable of cumulative culture because of reasoning and insightful strategy, 
our simulations of the Low-precision condition suggest that these capacities are not 
completely necessary for accumulation to occur in all settings. 
In simulating the behavioural data of the Low-precision condition, we found that 
individuals’ use of a mixed strategy meant that transmission chains had the potential to 
reach the maximum score faster than the low-risk strategy, and in some grid sizes, 
participants were able to outperform a computer-generated parent model which was 
programmed to follow this low-risk strategy. Although individual participants adopting 
the mixed strategy do risk performing more poorly than the low-risk strategy, this 
increased their opportunities to select all of the rewarded stimuli by chance. Since even 
in real participant behaviour, a perfect parent model score usually resulted in a repeat-
all response, these maximum scores – once achieved – were then relatively well-
preserved within the chain simulations.  
The results of this study successfully demonstrate that the PFR methodology is suitable 
for identifying cumulative culture, and for comparing conditions under which 
cumulative culture may be restricted in adult humans. As shown here, the vicarious 
information given to participants before they complete the task themselves does not 
necessarily need to be derived from a real participant sample. In this case, all vicarious 
information was artificially generated, and each participant saw every possible 
permutation of landscape size and score on each. This greatly reduced the requirement 
for a large participant pool, while providing results analogous to full chain studies. Using 
computer generated information also eliminated the need for coordination of 
participants, as no information transfer occurred. 
The potential scope of the paradigm is broad. Even in applying close adaptions of the 
current task, such as to include multiple conditions or comparisons between species, it 
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could contribute to answering a lot of open questions about cumulative culture. In 
particular, the method could be used to tackle those that are currently unanswered due 
to similar logistical challenges with implementation.  
 
Methodological limitations 
Of course, this paradigm is not without its limitations, and it would not be appropriate 
to claim that it would solve all the logistical problems associated with cumulative 
culture studies. The task itself is extremely abstract, with a requirement for participants 
to engage in behaviour that is very far removed from any real-world scenario typically 
associated with the phenomenon of cumulative culture. However, the flexible nature of 
the PFR paradigm means it may be possible to reduce the impact of this sacrifice in 
ecological validity by both altering the context of the task, and increasing its open-
endedness. In this way, it might be possible to better approximate the challenges, and 
complexity of potential outcomes, of real-world social learning. 
 
Conclusions 
The current study demonstrated that cumulative culture can be successfully captured 
using adult participants in the PFR paradigm. This was evident from both individuals’ 
repeating behaviour and simulated repeated transmission over generations. This 
paradigm therefore provides an effective alternative method for assessing the potential 
for cumulative cultural evolution in human and non-human populations. By making 
inferences about the outcome of repeated transmission based on individual 
performances, we reduce the requirement for complicated coordination of participants 
and large sample sizes. As a result, using this paradigm could open up the possibility of 
investigating questions about cumulative culture which were previously precluded as a 
result of the logistical challenges involved in implementing a traditional transmission 
design This method could therefore create opportunities to investigate the capacities 
required for cumulative culture in adult samples, as well as the developmental 
emergence of these capacities in children. Furthermore, it may open up possibilities to 
examine differences in cumulative culture between humans and non-humans, 
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potentially only requiring minor adaptions, meaning the resulting data would be very 
comparable. Given the volume of research that has already been undertaken using 
established methods, we are optimistic that this paradigm will contribute greatly to 
expanding the field. 
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Chapter 3:  Intentional information sharing promotes cumulative 




3.1  Abstract 
Humans frequently communicate with intent to inform. This propensity, which is likely 
to be unique to humans, may contribute to the similarly distinctive capacity for 
cumulative culture. Here we study human adults, using an experimental transmission 
chain design, to investigate how intentional information sharing could promote the 
accumulation of beneficial information, relative to transmission via inadvertent 
behavioural cues. Participants completed a landscape-searching task, scoring points by 
finding hidden targets. Information was transmitted between participants such that 
receivers were informed of the results of part or all of their predecessor’s search 
attempt. There were three information conditions: Intentional, Inadvertent, and Full. In 
the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions, a small subset of the search was 
transmitted from cultural parents to cultural offspring, either selected by the 
information producer themselves for informativeness (Intentional), or a random sample 
(Inadvertent). Scores increased over learner generations across all conditions, but were 
higher in the Intentional condition compared with the Inadvertent condition. 
Furthermore, scores in the Intentional condition were comparable to those in the Full 
condition, despite participants being provided with a more limited sample. We 
conclude that intentional information sharing can compensate for loss of expertise that 
would otherwise occur as a consequence of transmission bottlenecks (e.g., limited 




3.2  Introduction 
Cumulative cultural evolution (Caldwell & Millen, 2008b; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018) is 
widely recognised to be both pervasive and ubiquitous in human societies; techniques, 
technologies and practices are not only socially transmitted, but also become further 
developed over time, through refinements, modifications and extensions. This process 
is therefore responsible for one of the most interesting and noteworthy properties of 
human culture, which is that later generations of particular populations are generally 
able to benefit from valuable knowledge and resources that were unavailable to their 
predecessors (e.g., Caldwell (2018)). In contrast, evidence of equivalent phenomena 
appears rare in non-humans (e.g., Dean et al. (2014); although see Sasaki & Biro (2017); 
and Jesmer et al. (2018); for some noteworthy exceptions).  
Most accounts of the distinctiveness of human cumulative culture have focussed on the 
role of cognitive mechanisms that also appear to be restricted to humans (e.g., Boyd et 
al. (2011); Dean et al. (2014); Hill et al. (2009)). There are numerous theoretical 
accounts which propose compelling logical rationales linking such individual-level 
cognitive abilities to the potential for cultural accumulation at the population-level 
(e.g., Boyd & Richerson, (1996); Tennie et al. (2009); Tomasello et al. (2005)). However, 
there is still relatively little experimental evidence investigating how the identified 
factors actually influence group-level outcomes, and under what circumstances.  
Here we report an experiment investigating the accumulation of beneficial information 
over generations, comparing the effects of inadvertent social information with 
intentional information sharing. This comparison may be particularly relevant to 
understanding differences between human and non-human cultural evolution, as 
humans readily engage in intentional knowledge sharing, whereas the vast majority of 
social information use in non-humans depends on inadvertent social information. 
Inadvertent social information is used to describe information available as a 
consequence of others’ efficient performance of their activities (Danchin et al., 2004). 
As such, it is neither selected for, nor intended to, perform any communicative function 
for the cultural offspring. In spite of this, cultural offspring may nonetheless be able to 
use such ‘public information’ to their advantage. For example, others’ foraging success 
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may provide valuable information about patch quality (Smith et al., 1999; Templeton & 
Giraldeau, 1996). Learning from such inadvertent social information even appears to be 
the main mechanism supporting cases of relatively enduring behavioural traditions in 
non-humans. For example, chimpanzees learn the foraging and social behaviours 
particular to their social group (e.g., Whiten et al. (1999)), but there is little or no 
evidence of experienced individuals modifying their behaviour in ways that would 
facilitate others’ learning (e.g., Thornton & Raihani (2008); Whiten et al. (2003)). The 
chimpanzees’ learning therefore appears to occur primarily through exposure to 
information which is available purely incidentally as a result of others’ activity. 
It should nonetheless be emphasised that some non-human behaviours do perform a 
teaching function (e.g., see review in Thornton & Raihani (2008)). However, these 
examples appear to be the exception, rather than the rule. Furthermore, although such 
cases cannot be classified as involving inadvertent social information (since the 
information producer plays an active role in facilitating transmission, (e.g., Hoppitt et al. 
(2008)), they nonetheless do not reflect intentional information sharing. Examples of 
teaching in non-humans appear to be fairly narrowly-focused adaptations that facilitate 
learning in the very specific context of particular species-typical behaviours (e.g., prey 
provisioning in meerkats, Thornton & MaCuliffe (2006); and tandem-running in ants, 
Franks & Richardson (2006). It is unlikely that the animals in question have any insight 
into the fact that their behaviour impacts on others’ knowledge or skill level. As 
Premack (2007) has previously noted, non-human teaching reflects adaptations that 
have a single target, whereas human teaching is a “domain-general competence with 
indeterminately many targets” (p13862). 
The domain-generality of human teaching likely arises as a consequence of an 
individual’s recognition that their actions can potentially benefit others’ learning, along 
with some understanding of how this might be achieved, thus allowing for intentional 
knowledge sharing. In contrast it is widely agreed that non-human teaching probably 
does not involve this kind of understanding, due to disparities in capacities for mental 
state understanding (e.g., Kline (2015); Thornton & Raihani (2008)). 
It is perhaps unsurprising then that such distinctively human teaching has been 
identified by a number of authors as potentially a key mechanism that could explain the 
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evolutionary anomaly of human cumulative culture (Caldwell et al., 2018; Dean et al., 
2012; Kline, 2015; Laland, 2017). Indeed, Caldwell et al. (2018) have noted that human 
intentional knowledge sharing ensures that the kind of novel variants inherent to 
cumulative culture can be taught to others, despite the absence of any opportunity for 
adaptations to evolve which are specific to these traits.  
Despite the relative abundance of theoretical arguments linking them, there is currently 
little evidence demonstrating that intentional knowledge sharing can indeed facilitate 
the accumulation of beneficial information, over and above the use of inadvertent 
social information. Experimental research investigating cumulative culture under 
laboratory conditions (with participants organised into transmission chains or 
microsocieties) have sometimes involved manipulations of learning conditions (e.g., 
Caldwell & Millen (2009); Zwirner & Thornton (2015)), although also see Morgan et al. 
(2015)). However, to date these studies have found little evidence of benefits from 
intentional knowledge sharing. Although neither study was directly focussed on the 
question of comparing intentional with inadvertent social information, both Caldwell & 
Millen (2009) and Zwirner & Thornton (2015) included conditions involving teaching by 
verbal communication, and compared these with conditions in which participants were 
exposed to only the finished products left by their predecessors. These conditions could 
therefore in principle be re-cast as involving intentional information sharing and 
inadvertent social information respectively. However, the differences between these 
conditions extended well beyond the fact that the information was either intentionally 
or inadvertently shared, with participants also exposed to a much greater quantity of 
information in the teaching conditions, compared with the products-only conditions. 
Furthermore, despite this, task scores were found to increase over learner generations 
even in the products-only conditions of both studies, with very little evidence of 
additional advantages from teaching. 
In the current study, we aimed to directly compare conditions which differ only with 
respect to whether the transmitted information has been intentionally shared or is 
acquired incidentally from the information producer’s activity. In addition, the goal of 
this study extends beyond the simple question of whether it is possible to identify an 
advantage of one transmission condition over another, but to instead identify 
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conditions under which this might be the case. As Caldwell (2018) has previously 
argued, laboratory studies of cultural evolution must be interpreted with caution in 
relation to identifying prerequisites and constraints on cumulative culture. Whilst the 
studies by Caldwell & Millen (2009) and Zwirner & Thornton (2015) demonstrate that 
intentional knowledge sharing is not a strict prerequisite for cumulative culture, it is 
possible that there may be circumstances under which it offers significant advantages.  
Here we test the hypothesis that when transmission occurs through a learning 
bottleneck (i.e., only limited information is transmitted), intentional knowledge sharing 
will allow for the accumulation of beneficial information, as compared with inadvertent 
social information, due to the potential for highlighting information likely to hold the 
greatest value for the learner.  
Participants took part in a task which required them to search for hidden targets within 
landscapes which were subdivided using a grid. Points on the grid could be searched 
one at a time, and participants scored points by finding the targets, using a limited 
lifespan of a finite number of unsuccessful search attempts. Information transmitted 
between participants included the location of grid points searched by the cultural 
parent, but also whether this was a hit (part of a target) or a miss.  
We ran 15 chains each composed of ten participants, with five chains in each of three 
conditions: Full, Intentional and Inadvertent information. In the Full information 
condition, cultural offspring were shown all of the search outcome obtained by the 
cultural parent. In the Intentional information condition, each participant, in their role 
as cultural parent after completing their grid search in the role of cultural offspring, was 
asked to select a subset of the hits and misses they had revealed during the search 
stage (three grid squares) for transmission to the next cultural offspring. In the 
Inadvertent information condition, an equivalent subset (three grid squares) was 
randomly selected from the outcome revealed during each participant’s search, and 
this formed the information transmitted to the next participant in the chain (see 
Methods for full details).  
We predicted that participants’ scores would be higher in the Intentional information 
condition, compared with the Inadvertent information condition, and that this 
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difference would be more apparent in later generations, compared with earlier ones 
(indicative of the benefits arising as a result of the accumulation of information enabled 
by social transmission). Scores in the Full information condition were expected to be 
highest of all, with these providing an indication of the upper limit of the benefits that 
could accumulate as a consequence of social learning in this task context. Our key 
predictions were pre-registered: https://osf.io/jszvc/  
 
3.3  Methods 
3.3.1  Participants 
One hundred and fifty-nine adults aged between 17 and 62 years (Median = 20 years, 
103 females) were recruited in total, with data from nine of these participants being 
excluded from the study due to experimenter or technical error (in accordance with the 
exclusion criteria specified in the pre-registration). The final sample consisted of 150 
adult participants aged between 17 and 62 years (Median = 20, 100 females). Of the 
final sample, 133 participants were recruited from the University of Stirling via an 
online recruitment database, through which students can earn tokens required for 
course completion by participating in research studies, and a further 17 participants 
were recruited from Glasgow Science Centre (www.glasgowsciencecentre.org/) on a 
voluntary basis.  
Fifty participants were assigned to each of the three conditions, with ten participants in 
each transmission chain, and five complete chains in each condition. Participants were 
assigned to a condition randomly, and chain position was constrained by the current 
state of completion of the chain to which they were recruited. Participants whose data 
was excluded were replaced in that chain by a new participant, prior to further 
recruitment to that particular chain. The study was approved by the University of 
Stirling General University Ethics Panel (approval reference number: GUEP 295), and 
every participant gave written consent before the experiment took place.  
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3.3.2  The experimental task 
The task completed by the participants was a landscape searching challenge loosely 
based on the game ‘Battleships’. The task was run using PsychoPy 1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 
2019), on either a desktop computer or a Microsoft Office tablet running Windows 10.  
Participants were presented with a series of ten 16x16 grids, in each of which three 3x3 
targets (ships) could be found. Targets were randomly placed, and consisted of nine 
grid points (See Figure 15). Participants could search the grid for targets by clicking on 
(desktop), or touching (tablet), any of the grid squares. When part of a target was 
found, these were scored as ‘hits’, and selection of any of the non-target squares in the 
16x16 grid were scored as ‘misses’. The participant’s primary goal was to maximise their 
score by finding as many hits as possible, across the ten grids.  
Participants used up one of their limited search attempts for every grid square they 
selected which did not contain part of a target. In contrast, when participants selected a 
target grid square, the number of search attempts did not reduce, and they were 
instead awarded one point. This scoring system was intended to capture the relative 
payoffs typically associated with real world subsistence activity, with fruitless search 
always costly, and success always profitable. A maximum score of 27 points was 
available in each grid (nine for every full target), and participants were allotted nine 
search attempts in which to find them. This meant that the score for each grid varied 
depending on how many hits and misses were found. For example, if all 27 hits (i.e., 
three complete targets) were found without any error, the score for that grid would be 
27, with nine search attempts remaining and exactly 27 grid squares revealed. If no 
targets were found, the score for that grid would be zero, with all search attempts used 
and only nine (miss) grid squares revealed.  
The first participant in each chain received no information about the contents of any of 
the grid squares, other than that generated by their own search. All other participants 
in the chain received some information about their cultural parent’s performance for 
each grid.  
The same pre-specified reward landscape was kept consistent for each grid completed 
by a particular chain, such that the results of the cultural parent’s search held true for 
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the cultural offspring. Depending on the condition, participants saw some or all of the 
search outcome obtained by their cultural parent (including whether each revealed grid 
square was a hit or a miss). The nature of the information varied by condition as 
detailed below: 
Full Information (control): With the exception of the first in each chain, each participant 
was shown all of the search outcome obtained by their cultural parent. Thus, cultural 
offspring received information about the value of between nine and 36 grid squares.  
Intentional Information: At the end of their search, each participant in this condition 
was asked to select a subset of the hits and misses they had revealed during the search 
stage (three grid squares). Thus, the information that each participant received 
comprised the value of these three squares, as selected by their cultural parent in the 
chain.  
Inadvertent Information: A randomly selected subset (three) of the grid squares 
revealed during each participant’s search were passed on to the next participant in the 
chain. Thus, as in the Intentional condition, participants in this condition received 
information about the value of three grid squares. This condition was therefore 
intended to be analogous to using ‘public information’ (e.g., Danchin et al., 2004), 
available as a by-product of another’s activity, as long as the observer happens to be in 
the vicinity of the cultural parent.  
 
3.3.3  Procedure 
Participants gave written consent before being pseudo-randomly assigned a condition 
and chain position according to the constraints detailed in the Participants section 
(3.3.1).  
Participants were provided with thorough instructions on screen before beginning the 
experiment. These included picture examples of an unselected grid square, a selected 
hit, a selected miss and a full 3x3 target. Participants were also given instructions about 
the constraints on their search activity for any given grid, i.e., that the program would 
advance to a new grid when either all nine search attempts had been used up, or when 
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all 27 hits (i.e., three complete targets) had been selected (see description of 
experimental task above).  
If a participant was in generation 1 (i.e., the first participant in a chain of ten), then they 
received no information about the location of hits or misses. Participants in all other 
chain positions received some information about the grid, as detailed in the description 
of the experimental task. In all conditions, participants were told that they would 
receive some information from a previous participant’s performance, and that they 
could use this information however they wished. Details about the source of the 
information was not explicitly disclosed to participants.  
After participants had completed their own search, in the Intentional condition, they 
were also required to make decisions about the information to be transmitted to the 
next participant in the chain. Participants in this condition were therefore made aware 
that the information was to be sent to a future participant who would be presented 
with the same task they had just completed. Following each grid search, they were 
asked to select three of the grid squares from the selections that they had made for any 
given grid.  
After all ten grids had been completed, participants were shown their final score (total 
hits selected across all ten grids). Participants were then fully debriefed regarding the 
aims and hypotheses of the experiment, and given the opportunity to ask any 




Demonstration of information transmission between two generations.  
 
Note. In this demonstration, filled green grid squares indicate a hit, filled red grid 
squares indicate a miss and striped grid squares indicate information that was 
transmitted from the cultural parent but not subsequently selected by the cultural 
offspring. Blue arrows represent the direction of transmission.   
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3.4  Results 
All generalised linear mixed models were performed using R (R Core Team, 2020) and 
lme4 (Bates et al., 2014). Graphs were created using ggplot 2 performed on R Studio 
(RStudio Team, 2020), supported by R version 4.0.2. The dependant variable in each 
analysis was score or search attempts remaining (both numeric). Chain position was 
centred every time. Fixed effects are specified before each model output.  
Non-convergent and singular fit models were addressed by removing random effects, 
however models with the maximum random effects structure (Barr et al., 2013) were 
considered first. Post-hoc comparisons were done using the emmeans package (Lenth 
et al., 2019). Tests were two-tailed, and p-values of < .05 were taken as statistically 
significant. Emmeans using the Tukey adjustment was used for multiple comparisons, 
and Emtrends was used to assess interactions between slopes when significant 
interactions were found in the model. 
 
3.4.1  Mean scores  
Mean scores were calculated using each participant’s sum scores across all 10 
completed grids. The maximum score possible for participants to achieve was 270, that 
is, 27 points for each of the ten grids searched.  
First, we examined the scores at chain position 1 using condition as the independent 
variable, and chain included as a random variable. The Intentional condition was used 
as the intercept. We found no significant differences in scores at chain position 1 
between the Intentional and Full conditions (b = -20.8, SE = 18.5, t(8) = -1.123, p = 
.528), between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = -4.4, SE = 18.5, t(8) = -
0.238, p = .970) or between the Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 16.4, SE = 18.5, t(8) 
= 0.885, p = .664). (Figure 16a) Any significant differences at the beginning of the chains 
might have cast doubt on the source of any differences that we found in later 
generations of the chains (i.e., potentially suggesting that these might not be a result of 
differences in the degree of accumulation of beneficial information).  
97 
 
In this model, we included condition and chain position (centred) as independent 
variables, chain was included as a random variable. The Intentional condition was used 
as the intercept.  
Looking at all three conditions together, a significant main effect was found for chain 
position (b = 116.39, SE = 28.34, t(149) = 4.12, p < .001). There were also main effects 
of condition. Sum score was significantly higher in the Intentional condition when 
compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 40.6, SE = 11.5, t(140) = 3.529, p = .002), 
and significantly higher in the Full condition when compared to the Inadvertent 
condition (b = 63.2, SE = 11.5, t(140) = 5.491, p < .001). No significant difference was 
found between the Full and Intentional conditions (b = 22.6, SE = 11.5, t(140) = 1.96, p = 
.126).  
We also tested for interactions between condition and chain position for the sum score 
measure. This would tell us whether any differences between conditions increased over 
generations, in line with our predictions. The comparisons between conditions, 
analysing interactions involving chain position, were as follows: Full and Intentional 
conditions (b = -21.7, SE = 40.1, t(140) = -0.541, p = .852); Full and Inadvertent 
conditions (b = 50, SE = 40.1, t(140) = 1.248, p = .427); and Intentional and Inadvertent 
conditions (b = 71.7, SE = 40.1, t(140) = 1.789, p = .177).  
 
3.4.2  Exploratory analysis of differences between conditions using only 
generations 1-6  
In the event of finding support for our predictions regarding overall differences in sum 
score between conditions (which we did indeed find), we had expected also to find 
these differences accompanied by corresponding interactions involving chain position. 
If the differences between the conditions were more apparent in later generations, this 
would be consistent with the idea that these differences were attributable to 
differences in the degree to which beneficial information was accumulating over 
generations. However, as reported above, we did not find any significant interactions 
between condition and chain position, for the measure of sum score. We suspected 
that the absence of interactions between conditions could have been attributed to 
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scores reaching a plateau relatively early in the chains and improving no further beyond 
this point. In our planned analysis (which considered all 10 generations) the plateau 
effect in later generations could have potentially obscured the effect any differences in 
rates of increase between the conditions in earlier generations. In Figure 16b it can be 
seen that the plateau begins around chain position 6 (with all conditions being similar in 
this respect, despite other differences). Indeed, there even is some indication that 
scores began to drop after this point. In the Discussion we will return to the issue of 
why task performance may have actively deteriorated in later generations, possibly as a 
direct consequence of the task becoming so trivial that this caused confusion. However, 
setting aside the issue of interpretation, here we simply wished to explore the 
possibility of finding interactions between conditions using only data generated prior to 
the plateau. We therefore re-ran the analysis reported above, with chain positions 7-10 
omitted. (Figure 16c) 
In this model, we included condition and chain position (centred) as independent 
variables, and chain is included as a random variable. The Intentional condition was 
used as the intercept.  
Broadly speaking, the main effects and pairwise comparisons between conditions 
showed a similar pattern of results to the planned analysis. A significant main effect was 
found for chain position (b = 141.189, SE = 27.638, t(89) = 5.108, p < .001). Sum score 
was not significantly higher in the Intentional condition when compared to the 
Inadvertent condition (b = 27.9, SE = 11.1, t(80) = 2.511, p = .037. Scores in the Full 
condition were significantly higher compared with scores in the Intentional conditions 
(b = 31.8, SE = 11.1, t(80) = 2.858, p = .015), and significantly higher in the Full condition 
when compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 59.7, SE = 11.1, t(80) = 5.369, p < 
.001). This comparison identified a predicted difference between these conditions in 
this analysis, which had not been found in the planned analysis reported above. This 
may have been attributable to the fact that any confusion caused by the excessive 
easiness of the task (mentioned previously as a possible explanation for the observed 
plateaus/peaks) would have had a dampening effect on the scores in later generations 
in the Full Information in particular.  
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Nonetheless, we were most interested in the question of whether some interaction 
effects involving chain position might be significant once any generations subject to 
plateau effects had been excluded. The comparisons between conditions, analysing 
interactions involving chain position, were as follows: Full and Intentional conditions (b 
= 13.9, SE = 39.1, t(80) = 0.354, p = .933); Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 90.2, SE = 
39.1, t(80) = 2.309, p = .060); and Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 76.4, SE = 
39.1, t(80) = 1.954, p = .130). Therefore, no significant interactions were found, despite 
this being marginal between the Full and Inadvertent conditions. However, it is perhaps 
worth noting that in this analysis the identified trends corresponded more closely to the 
pattern of results that we had predicted. Also, the interaction for which we would have 
made the strongest predication, had a relatively low p-value. 
 
Figure 16a 
Mean score increase at each chain position, split by condition.  
 




Curvilinear regression graph showing the plateau of scores in each condition.  
 
Note. Data points have been jittered so that the number of points at each value is 





Mean score increase from chain position 1 to chain position 6, split by condition.  
 




3.4.3  Mean search attempts remaining 
Mean search attempts remaining were calculated using each participant’s sum scores 
and search attempts lost across all 10 completed grids. The maximum possible number 
of search attempts remaining was 90, that is, nine search attempts for each of the ten 
grids searched.  
First, we examined the search attempts remaining at chain position 1 using condition as 
the independent variable, and chain included as a random variable. The Intentional 
condition was used as the intercept. We found no significant differences in search 
attempts remaining at chain position 1 between the Intentional and Full conditions (b = 
-0.4, SE = 0.86, t(8) = -0.463, p = .890), between the Intentional and Inadvertent 
conditions (b = -1.4, SE = 0.86, t(8) = -1.620, p = .292) or between the Full and 
Inadvertent conditions (b = -1.0, SE = 0.86, t(8) = -1.157, p = .509) (Figure 17). As with 
score, this test provided reassurance that there was no pre-existing difference between 
the conditions prior to any information transmission.  
In this model, we included condition and chain position (centred) as independent 
variables, chain was included as a random variable. The Intentional condition was used 
as the intercept.  
Looking at all three conditions together, a significant main effect was found for chain 
position (b = 50.97, SE = 9.64, t(149) = 5.286, p < .001). There were also main effects of 
condition. The sum of the search attempts remaining was significantly higher in the 
Intentional condition when compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 19.7, SE = 3.92, 
t(140) = 5.035, p < .001), and significantly higher in the Full condition when compared 
to the Inadvertent condition (b = 34.1, SE = 3.92, t(140) = 8.706, p < .001. There were 
also significantly more search attempts remaining in the Full condition compared with 
the Intentional condition (b = 14.4, SE = 3.92, t(140) = 3.671, p = .001).  
We also tested for interactions between condition and chain position for the search 
attempts remaining measure. This would tell us whether any differences between 
conditions decreased over generations, in line with our predictions. The comparisons 
between conditions, analysing interactions involving chain position, were as follows: 
Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 50.36, SE = 13.60, t(140) = 3.693, p < .001); 
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Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 48.15, SE = 13.6, t(140) = 3.531, p = .002; 
and Full and Intentional conditions (b = 2.22, SE = 13.6, t(140) = 0.163, p = .985).  
 
Figure 17 
Mean search attempts remaining at each chain position for each condition, split by 
condition.  
 
Note. Error areas represent +/- 1 standard deviation.   
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3.4.4  Survival analysis for the first point of completion for each grid 
Kaplan-Meier survival analysis was used to construct a curve that displays the rate of 
first solution at each chain position, detailing the earliest point in the chain that all 3 full 
targets are uncovered (target maximisation). Stratified analysis using the Peto-Peto test 
was used to compare completion of grids in each condition – the Peto-Peto test was 
selected because it assumes proportional hazards are not constant This is primarily 
used when events (i.e., all 3 full targets are uncovered) are weighted depending on the 
percentage chance of estimated failure, for example, early events are allocated more 
weight because the probability of that event taking place is lower early in the chain 
(Karadeniz & Ercan, 2017). Cox proportional hazard regression analysis was used to 
identify which condition predicted the successful completion of grids, and estimate 
hazard ratios with 95% confidence intervals.  
Figure 18a shows the survival curve for all grids completed by participants at each 
position in the chain. The stratified analysis showed significant differences in median 
completion time over conditions (p < .001). 
Figure 18b shows the Cox proportional hazard regression model. Compared to the 
Intentional condition, the chance of completion was significantly higher in the Full 
condition (HR 1.632, 95%, CI 1.072 to 2.485, p = .022). The chance of completion in the 
Inadvertent condition was significantly lower than in the Intentional condition (HR 




Survival curve for all grids completed by participants at each position in the chain 
 




Forest plot of hazard rations from Cox proportional hazard regression model, using the 
Intentional condition as a baseline.  
 




3.4.5  Scores and search attempts remaining following information from a 
complete grid 
This analysis compared conditions using chain as a random variable.  
The data used for this analysis only included grids that followed a grid in which all three 
targets were found. (Full condition, n = 219; Intentional condition, n = 147; Inadvertent 
condition, n = 43).  
Scores were found to be significantly higher in the Full condition (n = 219) compared to 
scores in the Intentional condition (n = 147) (b = 3.07, SE = 0.844, t(406) = 3.635, p < 
.001). Scores in the Inadvertent condition (n = 43) were found to be significantly lower 
than scores in the Full condition (n = 219) (b = -5.12, SE = 1.342, t(399) = -3.811, p < 
.001). Scores in the Intentional condition (n = 147) were not found to be significantly 
higher than scores in the Inadvertent condition (n = 43) (b = 2.05, SE = 1.423, t(374) = 
1.440, p = .322). (Figure 19a) 
Search attempts remaining in the Full condition (n = 219) were found to be significantly 
higher than search attempts remaining in the Intentional condition (n = 147) (b = 3.46, 
SE = 0.313, t(405) = 11.044, p < .001). Search attempts remaining in the Full condition 
(n = 219) were found to be significantly higher than search attempts remaining in the 
Inadvertent condition (n = 43) (b = 6.67, SE = 0.498, t(406) = 13.387, p < .001). Search 
attempts remaining in the Inadvertent condition (n = 43) were significantly fewer than 
search attempts remaining in the Intentional condition (n = 147) (b = -3.21, SE = 0.53, 




Figure 19a  
Scores at the end of each grid search for participants who were given information from 




Search attempts remaining at the end of each grid search for participants who were 




3.4.6  Proportion of hits transmitted 
This analysis only included data from the Intentional condition. 
A paired sample t-test was used to compare the proportion of hits to misses sent by 
participants, to the total proportion of hits to misses they had found in their own search 
(thus, the proportion of hits to misses potentially available to send).  
On average, participants had 16.67 hits available and 7.04 misses available per grid. The 
average hits available to total grid squares available was 63.66%. 
The proportion of hits to misses sent was significantly higher than the proportion of hits 
to misses available (t(499) = 15.89, p < .001). This indicates that participants selected a 
higher proportion of hits than would be expected according to a random selection of 
the grid points available to send. 
 
Figure 20 
Proportion of hits to misses available compared with the proportion of hits to misses 










Note. Data points have been jittered so that the number of points at each value is 
visible. Error areas represent +/- 1 Standard Error.   
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3.4.7  Target segment positions transmitted 
The positions sent within each target were analysed to determine whether information 
senders sent any particular target segment more frequently. The proportion of each 
target segment sent can be seen in Figure 21. The data for this analysis only included 
target segments sent from complete targets (out of 1,500 targets available across all 
chains, chain positions and grids in each conditions: Full condition, n = 1,085; 
Intentional condition, n = 805, Inadvertent condition n = 652). 
To explore whether central tiles were transmitted more often relative to other target 
segment positions, we first compared the proportion of each target segment selection 
to a chance level selection. This analysis takes into account that there is only one 
central segment and eight edge segments in each target, and therefore this chance 
level was set to 0.11.  
A Pearson’s Chi-Square test was used to analyse any bias in the distribution of possible 
locations within targets (e.g., top left, centre, bottom right) sent in the Intentional and 
Inadvertent conditions. The Intentional condition was significantly different from a 
uniform distribution (x2(8) = 792.66, p < .001, n = 921), and the Inadvertent condition 





The proportion of each target segment sent in each condition 
 
Note. This graph incudes data from only completely uncovered targets. This graph 
therefore does not include any data from partially uncovered targets. X-axis values 
correspond to particular target segments. For example, ‘topleft’ refers to the top left 
segment in a target. In this diagram, ‘centre’ in shortened to ‘cent’, and ‘bottom’ is 





3.5  Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether intentional knowledge sharing could 
support cumulative cultural evolution under circumstances of limited information 
transmission. Specifically, we aimed to investigate whether this would occur when the 
amount of information transmitted was so limited that it would otherwise severely 
constrain the retention of beneficial information (i.e., when it was available only in the 
form of inadvertent cues). We were therefore particularly interested in how our two 
limited information conditions (Intentional and Inadvertent) compared to a Full 
Information condition, in which participants received all of the information generated 
by their cultural parent’s activity.  
We found that task scores increased over learner generations, consistent with the 
accumulation of information over successive generations of learners. Overall task 
scores were significantly higher in the Full information condition, compared with the 
Inadvertent information condition, confirming that limiting the amount of information 
transmitted (but selecting this subset at random) restricted the potential for cultural 
offspring to benefit from the cumulative exploration activities of their cultural parents 
in the chain. However, in line with our key prediction, task scores were significantly 
higher in the Intentional condition compared with the Inadvertent condition. 
Furthermore, the difference between the Full and Intentional conditions was not 
significant. This result implies that – at least under certain circumstances – intentional 
knowledge sharing can fully compensate for the loss that would otherwise occur as a 
consequence of a tight bottleneck on transmission (e.g., due to limited exposure time).  
The difference between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions occurred because 
participants in the Intentional condition were apparently able to strategically select 
elements of their search activity for transmission, which would be particularly 
informative for the cultural offspring. In contrast, in the Inadvertent condition the 
information consisted of a random sample of the cultural parent’s search activity. This 
suggested that participants in the Intentional condition may have been anticipating the 
needs of cultural offsprings, and that as a result they made significantly non-random 
choices about what to transmit in ways that did indeed benefit cultural offsprings.  
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Exploratory analysis of the information transmitted in the Intentional condition 
indicated that participants selected a disproportionate number of hits for transmission. 
Compared with information about miss locations, information about hit locations was 
strategically more useful to a cultural offspring aiming to maximise their score for a 
variety of reasons. Most obviously, using information about a hit (by selecting the same 
grid square) guaranteed that the cultural offspring could add a point to their score, 
whereas using information about a miss (by avoiding it and searching elsewhere) only 
very slightly increased the probability of scoring a point, relative to no information. In 
addition, the predictable clustering of target grid squares (the 27 hits within each grid 
were always arranged into three square targets of the same dimensions) meant that 
knowing the location of one target grid square narrowed down the potential locations 
of others that were part of the same target, making them much easier to find.  
These biases in the information transmitted by participants in the Intentional condition 
(i.e., locations of hits rather than misses, and information distributed across all targets 
found) clearly allowed cultural offspring to perform extraordinarily well given the 
limited quantity of information they had about their cultural parent’s search. Analysis of 
the performance of participants in the Intentional condition also showed that if they 
had been sent information by a participant who had found all three complete targets, 
they typically found all targets themselves before reaching their limit of failed search 
attempts (nine miss selections). This is quite remarkable given that participants only 
had information about the value of three of the 256 grid locations.  
In contrast, in the Inadvertent condition, participants received information extracted 
randomly from the search of their cultural parent. This meant that even when all 
targets had been found, they might not all be represented in the information 
transmitted to the cultural offspring, either because one or more miss locations was 
sent, rather than a hit, or because the hit locations were not distributed across the 
three targets. As a result, in this condition, participants whose cultural parent had 
found all three complete targets performed less well than their counterparts in the 




We can therefore state with some certainty that, in the Intentional condition, 
participants were selecting information for transmission in non-random ways. 
Furthermore, the resulting biases in the information provided did indeed benefit 
cultural offspring. However, the conclusion that this occurred as a consequence of the 
cultural parent’s anticipation of the needs of the cultural offspring is at present only 
speculation. Further research would be required in order to investigate the motivations 
underlying the choices made by cultural parents in the Intentional condition. Such 
research could potentially add weight to the proposal that distinctively human 
intentional knowledge sharing can promote the accumulation of beneficial information.  
Developmental research offers a potentially fruitful avenue for investigating the 
cognitive requirements of the strategic knowledge transmission behaviour we identified 
in the current study. Children’s teaching behaviour is known to exhibit age-related 
changes consistent with an increasingly sophisticated understanding of others’ minds 
(e.g., Ronfard & Corriveau (2016); Wood et al. (1995); Ziv et al. (2016)). Consequently, 
children’s performance on this task could determine whether the biases in the 
intentionally transmitted information occurred as a result of such understanding. The 
ability to select appropriate information in the role of cultural parent might be age-
dependent, and linked to the maturation of other cognitive abilities. This would add 
weight to the view that the highlighting of particularly informative behaviours could 
require cognitive capacities not available to non-humans, thus contributing to the 
explanation of why cumulative culture is rarely documented in other species. 
Alternatively, factors such as salience, or reinforcement history, could in principle 
produce effects similar to those identified in our experiment, without requiring any 
consideration of another’s perspective. If even very young children make selections in 
the role of cultural parent that are comparable to those made by the adults, this would 
suggest that highlighting of details particularly beneficial to cultural offspring could 
itself occur inadvertently, as well as intentionally, potentially challenging the 
interpretation that such effects might be restricted to humans.  
It should be noted that retention of information about target locations was far from 
perfect. This was the case across all conditions, including the Full Information condition, 
in spite of the extreme transparency of the task and the cues that were available within 
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the experimental design. In the Full Information condition, participants were given 
information which revealed the value (hit or miss) of all of the grid squares searched by 
their cultural parent in the chain. Optimal use of this information virtually guaranteed 
improvement in score (or at least no deterioration) if all indicated hit locations were 
selected, and miss locations avoided. This was apparently trivial for most participants 
(as was our intention in planning the design). However, a minority of participants 
apparently either failed to understand the task rules and instructions, or adopted an 
extremely suboptimal game strategy (using up their full quota of moves searching non-
cued locations prior to making use of the cues provided), or simply elected to ignore 
the instructed goal of maximising task score. These factors were outside of our control. 
However, although such behaviour violated some of our basic assumptions about how 
participants would respond to the task, we chose not to exclude any data on this basis, 
as this would have involved formulating post-hoc exclusion criteria. Given this context, 
it is particularly noteworthy that we identified the predicted differences between our 
conditions in spite of the resulting catastrophic collapses which wiped out the 
previously accumulated information. In both the Full and Intentional information 
conditions, chains were generally able to recover from such loss within just a few 
generations.  
As a result of the catastrophic loss of information towards the end of chains, we 
included an additional exploratory analysis of performance up to where we considered 
the scores to ‘plateau’. Identification of the plateau was based on real participant 
scores only, however, future research may benefit from including a simulated optimal 
performance model. This would provide an indication of whether participants are 
performing optimally, and also give a clearer insight into the point at which 
performance begins to deviate from this (i.e., the plateau point).  
Overall, our findings suggest that intentional knowledge sharing can result in highly 
efficient transmission of beneficial information, such that cultural offspring do not 
necessarily need to be exposed to the full exploration history of their cultural parent in 
order to achieve the same, or better, performance. As a result, intentional knowledge 
sharing could be expected to significantly facilitate cumulative culture relative to 
learning from public information available in the form of inadvertent cues. Indeed, the 
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efficient transmission of information is likely particularly critical to cumulative culture 
for the very reason that we expect cumulative culture to result in an increasingly large 
pool of discoveries worth transmitting, and/or increasingly hard-to-learn traits (e.g., see 
Mesoudi (2011)). The human propensity for intentional knowledge sharing may 
therefore play a key role in supporting cumulative culture, which is particularly 
beneficial once multi-generational transmission is already under way and has begun to 





Chapter 4: The development of intentional information sharing 
that promotes cumulative culture 
 
 
4.1  Abstract 
In the previous study, we found that intentional information transmission from cultural 
parents facilitated the accumulation of beneficial information over generations. Due to 
humans’ distinct propensity for intentional information transmission, we concluded 
that this (relative to inadvertent information making up non-human transmissions) may 
be a key facilitator of distinctively human cumulative culture. In the previous chapter, 
adult’s selective information transmission was speculatively attributed to a fully 
developed capacity for mental state understanding, such that they selected information 
for transmission that would be particularly beneficial to a naïve offspring. However, it is 
not completely clear from the results that adults’ performance in the task was due to 
complex cognition, over simple biases and preferences. The current study therefore 
aimed to clarify that the effect found in adults was brought about by complex cognitive 
reasoning that is not accessible to non-humans and young children. If the same result 
that was found in adults is also found in young children, then it is unlikely that any 
complex reasoning is taking place. Specifically, the current study aimed to provide 
evidence that cumulative culture, supported by particularly beneficial information 
transmission, emerges on a similar developmental trajectory as advanced, and higher-
order, mental state reasoning. We applied an experimental paradigm adapted from the 
one used in Chapter 3 with chains of children split by age: 5 to 6 years, 7 to 8 years and 
9 to 10 years. We found that chains of 5- to 6-year-olds did not accumulate information 
in any condition; and 7- to 8-year-olds accumulated information only when all of the 
information from the cultural parent was available to the cultural offspring However, 
only 9- to 10-year-olds’ performance resembled that of the adults, with this group 
exhibiting accumulation in the intentional transmission chains also. Children’s cognitive 
abilities expand in a wide variety of ways over the age range we studied, and many of 
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these, not just capacities for mental state understanding, could have potentially 
underpinned the effects we found. The test for mental state understanding we had 
hoped to use as a predicting variable in our analyses returned results that suggested 
low validity, meaning that these scores could cast no further light on this issue. 
Nonetheless, the developmental trajectory we identified was consistent with the idea 
that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the effect we found in the adult task 
were non-trivial and might be distinctive to humans. Furthermore, an ability to reason 
about others’ minds remained amongst the most logically plausible explanations.  
 
4.2  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we found that chains of adult participants transmitting subsets 
of intentional, compared to inadvertent, knowledge from cultural parents to cultural 
offspring demonstrated a significantly greater accumulation of knowledge over 
generations. Using an adapted version of the methodology applied in Chapter 3, the 
current study aims to assess whether the ability to intentionally select useful 
information for transmission is age-dependant and linked to the development of other 
cognitive abilities coming to fruition at the same time. Similarly to the previous study, 
we were particularly interested in whether any age-related changes in the ability to 
intentionally transmit beneficial information was reflected in the accumulation of 
information over multiple generations of transmission, compared with circumstances in 
which transmissions were made up of inadvertent information from the cultural 
parent’s performance.  
To effectively transmit knowledge (referred to on occasion in this chapter as ‘teaching’), 
there may often need to be some understanding from the cultural parent about where 
there are gaps in the cultural offspring’s knowledge (Davis-Unger & Carlson, 2008). For 
this reason, in the conclusion of Chapter 3, we tentatively attributed the adults’ ability 
to successfully transmit intentional knowledge and subsequently accumulate 
information over generations to distinctively human cognitive mechanisms, potentially 
including the fully developed understanding of others’ mental states. However, if the 
same biases that were found in intentional adult transmissions (e.g., sending 
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information about the centre grid square of fully revealed targets) are found in very 
young children, this would suggest that these biases are unlikely to be a consequence 
of sophisticated social cognitive mechanisms that only develop in later childhood. Of 
course, following a similar logic, if adult-like transmissions are apparent only in older 
children, then the age at which this develops would provide valuable insights into the 
level of social understanding required to effectively transmit knowledge in this task. In 
the current study we therefore attempted to capture a developmental trajectory for 
cumulative culture supported by intentional knowledge transmission, which could 
highlight whether this capacity can really be attributed to distinctively human cognitive 
mechanisms. Furthermore, we applied a test of mental state understanding suitable for 
children over the age of 4-years, to support the theory that the cognitive mechanism 
responsible is the fully realised understanding of other’s mind states. Finding evidence 
of this would subsequently support the idea that intentional knowledge transmission 
may be dependent on capacities for reasoning about mental states, which are believed 
to be distinct in humans. This finding would also support theories present in the current 
literature, which often link the emerging capacity of mental state understanding with 
the ability to effectively teach others. 
In the current literature, children’s acquisition and understanding of teaching is 
consistently found to correlate with the developing knowledge of their own, and 
other’s mental states, which are established at around 4 years of age (Chapter 1). 
Ashley & Tomasello (1998) and Wood et al. (1995) found that children rarely show any 
signs of peer-teaching (defined as circumstances where, during problem solving, a more 
knowledgeable child assists a naive child by adjusting their teaching strategy to suit the 
naïve child’s needs) until around 3 years of age, where these abilities begin to emerge. 
After this age, children’s repertoire of teaching behaviour increases, with experimental 
evidence citing children engaging in sibling/peer tutoring and cooperative learning from 
around 3 to 4 years of age (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Howe et al., 2012; Maynard, 
2002; Wood et al., 1995).  
However, it is not until the development of sophisticated mental state understanding at 
around 4 to 5 years of age, that children display a surge in teaching ability. At this stage, 
children begin to refine their information transmissions, using a larger rage of 
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strategies, and responding more accurately to the learner’s needs/errors (e.g., Davis-
Unger & Carlson (2008); Gweon et al. (2014); Jeong & Frye (2018); Strauss et al. (2002); 
Ziv et al. (2008); Ziv & Frye (2004)). This is likely because, in order for a cultural parent 
to infer what a cultural offspring needs to know, some awareness of the offspring’s 
knowledge state is required – more specifically, an ability to reason that gaps in the 
offspring’s knowledge can potentially be addressed by a transfer of relevant 
information from the cultural parent.  
Of course, to transfer the relevant information, the cultural parent must recognise that 
they have the knowledge in which to do so, and that what they transmit results in the 
cultural offspring gaining some knowledge that they did not previously have. Davis-
Unger & Carlson (2008) found that children’s responses to metacognitive questions 
indicated that their understanding of their own power as an informed cultural parent 
advanced with age, such that they were able to reason how they knew that the cultural 
offspring had learned a task as a result of the information they had transmitted as a 
cultural parent by around 4.5 years of age. Such reasoning indicates the ability to apply 
a capacity greatly linked to mental state understanding; sophisticated level-two 
perspective taking, i.e., the ability to reason about how knowledge or beliefs about a 
common object or concept may differ between agents. Level-two perspective taking 
emerges in elicited tasks at around the age of 3 to 4 years of age (Pillow & Flavell, 1986) 
and continues to mature until around 8 years of age (Salatas & Flavell, 1976).  
Any perspective taking before 3 years of age tends to follow the model for level-one 
perspective taking, which only allows identification of common knowledge (i.e., what I 
can see, you can see) without any reasoning about differing knowledge or beliefs 
(Flavell et al., 1981). In Ashley & Tomasello (1998)’s task, children under 3 years of age 
did have some, albeit a limited, sense that their communicative partner had a different 
role, however, after 3 years of age, children began to develop a good grasp of their 
communicative partner’s point of view, and what they could do as a cultural parent, to 
change it. This suggests that children over the age of 3 years were beginning to access 
level-two processes akin to adult-like mental state understanding and using this 
newfound capacity to support their teaching ability.  
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However, as aforementioned, level-two perspective taking is found to continue to 
develop long after the recognised developmental milestone at 4 years of age. This 
developmental pattern is very common for higher-order capacities related to mental 
state understanding, meaning that children continue to gain additionally complex belief 
reasoning throughout childhood (discussed in more depth in Chapter 1). This increase 
has been found to benefit the selective transmission of information to others. 
One of the main questions in the current study relates to children’s ability, as a cultural 
parent, to select information that is particularly useful for a cultural offspring. There are 
relatively few studies exploring how young cultural parents identify information worthy 
of transmission. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one such study: Ronfard et 
al. (2016) studied children aged 4 to 7 years old, and found that children from 4 years 
of age preferentially transmitted information that they themselves had acquired from a 
cultural parent, compared with information they acquired through individual 
exploration. This preference was only visible when the transmittable information is 
deemed ‘more challenging to use’, or ‘difficult to acquire’ through individual 
exploration. In contrast, when difficulty for use and acquisition were equal for both 
information transmitted from a cultural parent and information that was self-
discovered, children were relatively less likely to transmit a method they had acquired 
from the cultural parent. This means that children were specifically selecting 
information for transmission if it was deemed that they (and therefore also potentially 
the offspring) could not have acquired that knowledge through individual exploration.  
Of course, the cost of both selecting information for transmission, and processing that 
information is high, and taking these costs into account is important when deciding 
what to transmit to a cultural offspring. For example, it is not beneficial to either party 
to teach more information than necessary, because this would require the cultural 
offspring to sift out what information is necessary to complete the desired task. 
Therefore, selective transmission of knowledge is required – particularly in 
circumstances where transmission is limited, as it is in the current task. This level of 
efficient teaching has been reported to increase between 3 and 7 years of age (Ronfard 
& Corriveau, 2016; Wood et al., 1995; Ziv et al., 2016). To transmit knowledge 
efficiently in this way, children must assess the cost of transmission relative to the 
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benefit to the cultural offspring. Children above 5 years of age have been found 
recognise the learner’s expected utility (Bridgers et al., 2016), for example, choosing to 
transmit difficult-to-learn methods for a return of the cultural offspring gaining a better 
reward. Children at this age will also transmit information at the expense of their own 
utility as long as the goal is being met (Gweon et al., 2014). This suggests that older 
children are able to make an accurate assessment of their own motivations and ability 
to transmit information.  
Along with the cost of producing the information to be transmitted, the requirement to 
understand the cultural offspring’s knowledge state means that information 
transmission on part of the cultural parent may carry quite a heavy cost. Judging by the 
adult participants’ performance in Chapter 3, this may be an essential element in the 
current task, because cultural parents transmitted information that allowed the cultural 
offspring to make correct inferences about the location of adjacent rewards. It has been 
argued that the adaptivity of information transmission depends on evaluation of 
whether the cultural offspring could acquire the information through exploration. It is 
potentially wasteful to transmit something that the cultural offspring could discover 
through trial and error in a short time, however to the benefits are more likely to 
outweigh the costs when transmitting something that the cultural offspring would be 
unable to discover on their own (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Fogarty et al., 2011). 
Therefore, as in the adult task (Chapter 3), in cases where a cultural parent can only 
send a limited amount of information to an cultural offspring, selecting the information 
that is the most useful to the cultural offspring will be the greatest support in terms of 
cumulative culture. Doing this requires the cultural parent to have some knowledge of 
the cultural offspring’s goals, current knowledge, and required knowledge. This thesis 
has already shown that adults can intentionally transmit information with these 
requirements in mind (Chapter 3), but the development of selective teaching to 
support cumulative culture has not been explored empirically.  
The current study aimed to assess age-related changes in the ability to intentionally 
select information from one’s own knowledge in a way that promotes an increase in 
acquired information over generations of transmission. We applied an experimental 
paradigm adapted from the one that was used in Chapter 3. The condition of 
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intentional knowledge transmission was directly compared to a condition in which 
knowledge from a cultural parent was acquired incidentally from the parent’s activity 
(reflecting the vast majority of social information use in non-humans, discussed in 
depth in Chapter 3).  
As aforementioned, we were particularly interested in whether transmission chains of 
younger children were able to accumulate information in circumstances where 
intentional information sharing was permitted. If this were to be the case, this would 
call into question the claims made in Chapter 3, that accumulation over generations can 
be attributed to the cultural parent’s sophisticated and distinctively human cognitive 
capacities. However, if chains of younger children are found not to benefit from 
intentional information sharing, this would add weight to the claims that cumulative 
culture may be distinct in humans as a result of similarly distinct cognitive prerequisites 
such as advanced mental state understanding. Based on the evidence supporting the 
relatively late development of mental state understanding, and its relationship to age 
related changes in teaching, we test the hypothesis that age-related changes will occur, 
such that younger children, compared to older children, will be unable to utilise 
intentional knowledge sharing to benefit accumulation over generations.  
To further investigate the mechanisms responsible, we also used an established 
measure of mental state understanding, testing all children prior to their completion of 
the main grid search task. Evaluating advanced capacities for mental state 
understanding in older children is more challenging than answering the more 
straightforward question of whether a child has a concept of mental states at all. As a 
result there are very few suitable tests for this in the literature, and the validity of many 
of these is debatable (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). We opted for the ‘Yoni task’ (Shamay-
Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The primary reason why we chose this measure over 
other established measures (such as the ‘strange stories’ tasks (Happe et al. 1994) was 
for ease of administration, particularly because we could scale down the Yoni task to fit 
within the time we were permitted to have children outside of their classroom. 
Furthermore, as well as measuring both first- and second-order mental state 
understanding, it also measures reasoning about metacognitive belief and intention 
(cognitive aspects) and reasoning about emotional mental states (affective aspects). 
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Therefore, using this measure meant we could assess multiple factors in a relatively 
short time frame.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies in the current literature that have 
used the Yoni task as a measure of the development of mental state understanding 
specifically.  However, its capacity to measure the multiple factors discussed above has 
been useful in assessing specific benefits of intervention strategies for children with 
impaired social cognition. For example, Kim et al. (2016) used 7- to 18-year-old 
children’s scores in the Yoni task as a measure to assess how children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) compensate for an impaired mental state understanding. The 
Yoni task has also been used in 6- to 12-year-old children to assist in identifying suitable 
stimulants for increasing social cognition in children with ADHD, with children scoring 
higher in trials following intervention compared to scores pre-intervention (Maoz et al., 
2014). These studies indicate that this measure is suitable for use with developmental 
populations. 
While this task has not been used extensively with children, it has been used to 
measure mental state understanding capacity in adult populations, particularly 
comparing neurotypical adults and older adults that may have an impaired higher-order 
understanding of mental states (Fischer et al., 2017; Rossetto et al., 2018). Because 
children are said to develop a capacity for second-order mental state understanding by 
the age of 7 years (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), we saw no reason as to why this test 
would not show the emergence of higher-order mental state understanding if 
administered correctly. We hoped that this measure would produce scores that could 
potentially be used as a predictor in our analyses, and that any age-related changes in 
performance on this task might correspond to age effects identified in the grid search 
task. 
For the main task, as in the previous chapter, participants took part in a search task 
which required them to locate hidden targets within landscapes segmented with a grid. 
Grid squares could be searched one at a time, and participants scored points by finding 
target segments using a limited lifespan of a finite number of unsuccessful search 
attempts. Information transmitted between participants included the location of grid 
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squares searched by the predecessor, and also whether this was a hit (part of a target) 
or a miss (not part of a target).  
To assess information transmission conditions across ages, we split participants into 
three age categories and concentrated chains within these categories: 5- to 6-year-old, 
7- to 8-year-old and 9- to 10-year-old. These age categories were chosen in order to 
assess how increased ability in the task emerges following the development of mental 
state understanding in the first instance. Specifically, we were interested in whether the 
increasing development of mental state understanding and perspective taking 
influences success in the older age groups relative to the younger age groups.  
The procedure for the main task follows a similar structure as the previous main task 
(Chapter 3). However, we made some parameter changes to account for testing large 
numbers of children of all ages. These edits were necessary because all children were 
tested in a school setting, and we endeavoured to reduce the amount of time spent out 
of class. Furthermore, we had some concerns about the concentration span of younger 
children and wished to limit the potential for fatigue effects. The main change we made 
in this respect was to reduce the number of grids given to each child to complete from 
ten to five to minimise the amount of time spent testing each child. To reduce the 
number of participants required we also reduced the length of transmission chains. 
Given that in the adult task we found that the scores achieved in chains plateaued 
earlier than we expected (around chain position six), we chose to reduce the size of 
chains from ten to five participants. We also made necessary edits to the instructions to 
make them more suitable for children to understand. The content of the instructions 
remained the same but some of the wording was made simpler, for example, ‘previous 
participant’ was changed to ‘previous space explorer’. The script read to children can be 
seen in Appendix 7. To ensure children understood the instructions, an understanding 
check questionnaire was included. Finally, some aesthetic changes were made to the 
task; however, these had no effect on the task structure. Further details about the 
changes made to the task can be found in the procedure section. 
In each age category, we ran 15 chains each composed of five participants, with five 
chains in each of three conditions: Full, Intentional and Inadvertent information. In the 
Full information condition, participants were shown all of the search feedback obtained 
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by the previous participant. In the Intentional information condition, each participant 
was asked to select a subset of the hits and misses they had revealed during in the 
search stage (three grid squares) for transmission to the next participant. In the 
Inadvertent information condition, an equivalent subset (three grid squares) was 
randomly selected from the feedback revealed during each participant’s search, and 
this formed the information transmitted to the next participant in the chain (see 
Methods for full details).  
We had no particular expectations about age effects in this task, other than that older 
children’s performance would be the most similar to the results found in the adult task. 
While we were most interested in the difference between results in the Intentional and 
Inadvertent conditions, it was also of some interest to assess whether there was a 
particular age group that could accumulate information in the Full condition. This would 
highlight a potential for benefitting from information about the previous participant’s 
performance, however in the absence of an advantage for intentional over inadvertent 
information transmission in the same age group, this would support the idea that the 
effect found in the adult task was due to the relative value of the information 
transmitted in the intentional condition.  
 
4.3  Methods 
4.3.1  Participants 
Two hundred and thirty three child participants aged between 5 years, 0 months and 10 
years, 11 months (Median = 7 years, 10 months, 116 females) were recruited in total, 
with data from six of these participants being excluded from the study due to 
experimenter error, technical error, or consent form errors (i.e., the parent had listed 
the child as being older or younger than their date of birth suggested, meaning that 
they did not belong in the category to which they had been assigned). The final sample 
consisted of 225 child participants aged between 5 years, 0 months and 10 years, 11 
months (Median = 7 years 11 months, 113 females, for breakdown of age categories, 
see Table 3). Participants were recruited from six different primary schools in the north 
of Scotland, with the minimum number of children collected from one school being 13, 
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and the maximum number being 46. Due to a technical error which was only discovered 
after data collection had been completed, the data from two of the participants from 
the 5- to 6-year age category was not fully recorded by the computer. However, for 
both of these participants, the information about their final scores and search attempts 
remaining had been recorded and therefore they were included in the primary analysis. 
However, because the data for which specific grid squares, they sent to the following 
participant were not recorded, this information was excluded from the relevant 






Descriptive statistics for each age category 
Category Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
5 to 6 years 5 years, 0 
months 
6 years, 11 
months 
6 years, 1 month 6 years, 1 
month 
7 to 8 years 7 years, 0 
months 
8 years, 11 
months 
7 years, 11 
months 
8 years, 0 
months 
9 to 10 years 9 years, 0 
months 
10 years, 11 
months 





75 participants were assigned to each of three conditions (Intentional, Inadvertent and 
Full information), with 25 in each age category (5 to 6 years, 7 to 8 years, and 9 to 10 
years). Five participants were assigned to each chain, hence there were five chains of 
each age category in each condition. Participants were assigned to a condition 
randomly, and chain position was constrained by the current state of completion of the 
chain to which they were recruited. Participants whose data was excluded were 
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replaced in that chain by a new participant, prior to further recruitment to that 
particular chain.  
The study was approved by the University of Stirling General University Ethics Panel 
(approval reference number: GUEP 557). Formal consent to conduct the study was 
obtained from The Highland Council education manager, and all head teachers gave 
consent for the experimenter to enter the school at least two weeks in advance of 
testing. Signed parental consent was obtained prior to testing which confirmed that 
children were permitted to take part in the experiment, and that this could be done 
during class time. Participants and their teachers also gave verbal consent before the 
participant was removed from their classroom. 
 
 
4.3.2  Mental state understanding test 
Before completing the experimental task, participants were given a test of mental state 
understanding adapted from Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz (2007)’s ‘Yoni task’. This 
task was run using PsychoPy v1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 2019), on either a Microsoft Surface 
tablet, or a Lenovo Yoga 520 touchscreen laptop in tablet mode, both using Windows 
10. 
All participants completed the mental state understanding test, however data from one 
participant in the 5- to 6-year-old age category and one participant from the 7- to 8-
year-old age category failed to record due to a technical error.  
Due to the adaptions we made to the task, and based on feedback received during 
informal piloting, we re-named the main protagonist in the task ‘Yanny’. Therefore this 
task will be referred to as the ‘Yanny task’ from this point forward. As in the original 
Yoni task, the Yanny task included separate trials testing for first- and second-order 
mental state understanding. All trials showed a yellow character (named ‘Yanny’) in the 
middle of a screen, a different image in each corner of the screen, and an incomplete 
sentence about Yanny at the top of the screen (as shown in Figures 22a and 22b). We 
reduced the number of trials in the original task so we could fit it within the timeframe 
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given to test each child, however, we ensured all of the essential elements of the 
original task were retained, such as at least one of each trial type. All of the stimuli 
images were re-created because the original task images contained some ambiguity 
about where some characters were looking, which we thought likely to affect children’s 
ability to successfully select target images. Otherwise, the layout of the task was the 
same.  
Children were asked to complete sentences that are assumed to require inference 
about a character’s cognitive, physical or affective state. In the First-order trials the 
child had to make a judgement about Yanny’s state in relation to particular objects. 
However in the Second-order trials the child had to make a judgement about Yanny’s 
state in relation to objects that could only be identified with reference to another 
character’s state. All of the sentences children were asked to complete can be seen in 
the stimuli shown in Appendix 5 and 6. 
Figure 22a  






An example of a trial assessing Second-order mental state understanding.  
 
 
Note. Children were read the sentence at the top of the screen and were asked to 





4.3.3  Procedure: Mental state understanding test 
Children were read brief instructions (Appendix 5 and 6) which introduced the Yanny 
character and explained that they were to select the object or person that Yanny was 
having a thought or a feeling about. Following this, children were shown 24 images 
which were headed with an incomplete sentence that could be completed by selecting 
one of four stimuli situated in the corners of the screen. 
An experimenter read aloud the sentence shown at the top of the screen and asked the 
child to select which of the four objects would correctly complete the sentence. Once 
the child selected an object, the next trial was shown. Participants completed 12 First-
order trials in the first stage, all of which were assumed to require first-order mental 
state understanding to complete (e.g., “Yanny likes____”). Following this, children 
completed 22 Second-order trials in the second stage, all of which were assumed to 
require second-order mental state understanding to complete (e.g., “Yanny likes the 
animal that ____ does not like”). All children completed the blocks and trials in the 
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same order. The reason for running the stages in the same order was based on a 
pragmatic decision to test all children using the easiest condition first (the First-order 
block). In the lead up to running this experiment it was decided that running the trials in 
the same order would be the easiest option, however in hindsight randomizing the 
order of the trials would have avoided any potential confounds caused by practice 
effects.  
Nonetheless, the potential for practice effects was relatively limited. The experimenter 
did not react to the child’s selection, and there were no built-in indicators of success. 
Therefore, children were given no feedback regarding whether or not they had made 





4.3.4  The experimental task 
The task completed by the participants was a landscape searching challenge loosely 
based on the game ‘Battleships’. This task was run using PsychoPy 1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 
2019), on either a Microsoft Surface tablet, or a Lenovo Yoga 520 touchscreen laptop in 
tablet mode, both running Windows 10.  
Participants were presented with a series of five 16x16 grids, in each of which three 3x3 
targets (ships) could be found. Targets were randomly placed, and consisted of nine 
grid points (See Figure 23). The reward landscape was randomised for each chain, such 
that within chains, participants completed the same five grids. A new random set of 
grids was generated for each chain, meaning that there were 45 new sets of grids 
generated in total. Participants could search the grid for targets by touching any of the 
grid squares. When part of a target was found, these were scored as ‘hits’, and 
selection of any of the non-target grid squares in the 16x16 grid were scored as 
‘misses’. The participant’s primary goal was to maximise their score by finding as many 
hits as possible, across all five grids.  
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Participants used up one of their limited search attempts for every grid square they 
selected which did not contain part of a target. In contrast, when participants selected a 
target grid square, the number of search attempts did not reduce, and they were 
instead awarded one point. This scoring system was intended to capture the relative 
payoffs typically associated with real-world subsistence activity, with fruitless search 
always costly, and success always profitable. A maximum score of 27 points was 
available in each grid (nine for every full target), and participants were allotted nine 
search attempts in which to find them. This meant that the score for each grid varied 
depending on how many hits and misses were found. For example, if all 27 target points 
were found without any error, the score for that grid would be 27, with nine search 
attempts remaining and exactly 27 grid squares revealed. If no targets were found, the 
score for that grid would be zero, with all search attempts used and only nine (miss) 
grid squares revealed.  
The first participant in each chain received no information about the contents of any of 
the grid squares, other than that generated by their own search. All other participants 
in the chain received some information about their immediate predecessor’s 
performance for each grid.  
The same pre-specified reward landscape was kept consistent for each grid completed 
by a particular chain, such that the results of the predecessor’s search held true for the 
successor. Depending on the condition, participants saw some or all of the outcome of 
their predecessor’s search (including whether each revealed grid point was a hit or a 
miss). The nature of the information varied by condition as detailed below: 
Full Information (control): With the exception of the first in each chain, each participant 
was shown all of the search feedback obtained by the previous participant. Thus, 
participants received information about the value of between nine and 36 grid squares.  
Intentional Information: At the end of their search, each participant in this condition 
was asked to select a subset of the hits and misses they had revealed during the search 
stage (three grid squares). Thus, the information that each participant received 




Inadvertent Information: A randomly selected subset (three grid squares) of the grid 
squares revealed during each participant’s search were passed on to the next 
participant in the chain. Thus, as in the Intentional condition, participants in this 
condition received information about the value of three grid squares. This condition 
was therefore intended to be analogous to using ‘public information’ (e.g., Danchin et 
al. (2004)), available as a by-product of another’s activity, as long as the observer 










Demonstration of information transmission between two generations.  
 
 
Note. Filled purple grid squares indicate a hit, filled red grid squares indicate a miss. 
Striped grid squares in the rightmost grids indicate information that was transmitted 
from the cultural parent but not subsequently selected by the cultural offspring. Blue 
arrows represent the direction of transmission.   
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4.3.5  Procedure: The experimental task 
Following the consent procedure, participants were pseudo-randomly assigned a 
condition and chain position according to the constraints detailed in the Participants 
section.  
To make the task more appealing to children, we changed the task stimuli from 
‘battleships’ to ‘spaceships’. This aesthetic change only included switching the colour of 
hits from green to purple, the hit noise from an ‘explosion’ to an ‘alien blip’, and the 
background from plain grey to a colourful space-themed scene.  
Participants were provided with thorough instructions on screen before beginning the 
experiment. These instructions were adapted from the adult task instructions to be 
easier for children to understand. These instructions included picture examples of an 
unselected grid square, a selected hit, a selected miss and a full 3x3 target. Participants 
were also given instructions about the constraints on their search activity for any given 
grid, i.e., that the program would advance to a new grid when either all nine search 
attempts had been used up, or when all 27 scoring tiles (i.e., three complete targets) 
had been selected (see description of experimental task in section 4.3.4). Following the 
instructions, participants were presented with an understanding check quiz (Appendix 
4) that ensured they could identify a 3x3 target, recall how many full targets were 
hidden, and, with the exception of the first participant in the chain, remember which 
transmissions from a previous participant indicated a hit and a miss. Children were 
given the quiz as soon as the instruction screens ended, and were encouraged to 
discuss the instructions until they had correctly answered all of the questions. The quiz 
was repeated at the end of the task to ensure they were still aware of the instructions. 
Children could refer to the quiz for reminders of the shape of the targets throughout 
the task.  
If a participant was in generation 1 (i.e., the first participant in a chain of five), then they 
received no information about the location of hits or misses. Participants in all other 
chain positions received some information about the grid, as detailed in the description 
of the experimental task. In all conditions, participants were told that they would 
receive some information from a previous participant’s performance, and that they 
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could use this information however they wished. Details about the source of the 
information was not explicitly disclosed to participants.  
In the event that participants stalled their search due to distraction, the experimenter 
gave them a prompt (such as “find the alien spaceship”). The full list of prompts used 
can be seen in Appendix 3. After participants had completed their own search, in the 
Intentional condition, they were also required to make decisions about the information 
to be transmitted to the next participant in the chain. Participants in this condition were 
therefore made aware that the information was to be sent to a future participant who 
would be presented with the same task they had just completed. Following each grid 
search, they were asked to select three of the grid squares from the selections that 
they had made for any given grid.  
After all five grids had been searched, participants were shown their final score (total 
hits selected across all five grids). Participants were given the opportunity to choose a 
reward sticker for participating.  
 
4.4  Results 
All generalised linear mixed models were performed using R (R Core Team, 2020) and 
lme4 (Bates et al., 2014). Graphs were created using ggplot 2 performed on R Studio 
(RStudio Team, 2020), supported by R version 4.0.2.  
Non-convergent and singular fit models were addressed by removing random variance, 
however models with the maximum random effects structure (Barr et al., 2013) were 
considered first. Post-hoc comparisons were done using the emmeans package (Lenth 
et al., 2019). Tests were two-tailed, and p-values of < .05 were taken as statistically 
significant. Emmeans using the Tukey adjustment was used for multiple comparisons, 
and emtrends was used to assess interactions between slopes when significant 




4.4.1  Mental state understanding test 
The proportion of correct responses recorded in each trial can be seen in (Figure 24). 
Generalized linear models were conducted to assess possible practise effects in the 
First- and Second-order stages. Each stage was conducted as a separate model. 
Children’s response to trials was included as a binary dependant variable. 
In both models, a significant main effect of trial number was found (First-order: (b = 
0.015, SE = 0.002, t(2674) = 7.035, p < .001); Second-order: (b = 0.004, SE = 0.0006, 
t(4904) = 5.632, p < .001)). This suggests that practice effects were present in both 
conditions. 
A general linear mixed effects model was conducted using stage and age category as 
fixed effects, including stimulus type (physical, cognitive, affective), and trial number as 
random effects. A significant main effect of stage was found (b = 0.423, SE = 0.119, z = 
3.544, p = < .001).  
Emmeans was used to explore this main effect further, firstly comparing the differences 
between stages within each age category. Scores in the First-order condition were 
significantly lower than in the Second-order condition in the 5- to 6-year age category 
(b = -0.423, SE = 0.119, z = -3.544, p < .001), in the 7- to 8-year age category (b = -0.890, 
SE = 0.134, z = -6.652, p < .001), and in the 9- to 10-year age category (b = -0.318, SE = 
0.137, z = -2.328, p = .020).  
Following this, emmeans was used to compare differences between age categories 
within stage. In the First-order condition, scores were significantly higher in the 9- to 
10-year age category compared with the 5- to 6-year age category (b = 0.518, SE = 
0.129, z = 4.006, p < .001), and in the 9- to 10-year age category compared with the 7- 
to 8-year age category (b = 0.400, SE = 0.131, z = 3.051, p = .006). Scores in the 5- to 6-
year age category were not significantly different from scores in the 7- to 8-year age 
category (b = -0.118, SE = 0.121, z = -0.972, p = .594). In the Second-order condition, 
scores were significantly higher in the 7- to 8-year age category compared with the 5- 
to 6-year age category (b = 0.585, SE = 0.122, z = 4.796, p < .001), and in the 9- to 10-
year age category compared with the 5- to 6-year age category (b = 0.413, SE = 0.117, z 
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= 3.453, p = .001). Scores were not significantly different in the 7- to 8-year age 
category compared with the 9- to 10-year age category (b = 0.172, SE = 0.130, z = 
1.323, p = .383).  
In this analysis, neither the expected age effects, or stage effects were found, and it is 
likely that this was largely as a result of performances close to ceiling in all groups for 
both stages. This gave a good indication that the test was not providing a sensitive 
measure, and that it was failing to pick up individual differences in advanced mental 
state understanding, rendering it of little value to use as a predictor in our analyses of 
the main task. For this reason, the results of this task were not used to bolster claims 




Figure 24  
Proportion of correct responses recorded in the First-order and Second-order mental state understanding test trials.  
 
Note. Split by age category and stage. Error areas represent +/- 1 standard error
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4.4.2  Mean scores and search attempts remaining over generations of 
learners. 
First, we examined the scores at chain position 1 using condition as the independent 
variable, and chain included as a random variable. The Intentional condition was used 
as the intercept. We conducted separate analyses for scores and search attempts 
remaining, and within each we conducted models comparing age within condition, and 
condition within age (12 separate models). Scores and search attempts remaining at 
chain position 1 were all non-significantly different, apart from scores in the Full 
condition between the 5- to 6-year age group scored significantly lower than the 9- to 
10-year age group (b = -15.0, SE = 5, t(12) = -2.998, p = .028). However, if the 
appropriate Bonferroni corrections were run, taking into account that this would 
include 12 tests, this would unquestionably be returned as non-significant.  
 
4.4.2a  Comparing condition within age category 
To assess the differences between the conditions in each age category, we split the 
data by age category. We conducted three models with ‘score’ as a dependant variable, 
and three models with ‘search attempts remaining’ (both numeric) as the dependant 
variable.  
 
Mean scores  
A separate model was run for each age category. Therefore, in each model, only the 
data from the specified age category was used in order to compare the differences 
between conditions within that age category alone. In these models, we included 
condition and chain position (centred) as independent variables, chain is included as a 






5- to 6-year-old chains: 
For the dependent variable of score, a significant main effect was found for chain 
position (centred) in the 5- to 6-year-old chains (b = 34.700, SE = 13.964, t(69) = 2.485, 
p = .015).  
In the 5- to 6-year-old chains, scores were not significantly different in the Full 
condition when compared to the Intentional condition (b = 3.56, SE = 5.59, t(69) = 
0.637, p = .800). Scores in the Full condition were not significantly different when 
compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 7.36, SE = 5.59, t(69) = 1.318, p = .390). 
There was also no significant difference between scores in the Intentional condition 
compared with the Inadvertent condition (b = 3.80, SE = 5.59, t(69) = 0.680, p = .776).  
In the 5- to 6-year-old chains, no significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the Full and Intentional conditions (b = 14.8, SE = 19.7, 
t(69) = 0.749, p = .735) or between the Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 25.0, SE = 
19.7, t(69) = 1.266, p = .419). No significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 10.2, SE = 
19.7, t(69) = 0.517, p = .864). 
 
7- to 8-year-old chains: 
For the dependent variable of score, a marginally non-significant main effect was found 
for chain position (centred) in the 7- to 8-year-old chains (b = 29.600, SE = 14.914, t(69) 
= 1.985, p = .0511).  
In the 7- to 8-year-old chains, participants’ scores in the Full condition were significantly 
higher than in the Intentional condition (b = 16.72, SE = 5.97, t(69) = 2.803, p = .018). 
There was a marginally non-significant difference between scores in the Full compared 
to Inadvertent condition (b = 13.20, SE = 5.97, t(69) = 2.213, p = .076), and no 
significant difference between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 3.52, SE = 
5.97, t(69) = 0.590, p = .826).  
In the 7- to 8-year-old chains, a significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the Full and Intentional condition (b = 79.1, SE = 21.1, 
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t(69) = 3.750, p = .001) and a significant interaction was found between the Full and 
Inadvertent conditions (b = 85.7, SE = 21.1, t(69) = 4.063, p < .001). No significant 
interaction of score increase over chain positions was found between the Intentional 
and Inadvertent conditions (b = -6.6, SE = 21.1, t(69) = -0.313, p = .948). 
 
9- to 10-year-old chains: 
For the dependent variable of score, a significant main effect was found for chain 
position (centred) in the 9- to 10-year-old chains (chain included as a random variable) 
(b = 61.900, SE = 9.457, t(74) = 6.545, p < .001). 
In the 9- to 10-year-old chains, participants’ scores were higher in the Full condition 
compared with the Inadvertent condition (b = 22.36, SE = 3.78, t(65) = 5.911, p < .001). 
Comparable to the pattern identified in adults, scores in the Intentional condition were 
significantly higher than those in the Inadvertent condition (b = 23.92, SE = 3.78, t(65) = 
6.323, p < .001), and scores in the Full condition were not significantly different than 
those in the Intentional condition (b = -1.56, SE = 3.78, t(65) = -0.412, p = .911).  
In the 9- to 10-year-old chains, a significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the Full and Intentional conditions (b = 45.1, SE = 13.4, 
t(65) = 3.372, p = .004) and between the Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 51.6, SE = 
13.4, t(65) = 3.858, p < .001). No significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 6.5, SE = 
13.4, t(65) = 0.486, p = .878). 
 
Mean search attempts remaining  
A separate model was run for each age category. Therefore, in each model, only the 
data from the specified age category was used in order to compare the differences 
between conditions within that age category alone. In these models, we included 
condition and chain position (centred) as independent variables, chain is included as a 




5- to 6-year-old chains:  
There was no significant main effect found for centred chain position in the 5- to 6-
year-old age category (chain included as a random variable) (b = 1.80, SE = 1.248, t(74) 
= 1.441, p = .154). 
In the 5- to 6-year-old chains, the sum of search attempts remaining was not 
significantly different between the Full condition and the Intentional condition (b = 
0.48, SE = 0.5, t(65) = 0.961, p = .604), or between the Full condition and Inadvertent 
condition (b = 0.88, SE = 0.5, t(65) = 1.762, p = .191). The sum of search attempts 
remaining was also not significant between the Intentional condition and the 
Inadvertent condition (b = 0.40, SE = 0.5, t(65) = 0.801, p = .704).  
In the 5- to 6-year-old category, no significant interaction of increase in search attempts 
remaining over chain positions was found between the Full and Intentional conditions 
(b = 1.9, SE = 1.77, t(65) = 1.076, p = .532), or between the Intentional and Inadvertent 
conditions (b = 2.0, SE = 1.77, t(65) = 1.132, p = .497). A non-significant difference was 
also found between the Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 3.9, SE = 1.77, t(65) = 
2.208, p = .077). 
 
7- to 8-year-old chains: 
There was no significant main effect found for centred chain position in the 7- to 8-
year-old age category (chain included as a random variable) (b = 0.50, SE = 2.172, t(74) 
= 0.230, p = .818). However, in the 7- to 8-year-old chains, the sum of the search 
attempts remaining was significantly higher in the Full condition when compared to the 
Intentional condition (b = 9.28, SE = 0.9, t(65) = 10.681, p < .001), and significantly 
higher in the Full condition when compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 9.12, SE = 
0.9, t(65) = 10.497, p < .001). There was no significant difference between search 
attempts remaining in the Intentional condition compared with the Inadvertent 
condition (b = -0.16, SE = 0.9, t(65) = -0.184, p = .982). 
In the 7- to 8-year-old chains, a significant interaction of increase in search attempts 
remaining over chain positions was found between the Full and Intentional condition (b 
= 25.9, SE = 3.07, t(65) = 8.432, p < .001) and between increase in search attempts 
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remaining in the Full and Inadvertent conditions (b = 27.6, SE = 3.07, t(65) = 8.985, p < 
.001). No significant interaction of the increase of search attempts remaining over chain 
positions was found between the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions (b = 1.7, SE = 
3.07, t(65) = 0.553, p = .845). 
 
9- to 10-year-old chains: 
There was a significant main effect found for centred chain position the 9- to 10-year-
old age category (b = 13.90, SE = 2.504, t(74) = 5.551, p < .001). In the 9- to 10-year-old 
chains, the sum of search attempts remaining was significantly higher in the Full 
condition when compared to the Inadvertent condition (b = 7.12, SE = 1, t(65) = 7.108, 
p < .001), and significantly higher in the Intentional condition when compared to the 
Inadvertent condition (b = 4.80, SE = 1, t(65) = 4.792, p < .001). There was a marginally 
non-significant difference between search attempts remaining in the Full condition 
compared with the Intentional condition (b = 2.32, SE = 1, t(65) = 2.316, p = .060). 
In the 9- to 10-year-old chains, a significant interaction of increase in search attempts 
remaining over chain positions was found between the Full and Intentional condition (b 
= 11.5, SE = 3.54, t(65) = 3.247, p = .005), between the Full and Inadvertent conditions 
(b = 25.2, SE = 3.54, t(65) = 7.116, p < .001), and between the Intentional and 
Inadvertent conditions (b = 13.7, SE = 3.54, t(65) = 3.869, p < .001). 
 
4.4.2b  Comparing age category within condition 
To assess the differences between the age categories in each condition, we split the 
data by condition. We conducted three models with ‘score’ as a dependant variable, 
and three models with ‘search attempts remaining’ as the dependant variable.  
 
Mean scores 
A separate model was run for each condition. Therefore, in each model, only the data 
from the specified condition was used in order to compare the differences between age 
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categories within that condition alone. In these models, we included age category and 
chain position (centred) as independent variables, chain is included as a random 




A significant main effect was found for centred chain position in the Full condition 
(chain included as a random variable) (b = 49.5, SE = 10.46, t(74) = 4.732, p < .001). In 
the Full condition, the sum score was significantly lower for 5- to 6-year-olds when 
compared to 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 29.12, SE = 6.82, t(12) = 4.272, p = .003), and 
significantly lower for 5- to 6-year-olds when compared to 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -
36.60, SE = 6.82, t(12) = -5.370, p < .001). There was no significant difference between 
scores for 7- to 8-year-olds compared with 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -7.48, SE = 6.82, t(12) 
= -1.097, p = .534). 
In the Full condition, a significant interaction of score increase over chain positions was 
found between the 5- to 6-year-olds and 7- to 8-year-olds (b = -59.2, SE = 14.8, t(57) = -
4.002, p < .001) and between the 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -57.5, SE 
= 14.8, t(57) = -3.887, p < .001). No significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 1.7, SE = 
14.8, t(57) = .115, p = .993). 
 
Intentional Condition: 
A significant main effect was found for centred chain position in the Intentional 
condition (chain included as a random variable) (b = 34.7, SE = 13.752, t(74) = 2.523, p = 
.014. In the Intentional condition, there was a non-significant difference between 
scores for 5- to 6-year-olds compared with 7- to 8-year-olds (b = -16.0, SE = 6.65, t(12) = 
-2.399, p = .080). The sum score was significantly lower for 5- to 6-year-olds when 
compared to the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -41.7, SE = 6.65, t(12) = -6.272, p < .001), and 
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significantly lower for 7- to 8-year-olds when compared to 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -25.8, 
SE = 6.65, t(12) = -3.872, p = .006). 
In the Intentional condition, no significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 5.1, SE 
= 19.4, t(57) = 0.262, p = .963), between the 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (b 
= -27.2, SE = 19.4, t(57) = -1.399, p = .348). or between the 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 
10-year-olds (b = -32.3, SE = 19.4, t(57) = -1.661, p = .229). 
 
Inadvertent Condition: 
A non-significant main effect was found for centred chain position in the Inadvertent 
condition (chain included as a random variable) (b = 24.5, SE = 12.914, t(74) = 1.897, p = 
.062). In the Inadvertent condition, the sum score was significantly lower for 5- to 6-
year-olds when compared to 7- to 8-year-olds (b = -23.28, SE = 5.46, t(12) = -4.261, p = 
.003), and significantly lower for 5- to 6-year-olds when compared to 9- to 10-year-olds 
(b = -21.60, SE = 5.46, t(12) = -3.954, p = .005). There was no significant difference 
between scores for 7- to 8-year-olds compared with 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 1.68, SE = 
5.46, t(12) = 0.308, p = .949). 
In the Inadvertent condition, no significant interaction of score increase over chain 
positions was found between 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 1.5, SE = 
18.3, t(57) = 0.082, p = .996), between the 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -
30.9, SE = 18.3, t(57) = -1.692, p = .217), or between the 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 10-
year-olds (b = -32.4, SE = 18.3, t(57) = -1.774, p = .189). 
 
Mean search attempts remaining  
A separate model was run for each condition. Therefore, in each model, only the data 
from the specified condition was used in order to compare the differences between age 
categories within that condition alone. In these models, we included age category and 
chain position (centred) as independent variables, chain is included as a random 
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No significant main effect of centred chain position was found in the Full condition 
(chain included as a random variable) (b = 3.7, SE = 2.631, t(74) = 1.406, p = .164).  
In the Full condition, the sum of search attempts remaining was significantly lower for 
the 5- to 6-year-olds when compared to 7- to 8-year-olds (b = -8.80, SE = 1.57, t(12) = -
5.613, p < .001), and significantly lower for the 5- to 6-year-olds when compared to 9- 
to 10-year-olds (b = -6.24, SE = 1.57, t(12) = -3.980, p = .005). There was no significant 
difference between search attempts remaining for the 7- to 8-year-olds compared with 
the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 2.56, SE = 1.57, t(12) = 1.633, p = .270). 
In the Full condition, a significant interaction of increase in search attempts remaining 
over chain positions was found between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds 
(b = -22.7, SE = 3.72, t(57) = -6.101, p < .001) and between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 
9- to 10-year-olds (b = -12.7, SE = 3.72, t(57) = -5.832, p < .001). No significant 
interaction of increase in search attempts remaining over chain positions was found 
between the 7- to 8-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 1, SE = 3.72, t(57) = 0.269, 
p = .961). 
 
Intentional Condition: 
No significant main effect of centred chain position was found in the Intentional 
condition (chain included as a random variable) (b = 1.80, SE = 1.843, t(74) = 0.976, p = 
.332).  
In the Intentional condition, there was no significant difference between search 
attempts remaining between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 0, SE = 
1.37, t(12) = 0, p = 1). The number of search attempts remaining was significantly lower 
for the 7- to 8-year-olds when compared to the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -4.4, SE = 1.37, 
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t(12) = -3.207, p = .019), and significantly lower for the 5- to 6-year-olds when 
compared to the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -4.4, SE = 1.37, t(12) = -3.207, p = .019). 
In the Intentional condition, no significant interaction of increase in search attempts 
remaining over chain positions was found between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 
8-year-olds (b = 1.3, SE = 2.61, t(57) = 0.499, p = .872). A significant interaction of 
increase in search attempts remaining over chain positions was found between the 5- 
to 6-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -12.1, SE = 2.61, t(57) = -4.641, p < .001), 
and between the 7- to 8-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -13.4, SE = 2.61, t(57) 
= -5.140, p < .001). 
 
Inadvertent Condition: 
No significant main effect of centred chain position was found in the Inadvertent 
condition (b = -0.2, SE = 0.683, t(69) = -0.293, p = .771). In the Inadvertent condition, no 
significant differences in search attempts remaining were found between the 5- to 6-
year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (b = -0.56, SE = 0.273, t(69) = -2.049, p = .108), 
between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 0, SE = 0.273, t(69) = 0, p = 
1), or between the 7- to 8-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 0.56, SE = 0.273, 
t(69) = 2.049, p = .108).  
In the Inadvertent condition, no significant interaction was found between the 5- to 6-
year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 1.0, SE = 0.966, t(69) = 1.035, p = .557), 
between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -0.4, SE = 0.966, t(69) = -
0.414, p = .910), or between the 7- to 8-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds (b = -1.4, 
SE = 0.966, t(69) = -1.449, p = .322),   
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Figure 25  
Mean score at each chain position for each condition and age category.  
 




Mean search attempts remaining at each chain position for each condition and age 
category.  
 




4.4.3  Proportion of hits transmitted in each age category 
Paired t-tests were used to compare the proportion of hits available with the 
proportion of hits transmitted in each age category. In the 5- to 6-year-olds, the 
proportion of hits transmitted was significantly greater than the proportion of hits 
available (t(119) = 7.660, p < .001). In the 7- to 8-year-olds, the proportion of hits 
transmitted was also significantly greater than the proportion of hits available (t(124) = 
4.766, p < .001). In the 9- to 10-year-olds, the proportion of hits transmitted was also 
significantly greater than the proportion of hits available (t(124) = 6.933, p < .001).  
We performed a linear model comparing the proportion of hits to misses transmitted 
across age groups, using the proportion of hits to misses available (centred) as an 
interaction variable. It was found that 5- to 6-year-olds transmitted a significantly 
higher proportion of hits to misses compared with the proportion of hits to misses 
available than 7- to 8-year-olds (b = 11.03, SE = 4.23, t(364) = 2.606, p = .026). This 
difference was not significant between the 5- to 6-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds (b = 
7.04, SE = 4.56, t(364) = 1.544, p = .272) or between the 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 10-




Figure 27  
Proportion of hits transmitted compared with the proportion of hits available.  
 
Note. Error areas represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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4.4.4  The proportion of each tile position selected for transmission in each 
condition and age category 
The data used in this analysis only included information that was produced following a 
search that uncovered one or more complete targets. Only information generated from 
complete targets (i.e., no partial targets or misses) was used. The proportion of each 
tile position selected for transmission in each condition and each age category can be 
seen in Figure 28. 
The positions sent within each ship were analysed to determine whether information 
senders sent any particular tile position more frequently. The data for this analysis only 
included tile positions sent from complete targets (out of 750 targets available across 
all chains, chain positions and grids in each condition for each age category: 5- to 6-
year-olds: Full condition, n = 39; Intentional condition, n = 36, Inadvertent condition n = 
20; 7- to 8-year-olds: Full condition, n = 116; Intentional condition, n = 61, Inadvertent 
condition n = 72; 9- to 10-year-olds: Full condition, n = 125; Intentional condition, n = 
118, Inadvertent condition n = 59). 
To explore whether central tiles were transmitted more often relative to other target 
segment positions, we first compared the proportion of each target segment selection 
to a chance level selection. This analysis takes into account that there is only one 
central segment and eight edge segments in each target, and therefore this chance 
level was set to 0.11. Binomial tests were then carried out to determine which tile 
positions were sent significantly more or less than chance.  
Pearson’s Chi-Square tests were used to compare the distribution of transmitted 
segments sent in the Intentional condition in each age category to a uniform 
distribution. It was found that the distribution was not significantly different from a 
uniform distribution in the 5- to 6-year-old age category (x(8) = 6.234, p = .621, n = 20) 
or the 7- to 8-year-old age category (x(8) = 6.267, p = .617, n = 72). A significant 
difference was found in the 9- to 10-year-old age category (x(8) = 21.726, p = .005, n = 
59). 
Pearson’s Chi-Square tests were used to compare the distribution of transmitted 
segments sent in the Inadvertent condition in each age category with a uniform 
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distribution. The distribution in all age categories was found to be not significantly 
different from a uniform distribution (5- to 6-year-olds: (x(8) = 1.922, p = .983, n = 36); 
7- to 8-year-olds: x(8) = 2.655, p = .954, n = 61; 9- to 10-year-olds : x(8) = 1.228, p = 
.996, n = 118). 
Because of the low numbers of complete ships uncovered, binomial tests were used to 
compare the proportion of centre tiles sent with the proportion of edges (non-central 
target tiles) sent. Again, this analysis takes into account that there is only one centre tile 
in each target, and eight edge tiles in each target. The proportion of centre tiles sent by 
the 5- to 6-year-olds was significantly different from the number of edges sent (x2(1) = 
5.951, p = .015). This comparison was also significantly different in both other age 
categories (7- to 8-year-olds: x2(1) = 11.17, p < .001; 9- to 10-year-olds: x2(1) = 58.663, p 
< .001). 
Chi-Square tests were also used to compare the proportion of centre tiles sent between 
age categories. The proportion of centre tiles sent was not significantly different 
between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the 7- to 8-year-olds (x2(1) = 11.88 p = 1), between 
the 7- to 8-year-olds and 9- to 10-year-olds categories (x2(1) = 0.796, p = .372) or 




Figure 28  
The mean proportion of each target segment selected for transmission in each 
condition. Split by age category.  
 
Note. This graph incudes data from only completely uncovered targets. This graph 
therefore does not include any data from partially uncovered targets. X-axis values 
correspond to particular target segments. For example, “topleft” refers to the top left 





4.5  Discussion  
The overarching aim of the previous (Chapter 3) and current studies was to assess 
whether cumulative culture is facilitated by intentional knowledge transmission from 
the cultural parent to the cultural offspring, relative to circumstances where knowledge 
from a cultural parent is acquired incidentally from their performance. In the previous 
study (Chapter 3), we found that adults successfully accumulated information using 
intentionally transmitted subsets of the previous participant’s search. This 
accumulation was just as successful in circumstances where participants had full access 
to the previous participant’s search history. In contrast, in circumstances where 
participants had access to an inadvertent subset of information, accumulation was less 
successful. However, while this study supports theories claiming cumulative culture 
relies on distinctively human cognitive mechanisms, adults’ information transmissions 
were only speculatively attributed to these mechanisms, and more specifically, an 
understanding of other’s mind states.  
To add weight to claims of human distinctiveness, the current study aimed to explore 
the developmental trajectory of the capacity for intentional information transmission. 
Given that children begin to develop a suite of cognitive mechanisms that may facilitate 
cumulative culture at around 4 years of age, and continue to develop these throughout 
childhood (Chapter 1), we expected to find that chains of younger children would be 
unable to accumulate information over generations due to the underdeveloped state of 
these mechanisms. As such, we expected to find an age-related increase in the ability to 
select information that facilitates cumulative culture at the population level, consistent 
with the developmental trajectory of capacities like mental state understanding.  
We found that task scores increased over learner generations for the 5- to 6-year-olds, 
however, all conditions increased at the same rate. This suggests that 5- to 6-year-olds 
did not fully benefit from the information available to them (since there was no 
apparent advantage even for full, over incomplete, information).  
We also found an increase in task scores over generations in the 7- to 8-year-olds. 
However, in this age group, scores in the Intentional condition and scores in the 
Inadvertent condition increased at the same rate, but the increase was significantly 
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greater in the Full condition. This suggests that lifting the bottleneck on transmission 
meant that children were able to use more information to their advantage, compared 
with younger children. However, it also suggests that children in this age group were 
either unable to select the most beneficial information for transmission, or were unable 
to derive the intended benefit from this, since there was no advantage for the 
intentional, over inadvertent, condition. Having fewer information points hindered their 
performance regardless.  
In the 9- to 10-year-old age group, we found the same increase in task scores over 
generations of learners. Chains in the Full condition showed a greater increase in scores 
than chains in the Intentional condition. However, both of these conditions increased at 
a significantly greater rate than the Inadvertent condition. This result confirms that 
intentionally selected information offers benefits over and above a randomly produced 
sample. 
We found a very similar pattern of results with regards to the search attempts 
remaining following a search. The 5- to 6-year-old chains consistently failed to conserve 
any search attempts in any of the conditions, and 7- to 8-year-old chains only 
conserved search attempts in the Full condition, with the number of search attempts 
remaining increasing over the course of the chains. The 9- to 10-year-old chains, 
however, increased the number of search attempts remaining over the course of chains 
in both the Full and Intentional conditions. This implies that children not only became 
gradually better at accumulating information with age, but were also able to use that 
information with a greater deal of efficiency (i.e., using fewer search attempts).  
The pattern of results found in the 9- to 10-year-old age group matches the pattern 
found in the data collected from the adult sample in Chapter 3. This suggests that 
children at this age are, at least approaching, the level of cognitive sophistication 
required to make complex judgements about what information can be useful to others. 
This allowed participants to anticipate what information the cultural offspring may 
need, and in turn make deliberate choices specifically to fulfil that need. The fact that 
this pattern of results does not emerge until around 9 to 10 years of age suggests that 
the capacities argued to support intentional information sending in really young 
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children, such as mental state understanding, are not sophisticated enough to apply to 
scenarios like this until much later in development.  
We conducted an exploratory analysis of transmission behaviour in the Intentional 
condition only. This revealed that children of all age groups selected a 
disproportionately high number of hits for transmission. Despite the stark differences 
between age groups in their accumulation of information, we found no significant 
differences between age groups in this analysis. Information about hits (compared with 
misses) is much more useful for the cultural offspring, who holds the same goal to score 
as many points as possible. By selecting the same hit tile, the cultural offspring is 
guaranteed to gain one point, and they also have a greater chance of locating the 
adjacent target tiles because of their clustered layout. Conversely, sending a miss 
location only slightly increases the chance of the receiver gaining a point, compared 
with sending no information at all. The finding that even very young children preferred 
to transmit information about a target when it was available suggests that this bias, also 
seen in the adult participants, may not require a complex understanding of the needs of 
the learner.  
It is perhaps surprising, despite participants in the Intentional condition having a clear 
bias for transmitting hit information across all age categories, that we still found striking 
age effects in score increases. These biases clearly allowed cultural offspring in the 9- to 
10-year-old age group to perform extremely well with a very limited information 
regarding their predecessor’s search. However, the same could not be said for the 
younger age groups. It is possible that there was something intrinsically strategic about 
the specific locations of the hits being sent in the 9- to 10-year-old age group. 
Therefore, we evaluated the strategic placement of hits transmitted by each age 
category to assess whether something about their specific placement was more 
valuable. 
In the adult study, we found a preferential transmission of central target tiles, which 
presumably aided the cultural offspring’s ability to locate all of the adjacent tiles while 
retaining as many of their search attempts as possible. In contrast, in the current study 
we found that when selecting information to send from a completed target, the 5- to 6-
year-olds did not send significantly more central target tiles than any other segment. 
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However, in both the 7- to 8-year-old and 9- to 10-year-old age groups, we found a 
significant preference for selecting centre tiles to transmit. While we found no 
difference between the age groups in terms of the proportion of centre tiles 
transmitted overall, this preference for sending centre tiles and avoidance of sending 
other tile positions indicates a shift in the older age groups that is consistent with their 
ability to increase their scores, and decrease the number of search attempts needed to 
locate all of the targets. This result provides some clarity over the discrepancy between 
score increase and the preferential selection of hits over misses. Of course, given that 
the sample size was relatively small, and the results were in the expected direction, it 
may be possible, with more data, to show that 9- to 10-year-olds were performing 
much better than was shown here. 
It could perhaps be argued that the 5- to 6-year-olds uncovered so few ships that there 
were too few data points to capture a preference. If this was the case, it could be 
possible that younger children’s performance suffered from an inability to fully benefit 
from the information they received, rather than a limited capacity to send more useful 
information. If this were the case, this would mean that children’s ability to assess 
others’ needs might develop earlier than their ability to fully appreciate the value of 
information that has been provided by others. As a result, future research would 
benefit from exploring how children of all age categories would strategically select 
information in a task where all targets were revealed following the search. Such a task 
could potentially use as stimuli the information generated in the current task to ensure 
all children had equivalent opportunity to select information from the same sample, for 
a direct comparison of the extent of their information-sending biases.  
In this study, we attempted to provide further support for mental state understanding 
as a specific mechanism that could be facilitative of cumulative culture. Before starting 
the experimental task, all children were tested using an adapted mental state 
understanding test deemed suitable for testing older children. This task, (‘the Yanny 
task’), assessed both first-order and second-order mental state understanding. In both 
First- and Second-order conditions, we found an increase in the proportion of correct 
trials, over ages, with older children in both conditions giving more correct answers 
than younger children. However, we also found that children generally gave more 
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correct answers in the Second-order condition, which was very unexpected given that it 
was the most difficult of the two conditions. Furthermore, practise effects were found 
in both conditions. Because neither the expected age or stage effects were found in the 
task (likely due to ceiling effects), this analysis was not used to support the role of 
mental state understanding in any of the further analyses. Furthermore, during testing, 
a number of children commented on the fact that they were utilizing the gaze of the 
Yanny character and facial expressions of the other characters in order to help them 
complete the sentences. While this is clearly a suitable way for children to score highly 
in the task, it does not necessarily indicate that children were using mental state 
understanding over and above forming associations involving basic gaze following and 
facial expression labelling. We concluded that much more research is required to 
confirm that this is a suitable test of mental state understanding in older children, and 
we therefore did not use the data from this task to support any other findings. 
Of course, it is not the case that this study, without, or even with, positive evidence 
from additional correlations with the development of mental state understanding, can 
pinpoint a specific cognitive mechanism that is responsible for the result. While there is 
a logical argument for mental state understanding, it can only be stated with certainty 
that the experimental task was cognitively challenging for participants, such that only 
older children could produce results that mirror those in the adult study (Chapter 3). A 
host of cognitive mechanisms develop at around the same age as mental state 
understanding, and discounting any of them as responsible for the result we found in 
this study would be premature. Batteries testing for other capacities such as executive 
functions, particularly those testing for both inhibition and working memory are found 
to capture a similar developmental trajectory as mental state understanding (Carlson et 
al., 2002; Carlson & Moses, 2001), with studies finding a correlation between the 
development of executive functions and mental state understanding in false belief 
understanding (Devine & Hughes, 2016). The development of language has also been 
correlated with the development of mental state understanding (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999), with some accounts also suggesting that this close correlation indicates a causal 
relationship (De Villiers, 2007; De Villiers & De Villiers, 2014). As with executive function 
abilities, language development could easily facilitate cumulative culture in this task. 
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While it was not necessary to use language explicitly in the task, having more advanced 
linguistic thinking may have improved older children’s ability to think and reason about 
the task, particularly because they may be more experienced at communicating with 
others. While it is not possible to confidently state that mental state understanding is a 
facilitator, it is certain that the results are not due to basic biases or preferences – that 
is, what participants are doing in this task appears not to be trivial, and hence may be 
likely to be distinctively human.  
Interestingly, the age at which intentional, and even full information becomes useful for 
the learner in this task, coincides with the age at which higher-order capacities for 
mental state understanding emerge in children over the age of 4 years. As discussed in 
the introduction to this chapter (Section 4.2), and in Chapter 1 (section 1.6), mental 
state acquisition at 4 years of age is not the peak of its development. Rather, it 
continues to develop in increasing orders of complexity, such that older children and 
adults can reason about multiple layers of beliefs held by different people. Holding a 
second-order capacity for mental states may be especially beneficial in this task from 
the cultural parent’s perspective, because it would allow them to assess the cultural 
offspring’s belief about their (the cultural parent’s) belief that transmitting a central 
target segment is more useful than transmitting any other target segment. 
Furthermore, it may allow an increased understanding of how others are viewing the 
search space. For example, giving cultural offspring the ability to reason that cultural 
parents may be transmitting an edge segment because they do not have a centre tile to 
send, rather than assuming that the cultural parent has opted to change their 
transmission strategy. In alignment with the results found in this task, the capacity for 
second-order mental state understanding and perspective-taking is typically found to 
develop in children at around the age of 7 years (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Salatas & 
Flavell, 1976), and there is evidence to suggest that development of even higher orders 
(i.e., third-order and beyond) continues into adulthood (Dumontheil et al., 2010; Valle 
et al., 2015). While the claim that mental state understanding and related capacities 
facilitate cumulative culture in this task must remain speculative, it is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the developmental trajectory found in this task may be related to the 
trajectory for higher-order mental state understanding.  
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Overall, our findings suggest a developmental trajectory in refining the intentional 
selection of information for the benefit of others. Older children (9 to 10 years old) 
were able to select a very small subset of information that made it possible for later 
generations to retain the value of a higher volume of information, compared what was 
found based on transmission of randomly-selected subsets. As a result, cumulative 
cultural evolution was facilitated when information sending was intentional. Because of 
the age differences found in this task, particularly in sending and interpreting 
intentional information, we suggest that the biases found in the intentional information 
condition in the adult battleship task (i.e., sending centre tiles) required a higher order 
of cognitive mechanisms. However, further research is required to determine whether 
mental state understanding, specifically, is at work here. Overall, in demonstrating 
cumulative culture as a result of successful teaching, consistent with an age increase, 






Chapter 5:  The effect of cultural offspring feedback on 
cumulative cultural evolution in a grid search task  
 
 
5.1  Abstract 
In a previous study, we found that intentional information transmission from cultural 
parents facilitated the accumulation of beneficial information over generations 
(Chapter 2). Due to humans’ unique propensity for intentional information sharing, we 
concluded that this (relative to the inadvertent information transmission found in non-
humans) may be a key facilitator of uniquely human cumulative culture. However, given 
that human teaching is often interactive, we followed up this study by introducing 
bidirectional information sharing, whereby successors (cultural offsprings, ‘offsprings’) 
could transmit feedback to predecessors (cultural parents, ‘parents’). Participants 
completed a grid search task whereby they were required to search for hidden targets 
using a limited number of search attempts. Information about participants’ grid search 
was communicated between dyads. The cultural parent was required to transmit 
information that they believed would assist the cultural offspring in finding as many 
targets as possible. The cultural parent always selected the information to be sent to 
the cultural offspring, whereas feedback from the cultural offspring varied across 
conditions. The feedback from the cultural offspring either consisted of the cultural 
offspring’s full search attempt, or subset of the cultural offspring’s full search attempt, 
which was either selected by the cultural offspring, or consisted of a random selection 
from the cultural offspring’s search attempt. We also included a condition whereby no 
feedback was sent from the cultural offspring to the cultural parent. Chains in all 
conditions increased their scores at the same rate, indicating that in this context, 
feedback from the cultural offsprings did not affect the accumulation of beneficial 
information over and above what can be achieved when intentional information is 
transmitted from the cultural parent. 
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5.2  Introduction 
The current study investigates whether feedback from a cultural offspring can support 
intentional information transmission from a cultural parent in such a way that 
cumulative culture is increased beyond what would be possible with a unidirectional 
communicative structure. In an earlier study (Chapter 3), we explored the facilitative 
effect of unidirectional intentional information sending, relative to inadvertent 
information sending, on cumulative cultural evolution in chains of individuals. We found 
that, in circumstances where there is a bottleneck in transmission (i.e., only a subset of 
knowledge can be transferred), accumulation of beneficial information still occurs, but 
only when the transmitted information was intentionally selected by the cultural parent 
to help the cultural offspring uncover as many rewards as possible. From this result, we 
know that cultural parents make informed decisions about what to transmit, and that 
these decisions allow an increased accumulation of benefits. However, we don’t yet 
know anything about the role of the cultural offspring, other than their ability to 
accurately interpret information from someone else. It is possible that the cognitive 
abilities of both the cultural parent and cultural offspring facilitate distinctively human 
cumulative culture. Given that we know about the cognitive requirements of the 
cultural parent in this context, the current study aims to assess whether the cognitive 
requirements of the cultural offspring matter. Specifically, whether judicious decisions 
made by cultural offsprings about what information about their knowledge to give to a 
cultural parent offers benefits over and above those found in Chapter 3.  
In most cases of synchronous teaching, cultural parents do not communicate 
unidirectionally to their cultural offsprings. Feedback from the cultural offspring may 
assist the cultural parent in fine-tuning the information they provide, such that it 
becomes more tailored to the needs of the cultural offspring. While the literature 
supporting this claim is sparse, there is some evidence from empirical research that we 
believe provides a strong rationale for this expectation. In a task that required 
participants to tie a variety of knots, Caldwell et al. (2018) found that conditions in 
which participants were allowed to interact with a teacher (synchronous information 
transmission) resulted in greater success for the learner than conditions in which 
participants only had access to pictures of the intermediate steps for knot completion 
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(asynchronous information transmission). In this study, the intermediate steps 
condition can be seen as a non-interactive teaching condition, since these materials had 
been produced for the express purpose of guiding a naïve learner through the process. 
The synchronous, interactive teaching condition did facilitate success for the learner, 
relative to this non-interactive condition, however only in cases where the knot to 
produce was deemed relatively difficult. Therefore, this study suggests that interactive 
teaching may be particularly supportive for hard-to-learn information.  
A further area of research that we believe bolsters our reasoning that cultural offspring 
feedback can facilitate effective teaching is the existing literature surrounding 
‘overhearers’ in conversational exchanges. These tasks involve interactions between 
members of a conversational dyad, but focus primarily on the understanding of an 
external participant (the overhearer), not directly involved in the interaction, who hears 
part or all of the exchange. As such, overhearers are privy only to information tailored 
in response to feedback from someone else. The information may therefore be less 
readily interpretable to the overhearer, despite the fact that they are exposed to 
identical information content. Overhearers, relative to addressees, have been found to 
have a reduced ability to match abstract objects to the speaker’s descriptions of those 
objects (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and retell stories (Schober & Clark, 1989). 
Therefore, there is a clear advantage to cultural offsprings who can give feedback to 
cultural parents about their own performance, or communication failures, or gaps in 
understanding, relative to overhearers who cannot give feedback.  
The above studies suggest that interactive teaching can support more accurate 
transmission of information. However, the intricacies of cultural offspring feedback 
have not yet been explored in relation to cumulative cultural evolution. Particularly 
pertinent from the perspective of this thesis, the question remains as to whether the 
cognitive abilities of the cultural offspring are relevant in the production of feedback 
designed to help optimise information transmission from the cultural parent, and as a 
result, the cultural offspring’s own knowledge. Alternatively, it may be possible that 
having access, as the cultural parent, to any information from the cultural offspring’s 
performance (i.e., not necessarily intentionally produced by the offspring) is all that is 
required to tailor information adequately enough without assistance from the cultural 
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offspring’s cognitive capacity. Inadvertent cues like these are likely to be produced by 
all species. As such, information about the cultural offspring’s knowledge and 
understanding can be indicated by their performance, for example, if a rat is not able to 
release food in a puzzle box by pressing the lever, then it would be fair to assume that 
the rat has not made the causal connection between pressing the lever and the release 
of food. If it is the case that these inadvertent cues are enough to inform the cultural 
parent, then it is unlikely that the cognitive capacities of cultural offsprings are relevant 
to the distinctiveness of cumulative culture in humans. If so, this would contrast with 
the findings from in the previous chapter, which established that the cognitive 
capacities of cultural parents certainly do appear to be relevant for understanding 
human cumulative culture.  
While cultural offspring can passively produce information about their success to the 
cultural parent without any deliberate transmission of their own knowledge, to produce 
information that functions to signal to the cultural parent their level of competence, it 
may be the case that active, intentional offspring feedback offers benefits over and 
above this. We know that human adults are in principle capable of this, but here we ask 
whether this makes a difference to the information being sent from the cultural parent, 
or if passive cues from cultural offspring are just as effective.  
We attempted to apply a bidirectional communication structure to the ‘Battleships’ 
paradigm outlined in Chapter 3, to assess whether a bidirectional information transfer 
increases the accumulation of information over generations. To do this we introduced a 
transmission channel allowing communication from cultural parent to cultural offspring 
(downward transmission), but also cultural offspring to cultural parent (upward 
transmission). Each pair of participants engaged in several interactions before the 
parent participant was replaced, with the former cultural offspring taking on the role of 
cultural parent, and a naïve participant being introduced as the new cultural offspring 
(See Figure 29).  
In this task, all transmissions from the cultural parent in the dyad were made up of 
three selections from their search, all intentionally selected by the cultural parent. 
Therefore, in all conditions in this task, information from the cultural parent to the 
cultural offspring was exactly as per the information sent in the intentional condition of 
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the previous task (Chapter 3). This is because we already determined the effectiveness 
of intentional communication in Chapter 3, and this study only aimed to explore 
conditions that would improve intentional communication from the cultural parent.  
The feedback response from the cultural offspring was manipulated to provide either: 
- An Intentional subset of the cultural offspring’s search selected by the cultural 
offspring themselves. 
- An Inadvertent subset of the cultural offspring’s search randomly generated 
from the cultural offspring’s selections. 
- Full information from the cultural offspring’s search (maximum feedback 
comparison). 
- Null information, i.e., no feedback was given from cultural offspring to cultural 
parent (no feedback baseline). 
 
Our main interest was whether this dyadic communication facilitated cumulative 
cultural evolution. We expected to see cumulative cultural evolution in every condition 
because the results of the unidirectional battleships study should hold true for this 
study too (given that all cultural parents send intentional information). However, there 
are two possible outcomes for the effect of offspring feedback – either the feedback is 
useful to the cultural parent but without any added advantage of this being 
intentionally produced, or offspring feedback is useful but particularly so if it is 
intentionally produced. The former would suggest that offspring feedback might 
facilitate cumulative cultural evolution, but the cognitive capacities of the offspring may 
not be relevant in this context, i.e., there would be nothing to suggest that this might 
be part of the explanation for the existence of uniquely human cumulative culture. 
However, if the latter was true, this would suggest that the offspring’s cognitive 
capacities are relevant, and may go together with the cultural parent’s cognitive 
abilities as part of the explanation for distinctively human culture.  
In the event that we did find an effect of intentional cultural offspring feedback, we 
planned a further exploratory analysis assessing the strategic transmission of specific 
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target segments. This is analogous to the analysis performed in Chapter 3 which 
revealed that cultural parents had a bias for transmitting central target segments over 
edges. The previous task used 3x3 targets, meaning that cultural parents had the option 
to send a centre target segment to indicate the location of a full target. Making this 
selection was a somewhat obvious best choice about which tile would be the most 
useful for the cultural offspring to know about, and it did allow the cultural offspring to 
find all of the remaining tiles in that target without incurring loss. If the cultural parent 
opted to send a different target segment (i.e., an edge square), the cultural offspring 
was more at risk of failing to anticipate which edge square the cultural parent selected, 
and therefore selecting non-target grid squares. To explore the effect of cultural 
offspring feedback and grounding, which might lead to the establishment of arbitrary 
communicative conventions, we reduced the target to a 2x2 grid size, thereby 
eliminating any objectively preferential options, allowing the possibility of establishing 
















Figure 29  
Organisation of participants in the task.  
 
Note. Participants involved in interactions are included together in coloured boxes. 
Parent participants are placed higher in the communication box and offspring 
participants are placed lower. Black arrows indicate downward transmission from 
cultural parent to cultural offspring and grey arrows indicate upward transmission from 




Based on the results of the previous study (Chapter 3), and the evidence supporting a 
facilitatory effect of offspring feedback, we make the following predictions: 
- Participants assigned to later generations in the chains will achieve higher 
scores than those assigned to earlier generations. 
- The ordering of conditions in relation to the total score will be: 
Full Feedback (highest scores) > Intentional Feedback > Inadvertent Feedback > 
No Feedback (lowest scores). 
- There will be an interaction between condition and generation such that any 
differences in task score found between conditions will be more apparent in 
later, compared with earlier generations.  
- The ordering of the conditions in relation to the generation by which all targets 
will be found will be: 
Full Feedback (earliest) > Intentional Feedback > Inadvertent Feedback > No 
Feedback (latest). 
- The ordering of the conditions in relation to the number of search attempts 
required to find all targets will be: 
Full Feedback (fewest misses) > Intentional Feedback > Inadvertent Feedback > 
No Feedback (highest number of misses). 






5.3  Methods 
5.3.1  Participants 
All participants were recruited as part of a second-year undergraduate lab practical 
class, and took part on a voluntary basis. Participants arrived to be tested in groups of 
up to 20. One group per hour was tested, and chains left incomplete after the hour 
session were either completed in the next session or discarded in the event that no 
session followed.  
Four computers were used to host the training task, and a further six computers were 
used to run the experimental task. As such, three pairs of participants could be tested 
at any given time, which meant that multiple chains were running simultaneously. 
Two hundred and forty-three adults (199 female) were recruited in total. Participants 
were given three age bandings as options for reporting age and as such, age 
distribution was as follows: 224 x 16- to 25-year olds, 14 x 26- to 35-year-olds, 5 x 36- to 
45-year-olds. 27 of these participants (all 16-25, 25 females) were excluded from the 
study due to experimenter or technical error, or due to incomplete chains which had to 
be discarded. Because of the nature of the recruitment process, it was common to have 
to end the session part-way through a chain. Incomplete chains could not be revisited 
at a later date because previous interactive members were no longer available to take 
part. The final sample consisted of 216 adult participants (175 female, age banding 
distribution: 197 x 16- to 25-year-olds, 14 x 26- to 35-year-olds, 5 x 36- to 45-year-olds).  
The Full and Null conditions each contained 52 participants (13 complete chains), and 
the Intentional and Inadvertent conditions each contained 56 participants (14 complete 
chains). Participants were assigned to a condition randomly, and the chain position was 
constrained by the current state of completion of the chain to which they were 
recruited. If a participant’s data was excluded, this was replaced by a new participant’s 
data before the chain progressed further. 
Chains were made up of four participants. We reduced the number of participants from 
ten (as was the chain length in Chapter 3) for several reasons. The first is because we 
found an accumulation of information in the Intentional condition at a much earlier 
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chain position than expected in the previous task. Given that the transmission from the 
cultural parent to the cultural offspring in this task was identical to the Intentional 
condition in the previous task, we shortened the chains accordingly. The second reason 
is that we determined it unnecessary to demonstrate cumulative culture on a larger 
scale, and instead focus on the inherent benefits of learner feedback on a smaller scale. 
The third reason concerned the logistics of collecting the data. As aforementioned, it 
was common for a testing session to end part-way through a chain, which could not be 
completed in a later testing session. Reducing the number of participants in the chain 
drastically reduced the loss of data as a result of this, and meant that a higher number 
of chains reached completion. 
The study was approved by the University of Stirling General University Ethics Panel 
(approval reference number: GUEP 470) and every participant gave consent via a 
Qualtrics (2020) questionnaire before the experiment took place. Qualtrics assigned 
each participant a random 6-digit number that they could use to withdraw their data 
should they wish to do so.  
 
5.3.2  The experimental task 
This task, including the training task, was run using PsychoPy v1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 
2019), on desktop computers running Windows 10. A total of six computers were used 
for the task simultaneously, and a further three were used to run the training task.  
During the experiment, participants played a landscape searching task based on the 
popular game, ‘Battleships’. Participants were shown three reward landscapes 
presented as 20x20 grids. Grids were partitioned into 16 sections as a visual aid (Figure 
30). Each grid contained nine hidden 2x2 targets to be found. Targets were randomly 
placed and consisted of four adjoining grid squares. The grid partitions did not affect 
the placement of targets, and targets could be placed over partitions, in more than one 
section. Targets were found by clicking the unselected squares on the grid. When a part 
of a target was located, this selection was coded as a ‘hit’, and was replaced with a 
white square containing a green pentagon to indicate that one point had been gained. 
Selection of a non-target grid point was coded as a ‘miss’ and was highlighted by white 
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square containing a red circle indicating the loss of one search attempt. The primary 
goal of all participants was to score as many points as possible over all three grids using 
as few search attempts as possible.  
Participants used one of their nine search attempts for every selection they made that 
reveals a non-target grid square. In contrast, the participant gained one point for every 
target segment they found, with the number of search attempts remaining being 
preserved in the process. This structure was designed to reflect real world relative 
payoffs, such that a search attempt resulting in a reward was always profitable, while a 
search attempt resulting in no reward was costly.  
The maximum score for each grid was 36 (nine targets each made up of four individual 
grid squares). The minimum number of selections required was nine (indicative of the 
number of search attempts allotted per search). In theory, the maximum number of 
selections per search attempt was 44, should a participant have found 35 of the target 
grid squares, using all nine search attempts to do so. The participant moved on to the 
communication segment or next grid once they had located all nine hidden targets, or if 



















Note. The number of search attempts remaining is shown in the top-left corner, the 
time remaining (number of seconds) is shown above the grid, and the number of 
targets left to find are shown to the right of the grid. The time remaining is an aesthetic 
feature to encourage participants to focus on the task only, and if the time remaining 
reaches 0 seconds, the task does not end, and participants can continue to make 
selections. Every time a participant uncovers a target, one of the targets shown to the 
right of the grid is highlighted and remains highlighted until the grid is complete. 
Participants can click on any of the grid squares to uncover whether it is a hit or a miss. 
Bold lines separating the grid are a visual aid only and do not imply the locations of any 





Number of search 
attempts remaining 
in this search (in the 
Experiment this was 
restricted to 9). 
 
Targets to be 
located. When 
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uncovered, one 
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The first participant in each chain received no information at all from a cultural parent. 
Participants in all other chain positions were given guidance in stages by their 
immediate predecessor (cultural parent). This guidance was given in three parts over 
the course of the grid search, such that one information point was given between each 
search expedition carried out by the cultural offspring. In the current task, we 
maintained the number of cultural parent transmissions that we allowed in previous 
tasks (three), however in those previous tasks, this amounted to one transmission per 
target available to find. This means that in the current task, if the cultural parent 
uncovered all nine targets, they would only be able to send information from three. The 
reason we did this was because, to see an effect of cultural offspring feedback, the task 
needed to be restricted from the cultural parent’s end. That is, if the parent could send 
all of the available information, we would not be able to draw out an effect of the 
manipulation.  
The reward landscape was pre-specified for each grid in each chain of participants, 
meaning that the results of the cultural parent stayed true for the cultural offspring. 
cultural parents saw some, all or none of the search attempts made by the cultural 
offspring. All transmitted information was completely transparent such that 
participants could see whether the grid square selected was a hit or a miss 
(characterised in the same way as a selected square but with an orange border to 
indicate that it had been sent from another participant). This information varied 
depending on the condition that the chain was assigned, and was applied to all 
members of the chain apart from the first chain position, who received no information. 
- Null Feedback Condition (control): Cultural parents were given no information 
from the cultural offspring about the progression of their search, and were 
therefore required to send guidance to the cultural offspring with no feedback. 
This condition was one of two controls, and was designed to mimic situations in 
which social information is required, but no access to the cultural offspring’s 
progress is available. 
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- Inadvertent Feedback Condition: Cultural parents received a subset of three 
information points that had been randomly generated from the cultural 
offspring’s immediately previous search attempt. This condition was designed to 
reflect inadvertent feedback available from a cultural offspring’s performance. 
- Intentional Feedback Condition: Following their search attempt, cultural 
offsprings were asked to select three of the uncovered grid points to send to the 
cultural parent as a means to guide the cultural parent ’s downward 
transmissions. Therefore, in this condition, both cultural parents and cultural 
offspring transmitted intentional information.  
- Full Feedback Condition: Cultural parents received all of the selections made by 
the cultural offspring during the immediately previous search attempt. 
Therefore, cultural parents in this condition received between nine and 44 grid 
squares. 
 
5.3.3  Procedure 
Training  
All participants completed a training session in which they were given all of the 
instructions for the game including a demonstration of an unselected grid square and 
grid squares transmitted from a previous participant showing both hits and misses. 
Instructions given to participants and a run-through of the training task can be seen in 
Appendix 8. Following the instructions, participants were given three grids identical to 
that of the real experiment, however, they showed no selected grid squares. These 
grids allowed completely free exploration with unlimited search attempts, and only 
progressed to a new grid once all of the targets were found. Participants remained on 
the training session until there was a free slot in the test stage, or until they had 






The experimental task 
The first generation of participants searched all three test grids without any 
communication phases before taking the role of the cultural parent to assist in the 
second generation’s learning stage. Therefore, generation one had no information 
about the location or presence of any of the hits or misses in any of the three grids 
prior to their search. All other generations received one completely transparent (that is, 
with hit/miss information visible) grid point in each transmission of the communication 
phase (three in total). The information from cultural parent to cultural offspring was 
always intentional, and was selected by the cultural parent from the selections they had 
made available during their own search. 
Newly introduced participants completed four ‘expeditions’ of each grid, making a 
minimum of 9 selections (i.e., the number of search attempts) in each expedition, and 
therefore using a minimum of 36 search attempts for each of the three grids. In the 
Intentional condition, immediately following each expedition of each grid, cultural 
offspring were asked to select three of the squares selected during that expedition to 
send to the cultural parent (the previous generation’s cultural offspring). The three 
squares selected by the cultural offspring were immediately transmitted to the cultural 
parent who could then respond by transmitting one of their own selections from any of 
the grid points revealed during their own search of the same grid. Cultural parent 
transmissions were sent before the cultural offspring continued with the next search 
expedition. During the cultural offspring’s search, cultural parents were able to view the 
end product of their own grid search, and could make selections to send from the 
uncovered grid squares (both hits and misses). A timeline of the task, including 
instructions screens shown to participants and a run-through of the task screens can be 
seen in Appendix 9, and a scaled-down version of the task to demonstrate the direction 
of transmission can be seen in Figure 31. 
Both cultural parent and cultural offspring were present during searches and 
transmission stages because the selections were transmitted in real time through a 
computer link. Participants who were interacting in the same chain were not positioned 
on computers next to one another, in order to avoid forbidden conferring.  
179 
 
After all three grids had been completed the cultural offspring took the role of cultural 
parent and a new participant was recruited as the cultural offspring. The former 
cultural parent was fully debriefed regarding aims and hypotheses and given the 
opportunity to ask questions.  
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Figure 31  
Scaled-down demonstration of the experimental task.  
 
 
Note. In the real experimental task, grid sizes were 20x20, however, the size and 
colours have been edited for visibility in this diagram. Cultural offspring (O) progress is 
shown on the left of this diagram, and cultural parent (P) information is shown on the 
right. In this diagram, red-filled grid squares represent uncovered misses and green-
filled grid squares represent uncovered hits. A dark blue border represents the most 
recent cultural parent transmitted information, and a light blue border represents 
parent information from an earlier transmission. A yellow border represents the most 
recent cultural offspring transmitted information, and an orange border represents 
cultural offspring information from an earlier transmission. Arrows represent the 
direction of transmission. A colour key for the real experimental task can be found in 
Appendix 9.  
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5.4  Results  
All generalised linear mixed models were performed using (R Core Team, 2020) and 
lme4 (Bates et al., 2014). Graphs were created using ggplot 2 performed on R Studio 
(RStudio Team, 2020), supported by R version 4.0.2. The dependant variable in this 
analysis was score (numeric). Fixed effects are specified before the model output.  
Post-hoc comparisons were done using the emmeans package (Lenth et al., 2019). Tests 
were two-tailed, and p-values of < .05 were taken as statistically significant. Emmeans 
using the Tukey adjustment was used for multiple comparisons.  
 
5.4.1  Mean score increase over generations 
Mean scores were calculated using each participant’s sum scores for all grids, over all 
expeditions, across all three completed grids. Mean scores at each chain position can 
be seen in Figure 32.  
The search attempts remaining for each participant were not calculated, due to there 
being no instance where any participant found all nine targets, thus the number of 
search attempts remaining was the same for all participants across all conditions.  
Linear mixed effects modelling was used to calculate the differences in overall scores 
using condition and chain position (centred) as fixed effects. Chain was also included as 
a random variable. A significant main effect of chain position was found (b = 12.307, SE 
= 1.53, t(647) = 8.038, p < .001, with participants in later generations scoring higher 
than earlier ones. 
Emmeans comparisons were used to explore the differences between conditions in 
terms of score increase over generations.  
No significant differences were found when comparing the Full and Intentional 
conditions (b = -0.183, SE = 0.89, t(50) = -0.205, p = .997), or the Full and Inadvertent 
conditions (b = 0.644, SE = 0.89, t(50) = 0.723, p = .888) A non-significant difference was 
also found between the Full and Null conditions (b = 0.032, SE = 0.91, t(50) = 0.035, p = 
1). There was also no significant differences found between the Intentional and 
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Inadvertent conditions (b = 0.827, SE = 0.88, t(50) = 0.946, p = .780), the Inadvertent 
and Null conditions (b = -0.612, SE = 0.89, t(50) = -0.687, p = .902), or the Intentional 
and Null conditions (b = 0.215, SE = 0.89, t(50) = 0.241, p = .995).  
 
Figure 32 
Mean score increase at each chain position, split by condition.  
 





5.5  Discussion  
The previous chapters in this thesis have found that cumulative cultural evolution is 
enhanced by intentional unidirectional information transfer. The general finding from 
the earlier study was that (adult) cultural offsprings are able to derive much more value 
from a subset of information that has been intentionally produced, compared with a 
subset that was produced inadvertently. However, given that some human teaching 
also involves intentional upward transmission from the learner, and given that this does 
probably does not occur in animal teaching, the current study followed on from the 
previous experiments by introducing bidirectional information transfer. This enabled 
the cultural offspring to transmit some feedback on their performance to the cultural 
parent over three transmissions. The main aim of this study was to assess whether the 
supporting role of intentional knowledge transmission in cumulative cultural evolution 
could be reinforced by the addition of intermittent upward transmissions from the 
cultural offspring to the cultural parent. Following a similar logic to the previous studies 
in this thesis, the amount of information transmitted was limited, to allow for 
comparison between intentionally selected versus randomly selected information. 
While the downward transmissions from the cultural parent to the cultural offspring 
were always intentional, the upward transmissions from the cultural offspring to the 
cultural parent differed depending on the condition being tested in the chain. We were 
particularly interested in how the two limited feedback conditions (Intentional and 
Inadvertent) compared to each other, and how they compared to a Full and a Null 
condition, in which cultural parents received all or none of the information generated 
by the cultural offspring’s activity respectively. 
Given the score increase found in the Intentional condition in the unidirectional task 
(Chapter 3) and given that all downward transmission in this task was also intentional, 
we expected to find an increase across all conditions. However, we expected to find a 
steeper increase in conditions where cultural parents were given access to full or 
intentional information from the cultural offspring’s search attempt, as compared with 
either inadvertent information, or no information. 
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We found a significant score increase over generations in every condition, however, 
there was no difference in the rate of this increase between any of the conditions. This 
result supports previous findings that intentional information transfer from the cultural 
parent to the cultural offspring facilitates cumulative culture, however it does not 
provide any evidence that feedback from the cultural offspring (revealing information 
about the outcome of the cultural parent’s transmissions), at least in this context, 
provides any additional facilitative effect. For this reason, we did not perform any 
additional analysis to assess transmission biases, or alignment of transmission biases 
within chains.  
There are several possible reasons why we didn’t find any differences in score increase 
between conditions. The first is that, very simply, cultural offspring feedback has 
absolutely no effect, and that accumulation in this task rests solely on intentional 
information being transmitted from the cultural parent to the cultural offspring. 
Although we still saw a small accumulation over chains, in most circumstances, cultural 
parents had a very limited selection of useful information available to send, which 
promoted the sending of redundant information, quite possibly not even chosen for its 
potential communicative value (see below).  
 
Redundancy 
In the unidirectional battleships task, participants transmitted information from one of 
two categories – it was either a hit or a miss. All of the information they could 
potentially choose was new information to the cultural offspring. However, in the 
current task, information that could be transmitted (in either direction) could be, for 
the recipient, an unknown hit, an unknown miss, or a hit or miss that had already 
known as a result of either their own expedition, or in a previous transmission. There is 
great variation in the value of sending each of these different categories of segment. 
Furthermore, the sender may or may not be aware of whether they are providing new, 




1. A hit that is novel to the receiver is arguably the most valuable information for 
downward transmissions, because it’s alerting the communicative partner to the 
location of a target that they were previously unaware of the location of. This is 
particularly useful information because the cultural offspring is guaranteed to 
increase their score as a result. Novel information is not useful to the cultural 
parent because participants can only transmit information from grid squares that 
have been uncovered on their own grids.  
2. It is possible that sending redundant hits bares some value in certain contexts too. 
For example, to signal to the parent sender of a novel hit that the offspring has 
found the remainder of that target. Of course, this assumes that the cultural 
parent needs an indication that that target has been found. If this is the case, 
sending that hit is a bit less redundant because it is necessary to stop any more 
redundant segments from that target being sent from the cultural parent. 
Arguably, these selections are the most valuable for upward transmissions.  
3. The value of misses is equal whether they are recently uncovered or from a 
previous search. In downward transmissions, these selections only serve to 
indicate to the cultural offspring that there is nothing to be found in that specific 
grid square, however in some cases, sections made near the edge of the landscape 
boundary, may provide a limited amount of further information (i.e., if it isn’t 
possible for a 2x2 ship to be located in the space between the miss selection and 
the boundary). The value that these misses hold are mostly relevant when they’re 
sent from the cultural parent to the cultural offspring, because they give an 
indication of where not to search. However, misses transmitted from the cultural 
offspring to the cultural parent indicate more generally that in some 
circumstances, the cultural offspring has no useful information to send, and so any 
outstanding targets that the cultural parent knows about should be transmitted. 
 
Methodological limitations 
Given that communication from the cultural parent happened between cultural 
offspring searches, cultural parents’ sending of offspring-novel information relied on 
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the cultural parents having further information to send which was still novel to the 
cultural offspring, even after the cultural offspring’s own expedition(s). However, if the 
cultural offspring located all of the targets found by the cultural parent, the cultural 
parent would no longer be in a position to provide the most valuable form of 
information (i.e., unknown hits). This was relevant across all conditions, as it was always 
likely that cultural offsprings would tend to find the same targets as their cultural 
parents, given that they were effectively being guided towards them by the information 
they received from their parents. Therefore, in retrospect, we may have made it 
difficult to find any differences between conditions. In future research, it might be 
possible to rectify this by altering the parameters of the task to reduce the possibility of 
cultural offspring finding all of the rewards discovered by their cultural parent before 
the cultural parent had completed their downward transmissions. 
It may also be possible that search biases can explain why there was so little novel 
information to send between dyads. In a task using an identical grid layout, Atkinson et 
al. (2020) found that participants selected certain grid squares (particularly tiles 
centrally located within the landscape, or bordering the partitioned grid sections) much 
more frequently than other tiles. If participants in this task has similar search biases, in 
addition to making similar discoveries as a result of cultural parent transmissions 
guiding them to certain areas of the grid, it would be a lot less likely for novel targets to 
emerge.  
 
Proposed adjustments for future research 
If we were to find any benefit of intentional information sending from the cultural 
offspring in this study, this depended on an assumption that the amount and/or quality 
of cultural offspring feedback did matter. However, this basic assumption was not 
fulfilled, in that there was no difference found between the Full condition (maximum 
possible feedback about cultural offspring performance) compared with the Null 
condition (no information at all about cultural offspring performance). As discussed 
above, finding a difference between these conditions may have been unlikely due to 
the parameters of the task. It may be possible to draw out a difference between these 
conditions with a few parameter changes, such as altering the number of selections 
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given to cultural offspring before they transmit information to the cultural parent. 
Finding a difference between these two extreme comparison conditions would be 
essential in order to infer any conclusion regarding the effect of the intentionality of 
cultural offspring feedback. In the absence of such an effect, we cannot conclude 
anything regarding whether intentional cultural offspring feedback is any more 
effective than inadvertent cultural offspring feedback.  
Future research may explore the search biases made by participants to assess whether 
common clustered searching restricted the number of uncovered targets. If the same 
search biases are found in this task as were found in the study conducted by (Atkinson, 
Blakey, & Caldwell, 2020), this would explain why participants had very little 
information to send between them. While increasing the target size may mediate for 
this to some extent, making some adjustments to the search environment (such as 
removing partitions in the grid) might also help.  
A new direction, and possible avenue for future research would be to change the goal 
of the task in order to explore contexts in which offspring feedback is beneficial for an 
accumulation of information. In the current experiment, participants were required to 
locate specific target points on the grid, and only those target points held value. There 
was very little value in sending information from unrewarded tiles. However, in a 
context where the goal is to move from one side of the grid to the other side using a 
path of connected grid squares while avoiding obstacles, having feedback from an 
offspring may provide a much richer base for the parent to form meaningful 
transmissions. Obstacle information would be highly valuable, in its role as something 
to avoid. However, information about unobstructed routes would also be valuable. 
Furthermore, feedback from the cultural offspring would be highly informative, as an 
indication of progression, thus revealing not only awareness about the status of the 
current location, but also providing an indication of what additional information would 
be relevant (onward route) and what would be now redundant (locations already 
passed). This information would allow the cultural parent to apply meaningful and 





Overall, our findings support the premise that intentional information sharing can result 
in a highly efficient transmission of beneficial information, even in very early 
generations. However, we found no further facilitative effect when a feedback loop was 
introduced. This may be due to methodological factors which were required to allow 
close comparison with the previous study (Chapter 3) but which may have constrained 
detection of an effect of offspring feedback. As such, the lack of effect in this task does 
not necessarily indicate that cumulative culture is not supported by information 




Chapter 6:  General Discussion 
 
 
6.1.  Summary of overall aims and hypotheses 
This thesis aimed to contribute to the existing literature exploring distinctively human 
cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, the aim was to provide support that the distinctively 
human propensity for understanding the mental states of others facilitates distinctively 
human cumulative cultural evolution.  
We explored this concept by altering aspects of traditional lab-based tests of 
cumulative culture to assess conditions in which intentional knowledge sharing is 
restricted in volume such that earlier generations have to apply some mental state 
understanding to make beneficial information more accessible to later generations. We 
compared this to conditions representing circumstances in which knowledge is 
transmitted inadvertently (i.e., selected without intention), which is likely to be the kind 
of transmission that supports social learning in non-humans.  
The motivation for exploring the role of distinctively human cognitive mechanisms in 
cumulative culture came from existing accounts that link them (e.g., Boyd et al. (2011); 
Dean et al. (2014); Hill et al. (2009)). Despite a large theoretical literature proposing a 
link between individual cognitive abilities and population-level cumulative culture, (e.g., 
Boyd & Richerson, (1996); Tennie et al. (2009); Tomasello et al. (2005)), there is 
relatively little supporting experimental evidence, both in terms of what mechanisms 
support cumulative culture, how, and under what circumstances.  
The apparent distinctiveness of mental state understanding to humans was the main 
motivator in exploring this capacity in relation to cumulative culture. Mental state 
understanding is not only distinct in humans, but also develops relatively late in human 
ontogeny (discussed fully in Chapter 1), further supporting the view that it may be rare 
or absent in other species. Mental state understanding also has multiple possible 




Given the lack of evidence for cumulative culture in non-humans, it is unlikely that 
social learning strategies applied in non-human populations could act as a facilitator. 
Non-human (and a lot of human) social learning is driven by heuristic biases (Heyes & 
Pearce, 2015), however there may be some cases in which human social learning is 
driven by a reasoned understanding of what the social model knows (i.e., mental state 
understanding). Social learning driven by reasoned understanding is likely to be far 
more effective in the context of cumulative culture compared with biases that are 
driven by associative learning and/or biological adaptions.  
While this thesis did not directly explore the benefit of reasoned understanding over 
associative learning, the idea that humans do adopt a reasoned strategy for learning 
from others ran concurrent through all experimental chapters in this thesis.  
 
Flexible teaching 
Teaching, as defined from a functional perspective, is rare in non-humans, and where it 
does occur (e.g., Franks & Richardson (2006); Thornton & MaCuliffe (2006)), it is largely 
restricted to a particular context. This means that the teacher is only able to teach a 
specific skill in a specific scenario, whereas human teaching spans a wide range of 
contexts. Such generalizable teaching is argued to require assumptions to be made 
about the knowledge of others, which allows the teacher to tailor signals to the needs 
of the learner (Thornton & Raihani, 2008). The general-purpose nature of human 
teaching likely arises as a consequence of an individual’s recognition that their actions 
can potentially benefit others’ learning, along with some understanding of how this 
might be achieved. In contrast it is widely agreed that non-human teaching doesn’t 
involve this kind of understanding, due to disparities in capacities for understanding 
mental states (e.g., Kline (2015); Thornton & Raihani (2008)).  
Previous research capturing the benefits of human teaching focuses broadly on 
whether teaching itself is more useful for information transmission than other social 
mechanisms, and these teaching conditions often involve sharing more information 
than is available to the learner in other conditions (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & 
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Thornton, 2015). As such, these studies do not highlight, specifically, the teacher’s 
understanding of the learner’s needs. Therefore, this thesis aimed to capture realistic 
teaching scenarios, in which a teacher can only transmit a limited amount of 
information to a learner, thus allowing an assessment of the choices teachers made 
about what to transmit. Furthermore, this thesis aimed to highlight the benefit of 
intentionally taught information by comparing this condition with an equivalently sized 
transmission of inadvertent information sharing. Even without restrictions on time, it 
would be impossible for a cultural parent to transmit every detail of the knowledge they 
have to the cultural offspring. Therefore, it holds more benefit for these transmissions 
to be made in a way that inspires inference of additional information from the surface 
transmission, in order to support successful replication and accumulation. This 
inference is likely to be built upon mental state understanding, as it requires the 
cultural parent to have an understanding of the cultural offspring’s knowledge state, in 
order for them to select specific information that can achieve this.  
This thesis aimed to capture the benefits of intentional knowledge sharing, both in 
terms of supporting cultural offspring to repeat beneficial behaviours, and to 
accumulate beneficial information over generations, reminiscent of cumulative culture.  
 
Bidirectional communication 
The use of intentional knowledge sharing for supporting cumulative culture is not 
exclusive to the cultural parent. It may also be necessary for the cultural offspring to 
select information about their own knowledge to guide the transmissions made by the 
cultural parent. While there is very little experimental evidence supporting this claim 
(as discussed in Chapters 1 and 5), it is widely accepted, and supported in Chapters 3 
and 4, that humans can access mental state understanding to produce tailored signals. 
However, it may be possible that passively produced signals from cultural offspring are 
just as beneficial for conveying their knowledge state to a cultural parent.  
Therefore, this thesis aimed to assess whether intentional knowledge sharing, relative 
to inadvertent knowledge sharing from cultural offspring facilitated effective knowledge 
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sharing from the cultural parent, and ultimately whether this exchange supported 
cumulative culture.  
 
Summary of the main questions this thesis aimed to answer 
Overarching Question: 
Does mental state understanding facilitate distinctively human cumulative 
culture? 
Contributing questions addressed in individual chapters: 
1. Proof of principle: Are human adults able to utilise information from a cultural 
parent in such a way that they can outperform a model demonstration at various 
levels of difficulty? 
1.1. Can we capture cumulative culture by using a selection task involving high-
precision vicarious information?  
1.2. Do participant’s performance increases amount to accumulation over 
simulated generations of learners? 
2. Does intentional knowledge sharing from a cultural parent to a cultural offspring 
allow accumulation of knowledge over and above instances of more inadvertent 
knowledge sharing (representative of non-human teaching)? 
3. Do the benefits of intentional knowledge sharing from a cultural parent to a 
cultural offspring emerge over a developmental trajectory that corresponds to 
advances in mental state understanding? 
4. Does intentional knowledge sharing from the cultural offspring to the cultural 
parent further facilitate the cultural parent’s ability to select meaningful and 
tailored information to support the cultural offspring’s learning?  
 
The following sections contain summaries of the aims, methods, results and 
contributions of all four of the experimental chapters in this thesis. These summaries 
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are grouped by methodology used, limitations of specific methodologies, and future 
directions of study are discussed at the end of each section.  
 
6.2.  Demonstrating a new methodology for examining performance 
improvement over generations of social transmission…without social 
transmission 
6.2.1  Summary of Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, we conducted a proof of principle to demonstrate that human adults can 
utilise information from a cultural parent to accumulate information over generations, 
and that this effect can be captured using a selection task feeding participants vicarious 
information from a computer-generated cultural parent model (‘parent model’).  
The other question in this study was whether it is possible to use individual-level data to 
infer the likely outcome of a transmission chain. To do this, participants were exposed 
to vicarious information equivalent to a range of different levels of success, which could 
then be modelled to generate multi-generational transmission. 
This was investigated this in two realistic contexts whereby the vicarious information 
was either of high- or low-precision. In the High-precision condition, more information 
about the parent model search was available in the vicarious information, specifically 
whether their individual selections were rewarded. The Low-precision condition did not 
carry this benefit, and participants were only afforded the location of the parent model 
search and the outcome of the entire grid search (i.e., no information about the value 
of specific search locations). These settings of various precision corresponded to 
different ways in which cumulative culture may operate in humans, i.e., probably 
sometimes caused by insightful and deliberate accumulation (High-precision condition) 
(Osiurak et al., 2016) but perhaps in other situations arising from the accumulation of 
adaptive traits as a result of biases in high-fidelity transmission, accompanied by errors 




This experiment used a simple computer-based task in which participants were asked to 
search reward landscapes of multiple sizes for rewards, using vicarious information 
from a parent model to guide them. All possible reward outcomes for the parent model 
were shown to participants, meaning that they were effectively creating a response to 
vicarious information at all generations. To assess whether performance increase at the 
individual level amounted to cumulative culture at the population level, we simulated 
transmission chains using the participant’s behavioural data. Therefore, along with 
testing for the human propensity to see value in information provided by others, this 
task had the additional benefit of testing the novel ‘potential for ratcheting’ paradigm 
outlined by Caldwell et al. (2020).  
In the High-precision condition, we found that generally, adult participants largely 
repeated rewarded parent model selections, and avoided unrewarded parent model 
selections in favour of individual exploration. As a result of adopting this insightful 
strategy, we found that participants either matched or outperformed the vicarious 
information from the parent model in almost every landscape size. Consistent with this, 
when the behavioural data was used to simulate multi-generational transmission, 
population chains accumulated at a similar rate to chains built to strictly adopt the low-
risk behavioural strategy in almost every landscape size.  
In the Low-precision condition, there was much less scope for individual participants to 
adopt a rule that ensured accumulation of beneficial information in most cases. The 
only rule that would guarantee no loss of information from the parent model was to 
copy all selections if all, or even some, rewarded selections had been made by the 
parent model. Similarly, the only situation in which participants should have risked 
deviating from the exact selections made by the parent model was in circumstances 
where the parent model scored below chance, and so scoring lower was unlikely with 
an avoid-all strategy. This strategy did, however, restrict grid maximisation to limited 
circumstances where avoiding all of the parent model selections resulted in selection of 
all targets by chance, which could only happen when the parent model’s score was 
zero, and was in all cases relatively unlikely, especially for some grid sizes. In some 
cases, particularly in circumstances where only some of the parent selections were 
rewarded, real participant behaviour in fact deviated from this low-risk strategy, and 
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involved a ‘mixed strategy’, whereby some parent selections were copied, and others 
were avoided. Of course, because there was no indication as to which selections were 
rewarded, the strategy was applied somewhat arbitrarily, and on average this strategy 
could never outperform the low-risk repeat-all/avoid-all strategy as perfectly applied 
(which may not have been possible for real participants anyway, as it involved 
calculating the exact tipping point). Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively however, this 
mixed strategy meant that result of the transmission chain simulation from the 
behavioural data had the potential to reach the maximum score faster than the low-risk 
strategy, because, although individual participants on average performed more poorly 
than the low-risk strategy, they were also increasing their opportunities to select all of 
the rewarded stimuli by chance. Since even in real participant behaviour, a perfect 
parent model score usually resulted in a repeat-all response, these maximum scores – 
once achieved – were then relatively well-preserved within the chain simulations. 
Nonetheless, the likelihood of maximizing the score of the grid remained relatively 
improbable, and increasingly so as grid sizes increased. 
 
6.2.2  Chapter 2: Contributions to current literature 
The methodology used in this chapter demonstrates an important new principle that 
could influence the field at a broad domain. As discussed in Chapter 2, traditional 
methods for capturing cumulative culture in lab studies are very restrictive for use with 
adult populations due to practical limitations, which affect use with other populations 
(children and non-humans) further. By using behavioural data collected from every 
possible transmission outcome, chains of transmission can easily be simulated without 
the need for the number of participants and complex organisation that goes along with 
necessarily extensive requirements of traditional tasks involving real transmission 
between different individuals. The current methodology could be adapted for use in 
future research, to further explore the transmission conditions under which cumulative 
culture can occur in human adults, children and non-humans.  
The findings of this chapter served to inform the later chapters in this thesis by 
confirming that human adults can accumulate information over simulated multi-
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generational transmission chains in a computer-based task, making few errors when 
adopting a reasoned strategy. However, we did not adopt the specific PFR simulation 
method for any of the following tasks. The general task approach was largely the same, 
and used a grid search task with high-precision vicarious information. However, in later 
tasks, we increased the complexity of the problem space, such that targets appeared in 
clusters and could be located anywhere on the grid, rather than one per row. As such, 
many factors, such as the shape of targets and their position relative to one another, 
could influence the cultural parent’s decision about what to transmit. Generating all 
possible scenarios of vicarious information and having participants respond to every 
one would be much more difficult than gleaning this information from a traditional 
transmission chain design. Therefore, while there is an inherent benefit to using the 
‘potential for ratcheting’ paradigm in terms of lowering participant recruitment and 
reducing organisation (as discussed in Chapter 2), we deemed it too important to have 
vicarious information come from a participating cultural parent. This is because, in the 
current study, we aimed to demonstrate accumulations, however in later studies we 
aimed to assess transmission behaviours, including biases that would be difficult to 
replicate in a computer-generated cultural parent model. 
 
6.3  Intentional information sharing promotes cumulative culture relative 
to inadvertent behavioural cues 
6.3.1  Summary of Chapter 3 
In Chapter 2, it was established that adult participants were able to significantly 
outperform a cultural parent such that cumulative culture can be observed in simulated 
multi-generational transmission chains. Chapter 3 used a grid search task to directly 
compare conditions in which information transmitted from human cultural parent to 
cultural offspring over multiple transmission generations affected the population-wide 
ability to accumulate information over those generations. Specifically, we aimed to 
establish, in conditions where the amount of transmission is limited, whether 
intentional knowledge sharing from a cultural parent to a cultural offspring allows 
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accumulation of knowledge over and above instances of more inadvertent knowledge 
sharing (representative of non-human teaching). 
The experiment used in this task involved transmission of grid search information from 
cultural parents to cultural offspring in transmission chains made up of ten participants. 
The information transmitted from cultural parents was manipulated such that cultural 
offspring received a limited subset of intentionally produced information (Intentional 
condition), a limited subset of information randomly generated from the cultural 
parent’s search (Inadvertent condition), or the cultural parent’s full search attempt (Full 
condition). The type of information transmission (Intentional, Inadvertent or Full) was 
consistent across chains, therefore we ran five chains in each of the three conditions. 
All information was of high precision, therefore the value of uncovered grid squares in 
the transmission was made available to cultural offspring.  
The results of this study revealed that a limited subset of intentional knowledge 
transmission facilitated accumulation of knowledge over generations at a similar rate as 
when full information from the cultural parent’s search was made accessible to the 
cultural offspring. Comparatively, inadvertent knowledge transmission produced far 
more limited accumulation over generations. We concluded that in cases where only a 
small amount of information can be transmitted, there is an inherent benefit to 
cumulative culture if that information was intentionally produced by the cultural 
parent. In further exploratory analysis, we attributed the success of Intentional chains 
to the cultural parent’s transmission preferences, as they appeared to have made 
effective choices about what specific information would benefit the cultural offspring 
both in terms of information accumulation and reduction of loss. 
 
6.3.2  Chapter 3: Contributions to current literature 
This chapter added to the relatively young literature using lab-based transmission 
studies to manipulate learning conditions with the aim to explore which of those 
conditions are the most suitable for supporting cumulative culture. A recent study by 
Lucas et al. (2020) highlighted the benefits of teaching in causally opaque tasks, with 
transmission chains in which cultural parents instructed the cultural offspring 
198 
 
accumulating information much faster than conditions of individual learning. However, 
this study, and its notable predecessors (Caldwell & Millen, 2009; Zwirner & Thornton, 
2015) focused primarily on teaching as a general benefit, rather than the specific 
actions of the teacher that produce this benefit, which meant that teaching conditions 
often resulted in a higher volume of information being transmitted between 
participants. Therefore, we extended this literature by controlling for the volume of 
transmitted information, which allowed a direct comparison of intentional teaching 
versus inadvertent transmissions.  
Our findings suggested that there are some conditions in which intentional knowledge 
sharing facilitates cumulative cultural evolution, however we still weren’t certain that 
the apparently strategic choices made by cultural parents could have occurred due to a 
sophisticated understanding of the cultural offspring’s mental state, or for some other 
reason (e.g., inherent preference for selecting central tiles, and for selecting hits over 
misses, which could have still facilitated learning in spite of not being designed for that 
purpose).  
 
6.3.3  Summary of Chapter 4 
In Chapter 3, adults’ ability, as a cultural parent, to transmit limited information that 
facilitated the performance of a cultural offspring was attributed to their complex 
understanding of the cultural offspring’s knowledge state. As such, cultural parents 
selected information for transmission that would be particularly beneficial to a naïve 
cultural offspring; however, the role of advanced cognition in this task was largely 
speculative. Chapter 4 aimed to extend this finding, particularly to investigate the age at 
which this beneficial information transmission began to emerge. The results of this task 
in a child sample can therefore be used as a means of determining whether this effect 
might be linked to cognitive capacities that develop in humans at a young age, such as 
advances in mental state understanding. Such a finding would bolster the theory that 
this is distinctively human. 
In the existing literature, children’s teaching behaviour is generally found to show age-
related changes in line with the emergence of mental state understanding (Ronfard & 
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Corriveau, 2016; Wood et al., 1995; Ziv et al., 2016). As such, we decided that extending 
the methodology used in Chapter 3 to a sample of children would provide an important 
insight into whether this method could capture an age-related increase in cumulative 
culture. This chapter therefore aimed to support the idea that cumulative culture is 
distinctively human and relies on capacities that develop in early childhood.  
We used a paradigm adapted from the one that was used in Chapter 3 to test a large 
sample of children aged 5 to 10 years old. Minor methodological edits were made to 
minimise the difficulties associated with testing children of multiple age groups.  
We found a very clear developmental trajectory for the emergence of the transmission 
preferences, and resulting accumulation, observed in the adults. Chains of younger 
children produced no accumulation in any condition, whereas chains of older children 
produced a pattern of results that mirrored that of the adults in Chapter 3. This result 
supported the speculative interpretation of the data from Chapter 3, that the ability to 
exhibit distinctively human cumulative culture is likely to be connected with the 
emergence of mental state understanding.  
Additionally, while all age groups had a significant bias for transmitting information 
about target grid squares compared with non-target grid squares, only children in the 
older age categories had a significant preference for transmitting the central target 
segment over any other target segment, and this preference increased further between 
the 7- to 8-year-olds and the 9- to 10-year-olds. This supports the theory that specific 
selections made by adults were driven by some insight into their value to a potential 
learner. Cultural parents made selections specifically tailored to the needs of the 
cultural offspring, and it is likely that they did this using a sophisticated understanding 
of the cultural offspring’s knowledge state.  
 
6.3.4  Chapter 4: Contributions to current literature 
In the current literature, there is a very limited pool of transmission chain studies that 
involve child participants, and those that do (e.g., Reindl & Tennie (2018), chains of 4- 
to 6-year-olds) find no evidence that children can improve (additively) on an earlier 
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generation’s example using chain designs. The study in this chapter not only 
successfully identified cumulative culture in children, but also found a clear 
developmental trajectory of the capacity to utilise intentional information from a 
cultural parent to increase cumulative culture. This suggests that children are not able 
to accumulate information over generations prior to the development of cognitive 
capacities known to emerge at around 4 years of age. Given that children were only 
able to accumulate information from full cultural parent performance at 7 years of age, 
this suggests that these capacities have to be somewhat established before they 
become effective enough to facilitate cumulative culture.  
 
6.3.5  Concluding summary of Chapters 3 and 4 
Together, the studies conducted in Chapters 3 and 4 lend great support to the current 
literature of both mental state understanding and cumulative culture. We not only 
established a methodology to assess conditions under which cumulative culture can 
occur, but used this to capture circumstances in which restricting the use of 
distinctively human cognitive capacities at an individual level reduces the ability to 
accumulate information over generations at the population level. We bolstered this 
finding by capturing a developmental trajectory whereby downward transmissions of 
full cultural parent performance facilitated cumulative culture at 7 to 8 years of age. 
However, adult-like accumulation, whereby transmission of a small subset of 
intentionally produced information is able to facilitate cumulative culture as efficiently 
as full information, only emerged in chains of 9- to 10-year-olds. While these results 
support the role of distinctively human mechanisms in cumulative culture, they do not 
specifically isolate mental state understanding, and so to conclude that a fully 
developed and sophisticated mental state understanding facilitates cumulative cultural 
evolution based on a correlation with age, would be very speculative. In Chapter 4, we 
did attempt to employ a test of mental state understanding with children, with the 
hopes of supporting the role of mental state understanding further. However, due to 
the fragility of the task itself, no clear conclusions could be drawn. Of course it is 
entirely possible that the developmental trajectory found in Chapter 4 could potentially 
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have been caused by any of the suite of cognitive mechanisms that emerge at around 
the same age. In particular, higher orders of mental state understanding and 
perspective taking, both of which are found to develop at around the same age as we 
begin to see adult-like performance in the child task.  
 
6.4  The effect of cultural offspring feedback on cumulative cultural 
evolution in a grid search task  
6.4.1  Summary of Chapter 5 
Because most instances of human teaching involve bidirectional transfer of information 
between cultural offspring and cultural parent (such that the offspring provides 
feedback or asks questions), Chapter 5 extended the results of the previous studies in 
this thesis by exploring the importance of bidirectional knowledge transfer in 
cumulative culture.  
In this study, we preserved only the intentional knowledge transmission condition from 
the cultural parent, because based on the results of Chapter 3, we had established that 
this condition facilitated cumulative culture. Furthermore, manipulating the cultural 
parent’s transmissions using any of the other conditions used previously would not 
allow an assessment of whether feedback from the cultural offspring guides 
transmissions made by the cultural parent. Therefore instead, we manipulated the 
intentionality of upward transmissions – that is, transmissions made from the cultural 
offspring to the cultural parent. We used the similar conditions as in the two preceding 
chapters such that cultural offspring information either consisted of the cultural 
offspring’s full search, or a subset of three of the cultural offspring’s search either 
selected by the offspring or randomly generated. We also included an additional 
condition in which no cultural offspring information was transmitted. This was to 
provide a low-bar baseline on which to compare the other conditions. We hypothesised 
that conditions in which full information, or an intentional subset of information was 
transmitted from cultural offspring to cultural parent would facilitate cumulative 
culture over and above what was possible in unidirectional, or inadvertent feedback, 
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transmission conditions. This chapter therefore aimed to establish whether cultural 
offspring can make effective strategic decisions about what to transmit to the parent 
about their own knowledge, to in turn inform the parent about what information they 
require.  
The methodology for this task was similar to the previous tasks such that they required 
participants to search grids to reveal targets. Selection of target segments amounted to 
an overall score per searched grid, and the increase of this score over generations of 
learners was measured to explore cumulative culture. However, in this task, rather than 
cultural parents giving information to cultural offspring in a single unidirectional 
transmission, three separate (downward) parent transmissions occurred between 
(upward) cultural offspring transmissions, such that cultural parent transmissions were 
made in response to cultural offspring transmissions. The final score for cultural 
offspring grids was collected after their final search, which followed the final 
transmission from the cultural parent.  
The results of this chapter revealed no effect of offspring feedback on cumulative 
culture, with chains in all four conditions showing an equal accumulation over 
generations. Because one of these conditions delivered no feedback from the cultural 
offspring to the cultural parent, we attributed this accumulation to the intentionality of 
the information transmitted from the cultural parent alone, and concluded that the 
design was in fact not sufficiently sensitive to detect an effect of any differences 
between the intentional and inadvertent feedback conditions.  
 
6.4.2  Design limitations in Chapter 5, and suggestions of future study to 
mediate these 
There are several possible reasons why we didn’t find any differences in score increase 
between conditions in this task. The first is that, very simply, cultural offspring feedback 
has absolutely no effect, and that accumulation in this task rests solely on intentional 
information being transmitted from the cultural parent to the cultural offspring. It could 
be possible that there was simply not enough motivation for offspring to tailor their 
transmissions in a way that would help them gain more information. As such, in the 
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discussion of Chapter 5, we made some suggestions for how to adapt this study to 
ensure all information send between dyads held some value.  
It is more likely, however, that an effect was not able to be seen because of task design. 
This was made prominent by the lack of difference between the Full and Null 
transmission conditions, which were expected to reflect opposite extremes, even if it 
was attributable to information volume rather than intentionality. It was suspected that 
this happened because in a lot of cases, the cultural parent’s potential to impart 
beneficial knowledge had reached its maximum well before their final opportunity for 
communication (i.e., through transmitting or receiving information about all of the 
ships they know about).  
In future research, it might be possible to rectify this by altering the parameters of the 
task to reduce the possibility of cultural offspring finding all of the rewards discovered 
by their cultural parent before the cultural parent had completed their downward 
transmissions.  
 
6.5  Benefits of the methodological approach used 
The methodology that we used throughout this thesis opens up possibilities for future 
research in a broad scope. Grid search tasks are beneficial because they can be tightly 
controlled with respect to the information sent between participants. They also allow 
systematic analysis of search biases and transmission biases, and can be applied to 
many different experimental scenarios to explore transmission conditions for 
cumulative culture. The task itself is also very malleable, for example, in the discussion 
of Chapter 5, we proposed a version of the grid search task that would invert the logic 
of the grid search task, such that instead of searching for targets, the object was to 
avoid obstacles, with participants goal being to move one grid square at a time from 
one end of the grid to the other. Such changes to the task design could greatly broaden 
its potential for testing novel hypotheses.  
There are also a lot of practical benefits of using grid search tasks. In Chapter 2, we 
discussed practical limitations of traditional transmission chain designs, which included 
204 
 
recruitment and organisation of participants such that they are able to see the process 
or outcome of the previous participant’s performance to scaffold their own. By using 
computer-based grid search tasks, it’s possible to have multiple chains and conditions 
running at once, because all search data and transmission data can be stored efficiently 
and automatically. For example, in the experimental task used in Chapter 3, we had 
three chains running at any given time, in order to pseudo-randomly assign participants 
to generations. In Chapter 4, we had the additional restriction of age category, 
however, given that there was no limit to the number of chains run consecutively at any 
given time, this was unproblematic. There were slightly more restrictions introduced in 
Chapter 5 given that adjacent members of the same chain had to take part 
simultaneously, however, we were still able to run multiple chains, and so, assess 
multiple transmission conditions at the same time – culminating in the total testing 
time for 243 participants coming out as just under five days.  
Running the task on touch-screen tablets holds the additional benefit of portability. 
Testing sessions can be run using touch screen laptops or tablets in many locations. For 
example, we collected data for Chapter 3 in the University of Stirling and at Glasgow 
science centre, and the data for Chapter 4 was collected from six different Highland 
schools. The data for Chapter 4 is an excellent example of multiple chains running at 
once, because all age groups and conditions were tested in each school – meaning at 
least nine chains were running between schools. While this task design doesn’t 
necessarily get around the issue of large participant pools, it does eliminate any need 
for complex organisation.  
There may be some circumstances in which collecting grid search data does hold a 
benefit for reducing participant numbers. In Chapter 2, we assessed a new 
methodology which used model participant data to create large datasets of behavioural 
responses which could be arranged into chains to assess the potential for ratcheting 
over generations. It is entirely possible that, in some contexts, the data collected in this 
study and future studies like it could be used to assess additional constraints or biases 




6.6  New contributions to the literature that support this research  
There is extensive research focus in mental state understanding, and while this thesis 
gives a current account of the relevant research available at the time, the field is in a 
state of constant development. Research in the field of cumulative culture is relatively 
young, however, the field is getting closer to unravelling the questions around whether 
it is distinctively human, and if so, what capacities humans have that give access to it, or 
restrict it in non-humans. The current thesis adds both to the growing support for 
mental state understanding as a distinctively human mechanism, and as a facilitator of 
uniquely human cumulative culture.  
Since this thesis has been in production, little has changed in the fields of either mental 
state understanding or cumulative culture that would affect the methodology I used, or 
the motivations under which I ran the studies. However there have been some recent 
theoretical advancements that give added weight to the ideas this work was based on. 
Part of the argument for mental state understanding as a distinctively human 
mechanism comes from its late ontogenetic development, however there are a number 
of studies that have claimed to find evidence of mental state understanding using 
indirect behavioural metrics, rather than direct explicit questions (see Chapter 1 for a 
full summary of these). Although non-mentalistic alternative explanations for these 
results span back as far as the original implementation of the studies, over the last few 
years, a number of replications have been attempted, many of which have failed to 
capture the same results using an identical paradigm (Kulke & Rakoczy, 2018). These 
failures cast further doubt on these findings, and thus give greater credence to the view 
that mental state understanding is a late-developing system. This reinforces the 
likelihood that it could be a distinctively human capacity, in line with the rational for the 






6.7  General conclusions 
The main goal of this thesis was to contribute to the existing literature exploring 
distinctively human cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, the aim was to investigate 
whether and how the distinctively human propensity for understanding the mental 
states of others facilitates distinctively human cumulative cultural evolution. Four 
experimental studies were conducted, each employing a novel grid search task to 
assess the benefits for cumulative culture of intentionally produced, over inadvertently 
produced information from a cultural parent. Overall, the studies presented in this 
thesis suggest that intentional downward information transmission can support 
cumulative culture relative to circumstances where only inadvertent information is 
available to a learner. This thesis also supported the idea that the capacity to transmit, 
and potentially make use of, this intentional information increases with age in a similar 
trajectory to higher-order mental state understanding. However, little support was 
found for a further facilitatory effect of cultural offspring feedback. The results of these 
studies together lend support to the theory that cumulative culture is facilitated by 
higher order mental state understanding; which in turn, supports the theory that 
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Following the instruction screen, participants are given 88 grids showing high-precision 
payoff data, each with a blank grid underneath as pictured in the example below.  
232 
 
Demo 1: Before current participant selections 
 
 





After all 88 grids have been completed, participants get an ‘end of block screen and 













Following the instruction screen, participants are given 88 grids showing high-precision 
payoff data, each with a blank grid underneath as pictured in the example below.  
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Demo 3: Before current participant selections 
 
 















Appendix 2:  Risk behaviour scale used in Chapter 2  
This questionnaire was adapter from (Weber et al., 2002) 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in 
each activity or behaviour.  
Provide a rating from 1 to 5 using the following scale: 





Unlikely Not sure Likely Very likely 
 
1. Admitting that your tastes are different to your friend’s. ____ 
2. Going camping in the wilderness, beyond the civilization of a campground. ____ 
3. Betting a day’s income at the horse races. ____ 
4. Buying an illegal drug for your own use. ____ 
5. Cheating on an exam. ____ 
6. Chasing a tornado or hurricane by car to take dramatic photos. ____ 
7. Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund. ____ 
8. Consuming five or more servings of alcohol in a single evening. ____ 
9. Cheating by a significant amount on your income tax return. ____ 
10. Disagreeing with your father on a major issue. ____ 
11. Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game. ____ 
12. Having an affair with a married man or woman. ____ 
13. Forging someone’s signature. ____ 
14. Passing off somebody else’s work as your own. ____ 




16. Arguing with a friend about an issue on which he or she has a very different 
opinion. ____ 
17. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed. ____ 
18. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock. ____ 
19. Approaching your boss to as for a raise. ____ 
20. Illegally copying a piece of software. ____ 
21. Going white water rafting during rapid water flows in the spring. ____ 
22. Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event. ____ 
23. Telling a friend if his or her significant other has made a pass at you. ____ 
24. Investing 5% of your annual income in a conservative stock. ____ 
25. Shoplifting a small item (e.g., lipstick or pen). ____ 
26. Wearing provocative or unconventional clothing on occasion. ____ 
27. Engaging in unprotective sex. ____ 
28. Stealing an additional TV cable connection off the one you pay for. ____ 
29. Not wearing a seatbelt when being a passenger in the front seat. ____ 
30. Investing 10% of your annual income in government bonds. ____ 
31. Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky 
diving). ____ 
32. Not wearing a helmet when riding a motorcycle. ____ 
33. Gambling a week’s income at a casino. ____ 
34. Taking a job that you enjoy over one that is prestigious but less enjoyable. ____ 
35. Defending an unpopular issue that you believe in at a social occasion. ____ 
36. Exposing yourself to the sun without sunscreen. ____ 
37. Trying out bungee jumping at least once. ____ 
38. Piloting your own small plane, if you could. ____ 
39. Walking home alone at night in a somewhat unsafe area of town. ____ 




Appendix 3:  Encouraging prompts for in-task, Chapter 4 
 
GENERAL 
“Remember, you get 1 point for every hit you find, and you lose a life for every miss you 
find!” 
 
“These are some things the last explorer found” 
 
INTENTIONAL ONLY 
“Now you can show 3 of the places you looked to the next explorer – help the next 





















How many Alien Space Ships are hiding in each 
universe? 
 
1           2           3          4  
 
The last explorer has sent you some clues! What 





Space Memory Quiz! 
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Appendix 5:  Stimuli used in the theory of mind test in Chapter 4 (first-
order) 
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Appendix 7:  Full task layout of the battleships task used with the adult 
sample and the child sample.  
This example shows participants completing one grid, however, in the real task, adults 
completed ten and children completed five. 
 
Adult’s Task (Chapter 3) Children’s Task (Chapter 4) 
 




















Chain position 2: 
Instructions were the same as chain position 1, but with additional elements: 
 
  















Chain position 3: 
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Chain position 4: 


























Appendix 8:  Chapter 5 training task layout 
 
Screen 1: Instructions 
This task will give you some practise ready for the real experiment. 
First, you can practice trying to sink ships in a grid. You’ll get 30 lives to sink as many 
ships as possible, and we’ll keep restocking your lives until you sink all the ships. 
In the actual experiment, however, you’ll only have a limited number of lives.  
 
Screen 2: Instructions 
The ships you are looking for are square, taking up 2x2 tiles. On the right of the screen 
you’ll see a tracker of how many you’ve still to find.  
At the top of the screen you’ll see how much time you have remaining to make all of 
your selections. 
 
Screen 3: Instructions 
Grid 1 


























Note. The number of search attempts remaining is shown in the top-left corner, the time 
remaining (number of seconds) is shown above the grid, and the number of targets left to 
find are shown to the right of the grid. The time remaining is an aesthetic feature to 
encourage participants to focus on the task only, and if the time remaining reaches 0 
seconds, the task does not end, and participants can continue to make selections. Every 
time a participant uncovers a target, one of the targets shown to the right of the grid is 
highlighted and remains highlighted until the grid is complete. Participants can click on any 
of the grid squares to uncover whether it is a hit or a miss. Bold lines separating the grid are 















Screen 4: Instructions 
Well done. 
Now we’ll let you know some more details of the experiment 
 
Screen 5: Instructions 
You’ll be doing this experiment at the same time as a partner, and often you’ll have to 
wait for your partner to make some selections before you continue.  
When this happens, you’ll see a waiting screen. You might have to wait a while, but 
please be patient. 
Note. Participants search the grid in sets of 30 selections, so the time remaining, and 
number of lives is refreshed each time. Green pentagons show uncovered hits and red 
circles show uncovered misses.  
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Press continue to see what the waiting screen looks like. It will advance automatically, 
so please don’t use the mouse or keyboard. 
 










Screen 6: Instructions 
At some points in the experiment, you may have the opportunity to help, or ask for 
help, from your partner.  
All of the instructions will be given to you on screen if and when this happens, but the 
next screen will give you a taste of how it works. 
 
Screen 7: Instructions 
Here, your partner is asking you to help them. All the huts and misses you know about 
will be available to you, and you must select one of those to send to your partner to try 
and help them to find more ships. 
To help *you* do that, you may get to find out some of the tiles your partner already 
knows about. If you do, these will be highlighted with a blue border.  
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If anything isn’t clear to you about this next screen, please ask one of the experimenters 




A training grid during a transmission demonstration, before the current participant 















Note. Selections highlighted with dark blue indicate selection that have been sent from a 
communicative partner. The number of selections remaining for the current participant is 
shown to the right of the grid. 
259 
 
A training grid during a transmission demonstration, after the current participant makes 








Note. The selection made by the current participant is highlighted with orange. 
 
Screen 8: Instructions 
Well done. So in the actual experiment the selection you just made would be given to 
your partner to help them. 
 
 








Appendix 9:  Full experimental task layout for Chapter 5 
 
Left column: Brief descriptions when needed. Colour coded by communication – it fits 
with Figure 1. Blue is communication 1, Orange is communication 2 and Red is 
communication 3. 
Centre column: Activity shown on PC screen 1 
Right column: Activity shown on PC screen 2 
 
In this demonstration, participants only search one grid, however in the real task 
participants searched 3. Screenshots with a Red border are showing an active cultural 




 PC 1 PC 2 
 
  
Gen 1 and Gen 2 seated 
  
Gen 1 active search 
begins (searches 4 


















Gen 1 becomes the 
Parent  
 







Gen 2 makes selections 





 PC 1 PC 2 
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from Gen 1 
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from Gen 1 
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Gen 3 makes selections 





 PC 1 PC 2 
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from Gen 2 
  







 PC 1 PC 2 
Gen 3 makes selections 
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from Gen 2 
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Gen 2 makes selections 




Gen 3 shown selections 





 PC 1 PC 2 
Gen 3 searches 
  
Gen 2 retires 
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Gen 4 makes selections 





 PC 1 PC 2 
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 PC 1 PC 2 
Gen 4 makes selections 




Gen 3 makes selections 
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from Gen 3 
  





 PC 1 PC 2 
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Gen 4 shown selections 





 PC 1 PC 2 
Gen 4 searches 
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